School District Efficiency as Measured by the Financial Allocation Study of Texas by Steele, Ryan
SCHOOL DISTRICT EFFICIENCY AS MEASURED BY THE 
FINANCIAL ALLOCATION STUDY OF TEXAS 
 
A Record of Study 
By 
RYAN DAVID STEELE 
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate ?????????????????Studies of  
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
 
DOCTOR OF EDUCATION 
 
 
 
 
Chair of Committee,  Jim Scheurich 
Committee Members,  Judy Sandlin 
    Lori Taylor 
    Mario Torres 
Head of Department,   Frederick Nafukho 
 
 
December 2013 
 
Major Subject: Education Administration 
 
Copyright 2013 Ryan David Steele 
 
 
ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
  The purpose of this record of study was to analyze efficiency in Texas public 
schools through the use of the Financial Allocation Study of Texas (FAST). A 
quantitative analysis of the FAST was conducted using ordered logistic regressions as a 
means of determining which factors contribute to the efficiency. Data from the three 
years of the FAST were used in the analysis. The biggest predictor of efficiency in the 
FAST was the percent of students who were economically disadvantaged. Additionally, 
it was found that larger districts are more efficient than smaller districts. Efficient 
districts spend less overall per pupil in 9 of the 15 functions of spending reported by 
schools and spend less on a variety of programs, including regular education, special 
education, and athletics/cocurricular spending. However, it was found that spending in 
the area of bilingual/ESL increased efficiency. It was also found that districts with high 
property wealth were less efficient overall and that the student/teacher ratio and teacher 
experience was negatively correlated with efficiency. The implications of this research 
include the need for districts wishing to become more efficient to increase the class size 
of classrooms and focus spending on improving the achievement of economically 
disadvantaged students. In addition, districts should focus resources on campus level 
administrators rather than instructional or curriculum specialists.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 The financing of public schools has long been a hotly debated topic and remains 
as complex an issue today as when it began. At a time when 48 of 50 states are 
proposing cuts in their budgets (Leachman, Williams, & Johnson, 2011), state legislators 
in Texas are looking any and everywhere to find ways to cut costs, including public 
education. These budget cuts come at the same time as state assessments on student 
achievement become more rigorous (Ball & Goldman, 1997; Equity Center, 2010). As a 
result, school districts are asked to find ways to be more efficient in their operations in 
order to increase student achievement with less funding. School districts which are able 
to operate efficiently will serve as valuable examples for other districts (Financial 
Allocation Study of Texas, 2010).  
 In order to examine the cost-effectiveness of Texas public schools, the 81st 
Texas Legislative session passed House Bill 3 (HB3) which directed the State 
Comptroller of Texas to “identify school districts and campuses that use resource 
allocation practices that contribute to high academic achievement and cost-effective 
operations.” The result of this mandate is known as the Financial Allocation Study of 
Texas (FAST), which examines the relationship between resource allocation and student 
achievement in a way that no other study ever has. By using the FAST as a framework to 
study efficiency, Texas educators and law makers are able to compare both school 
districts and campuses to determine which get the biggest bang for their buck.  
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For public schools in Texas to become more efficient, it is important to know which 
schools are rated as highly efficient and to examine what those schools do in order to be 
rated as efficient. Therefore, this study intends to explore what the trends are for district 
resource allocation across the 5 different ratings of the FAST in order make 
recommendations for schools to become more efficient. 
Statement of the Problem  
 Despite roughly 40 years of litigation and reform, Texas continues to struggle 
with the creation of a funding mechanism which meets the requirements of Article 7, 
Section 1, of the Texas Constitution, which states: “it shall be the duty of the Legislature 
of the State to establish and make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of 
an efficient system of public free schools.”  The long history of legal challenges in Texas 
has resulted in both major and minor changes in the funding mechanism (Imazecki & 
Reschovsky, 2006). While this funding mechanism has often included triggers intended 
to create wealth neutrality (Imazecki & Reschovsky,  2004) or equalize revenue between 
property rich and property poor districts (Imazeki & Reschovsky, 2006), the continued 
efforts to reform school finance in Texas speaks to the persistent failure of the funding 
mechanism to accomplish its goals. One of the causes for the seemingly endless effort 
the state governments—both in Texas and across the nation—to reform public school 
finance is that “states frequently rely on lawyers rather than economists, so that the 
mechanisms are manifestations of the legal rhetoric of equalizations rather than the 
economic logic about taxation and redistribution” (Hoxby, 2001, p. 1190). Hoxby 
continues to argue that the results of this type of planning is that funding mechanisms 
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often fail to produce their desired results and end up as  trial-and-error systems of school 
finance. 
 Highlighting the need for efficiency in schools are several factors which 
negatively impact the current state of school finance in Texas. The first factor which 
negatively impacts school finance in Texas is a structural deficit in tax revenue for 
public schools created by House Bill 1 (HB1) in the 3rd called special session of the 
79th Texas Legislature in 2006. As explained by State Representative Jim Dunnam, 
(2009):  
In a special session in 2006, the Texas Legislature cut property taxes by 
$14.2 billion and passed a revenue package, including a revised franchise 
tax, to help pay for the cuts. The revised franchise tax is estimated to 
produce substantially less than projected, and the “revenue neutral tax 
swap” passed in 2006 is now projected to create a gap in excess of $8 
billion in the budget. This structural deficit is said to be regardless of the 
economic downturn; that is, it is “structural” within our Texas tax system, 
and cannot be cured without major overhaul. (9) 
This structural deficit creates, and will continue to create in the future, the need for 
Texas public schools to be more efficient in their operations due to the continued 
shortfall in revenues that will occur in the foreseeable future.  
 Another factor which negatively impacts school districts is the fact that, in 
addition to the revenue shortfall created by the tax structure, the population of students 
in Texas continues to grow at rapid pace, especially low-income, Latino students 
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(Murphy, 2003).  This trend is especially concerning because poor districts, who are 
largely composed of students of color, are often the ones most detrimentally affected by 
legislative appropriation (Alemán, 2006). Because the population of students is growing, 
school districts must hire new faculty, provide more instructional materials, and build 
facilities in order to keep up with the growth.  
 Another contributor which exacerbates the budget shortfall in Texas public 
schools is the current trend of the depletion of local fund balances in order to avoid 
budget deficits. According to the Equity Center (2010), in 2007-08 and 2008-09 
approximately “40% of Texas districts spent more than $1.1 billion from their [local] 
fund balances in order to avoid budget deficits” (42). The Texas Associations of School 
Boards (2011) notes that over 50% of school districts used fund balance in 2009-2010 to 
balance their budgets. Fund balances are designed to serve as a means to cover cash flow 
deficits and to create a financial cushion to meet unexpected expenses and emergencies. 
As these fund balances are depleted, it will become impossible for school districts to 
cover the shortfalls in their budgets.  
 While State Representative Dunnam (2009) spoke of the roughly $8 billion 
deficit that the Texas Legislature would have to address during the 2010-2011 fiscal 
biennium, his concern for the structural deficit seems almost prophetic because today the 
state of Texas faces a $27 billion dollar shortfall in revenue for the 2012-2013 biennium 
(Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, 2011). According to Harrison (2010), this 
shortfall can be attributed to a nearly $2 billion shortfall in sales tax, the population 
growth in Texas, and the use of approximately $6 billion in Federal stimulus funds that 
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were used in 2009-2010 to balance the budget. At this point, it is unknown whether the 
changes made in the 83rd Texas Legislative session will adequately address the funding 
concerns of public school advocates, the continued threat of budget shortfalls due to the 
structural deficit make paramount the need for efficiency in public schools amongst 
educational leaders in Texas.  
All of these factors play an important role in the need for Texas school districts 
to become more efficient. However, the multitude of methods used by scholars and 
researchers to study school finance can result in vast differences in the findings of the 
researchers (Gronberg, Jansen, & Taylor, 2011), which might hinder the ability of 
educational leaders to know how to become more efficient. Though some (Hanushek, 
2005) cite a multitude of problems relating to the ambiguity of terms and the interpretive 
issues in students, as well as the fact that these studies are funded by special interest 
advocacy groups, as the source of such discrepancies, others (Duncombe, 2006) simply 
believe that such studies must refine their methods in order to increase interrater 
reliability and validity. Whatever the cause of the inconsistency in research studies, it is 
important for researchers to use a framework which will help educational leaders make 
decisions to increase their efficiency.  
Purpose of the Study  
With the advent of the Financial Allocation Study of Texas (FAST), educational 
leaders in Texas now have a framework with which to view efficiency in Texas school 
districts and campuses. As part of its design, the FAST rated each school district and 
campus in Texas in their ability to produce academic gains in achievement in relation to 
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their economic expenditures, i.e. schools with high academic achievement with low 
expenditures were rated higher than schools which produced the same level of 
achievement with high expenditures. As such, the purpose of this record of study is to 
use the FAST as a lens through which to study efficiency in Texas in order to determine 
which aspects of school spending produce the most efficient schools.  
It is the objective of this study to identify several spending patterns within 
districts which might serve as a predictor for efficiency. First of all, this study seeks to 
identify spending patterns across each of the 5 rating levels in the FAST which 
contributed to the school district receiving its current rating. In order for educational 
leaders to better understand how their district earned its rating, it would be beneficial to 
them to see the spending patterns of districts at each of the 5 rating levels. Second, this 
study will attempt to determine whether a district’s resource allocation can be used as a 
predictive measure in its rating according to the FAST. By identifying the trends in 
spending across the district level, it becomes easier for educational leaders to focus their 
spending on areas which produce the greatest efficiency. 
Next, this study will compare efficient districts with less efficient district in 
regards to their resource allocation. While some of the spending patterns may be the 
same across several rating levels, a comparison of efficient versus inefficient districts 
will enable educational leaders to better evaluate how their spending compares to other, 
more efficient districts.  
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Research Questions 
 The following research questions were established in order to fulfill the purpose 
of this study: 
1. Based on the FAST study, what are the spending patterns of school districts at 
each of the 5 rating levels of the FAST? 
2. Does the district’s allocation of resources predict the district’s efficiency as 
measured by the FAST?  
3. How do efficient districts compare in their resource allocation across the function 
and program versus less efficient districts? 
4. Do other factors—district size, property wealth, administrative costs, teacher 
experience, student/teacher ratio, cocurricular spending—explain differences in 
the FAST measure of efficiency? 
Significance of the Study 
 This study is significant because it is the first to use the FAST as a framework for 
studying efficiency in schools in Texas. As noted previously, researchers have used 
many different types of methodologies to study school efficiency, yet to this point “there 
is a lack of an established ‘consensus’ theory from which appropriate models can be 
constructed” (Vignoles et. al., 2000). Due to the fact that the FAST was created by the 
State Comptroller of Texas as a response to a legislative mandate and the fact that FAST 
is a highly publicized study which rates every district and campus in Texas, it is 
important for practicing administrators in Texas public schools to develop a greater 
understanding of the efficiency patterns shown by the FAST data. As important, the data 
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used in the FAST is used to evaluate both campus and district level spending. While this 
study will not attempt to evaluate the spending patterns at the campus level (See 
Limitations of the Study), it is hoped that this study will provide insight as to how 
efficient districts use their district resource allocation to increase their efficiency. Again, 
this information is significant for practicing school administrators because they will be 
able to use the examples set by efficient districts to pattern the spending in their own 
districts.  
Limitations of the Study 
 When conducting a research study, it is important for the researcher to consider 
any limitations that might be inherent to the study and address those limitations. To 
begin, this study will not attempt to complete analyses of expenditures at the campus 
level data. As the FAST (2010) notes, financial reporting to the Texas Education Agency 
varies by district. Districts can choose to allocate certain expenditures, i.e. multi-campus 
teachers, to specific campuses while others do not. This is also true with the campus 
level coding of expenditures. While one campus might code an expense as instruction, 
another campus might code the same expense as student support services. The coding of 
expenditures varies from district-to-district and even campus-to-campus within a district. 
Therefore, it is impossible to be able to truly analyze campus level expenditures to 
determine which expenditures have a predictive value.  
 Another limitation in this study is in how the FAST study measures the 
expenditures of districts which might serve as the fiscal agent for inter-district 
cooperatives. For example, many small or rural districts participate in a special 
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education cooperative or transportation to share and reduce the cost of these services in 
their budget. While there is an assumption that each district pays for their own costs 
associated with these services, the fiscal agent must report the cost of the cooperative as 
part of their local expenses, therefore artificially inflating the expenditures of the 
districts. Despite attempts by the researchers involved with the FAST study, during the 
first year of the study there was no practical way to account for what was a true 
expenditure of the district versus what was expenditure for the cooperative. Where 
expenditures could not be attributed to an individual member district of the cooperative, 
those costs were automatically accrued to the fiscal agent. During the final two years of 
the study, researchers were able to differentiate between cooperative costs and individual 
member district costs but were dependent on the fiscal agent of the cooperative to 
accurately report cooperative expenditures.  
Definition of Terms 
 Adequacy – The amount of money that a school must spend to achieve a given 
level of student performance (Reschovsky & Imazeki, 1997).  
 Efficiency – Efficiency in schools is generally defined as either a production 
efficiency measure—the maximum amount of output that can be produced from a given 
quantity of inputs (Schwartz & Stiefel, 2001)—or as a cost efficiency measure—the 
minimum amount of inputs needed to produce a given quantity of output (Haelermans, 
De Witte, & Blank, 2012). For the purpose of this study, efficiency will be defined as the 
cost efficiency of school districts and charter schools.  
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 Equity – The concept that one district or school receives the same or similar 
amounts of revenue as another, usually in the same district or state (Clune, 1994).  
Organization of the Study  
 Chapter I presents an overview of the record of study. Chapter I underscores the 
need for the study, provides the purpose, and gives the research questions to be 
addressed. Chapter II provides a review of the current literature, beginning with the 
history of finance litigation in Texas and the evolution of school finance from equity to 
adequacy to efficiency. Chapter II continues by describing the methodology and the 
justification for the use of the Financial Allocation Study of Texas (FAST) as a 
framework for studying school efficiency. Chapter III provides a description of the 
methods used in the study. Chapter IV contains the findings of the research study. 
Finally, Chapter V provides a summary of the research and offers recommendations and 
implications for future studies. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Introduction 
 Chapter II contains a brief review of the literature regarding school finance in 
Texas and school finance efficiency. The chapter begins with a brief history of school 
finance in Texas and how litigation and court rulings have changed the funding 
mechanism through the years. Following the review of Texas school finance cases, there 
will be a summary of current literature regarding the concept of school efficiency, 
including an explanation of how efficiency is measured and the importance of being 
efficient in expenditures. There will be a review of the Financial Allocation Study of 
Texas (FAST) which will include an overview of its methodology and the justification 
for its use as a framework for studying efficiency in Texas. Finally, a review of the 
current research regarding the best practices for school efficiency.  
History of School Funding and Litigation in Texas 
The first significant law to create school funding reform in Texas was known as 
the Gilmer-Aikens Act of 1949 (Alemán, 2007; Kuehlem, 2004; San Antonio v. 
Rodriguez, 1973). Prior to this act, school districts were almost entirely dependent on 
local property taxation to generate revenue and received very little, if any, funds from 
the state for public education. Seizing upon the economic boon and changing 
demographics that followed World War II and the Baby Boom Generation, the Texas 
legislature took the unprecedented step of scrutinizing public schools and making major 
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educational reforms, including studying the efficiency of public school finance. As a 
result of Gilmer-Aikins, several reforms were made, including: 
1. Transforming the State Department of Education to the Texas Education Agency 
(TEA), which enabled the state to guide the development of a more effective 
educational program while maintaining local control  
2. Changing the State School Board from a 9 member panel appointed by the 
governor to a 21 member panel elected by popular vote 
3. Created a State Commissioner of Education who was appointed by the State 
Board of Education 
4. Developed a new Minimum Foundation Program of school funding to assist the 
low economic areas to maintain a higher standard of school services and funded 
schools based on their Average Daily Attendance (ADA)  
5. Established minimum standards for teacher education and certification, requiring 
all high school teachers to have a baccalaureate degree 
6. Set a minimum salary scale for teachers 
Coupled with the National Defense of Education Act of 1958, a response to the Soviet 
threat after the launching of Sputnik I, the Gilmer-Aikins Act opened the door for the 
increased role of state dollars into the public education funding system and helped shape 
the current system of funding in Texas.  
 Despite its measures to for equity and its attempt to increase efficiency, the 
Gilmer-Aikins Act was unable to fundamentally change the way schools were funded 
(Alemán, 2007; Walker & Casey, 1996). According to Alemán (2007), “districts 
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continued to generate school operational and maintenance funds primarily through local 
property taxes. The state system was ‘unequalized’ and the varied property values across 
the state resulted in wide disparities in local school funding” (p. 534). Hardest hit among 
districts were those which had student population that was majority-Mexican American. 
Despite recommendations from several statewide commissions appointed by the 
governor to include a method to equalize funding, the state legislature refused to act. The 
failure to act by the legislature left those wishing to see meaningful changes in the 
school funding mechanism little choice but to pursue legal action in hopes of initiating 
change.  
San Antonio ISD vs. Rodriguez 
While there have been numerous cases, two of the earliest and most influential 
lawsuits are San Antonio ISD v. Rodriguez, filed in 1969, and a series of lawsuits 
collectively known as Edgewood v. Kirby, which was originally filed in 1984 (Dawn, 
1999; Walsh, Kimerer, & Manitis, 2005). San Antonio ISD v. Rodriguez was a federal 
case where plaintiffs argued that the system of educational finance in Texas was in 
violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Incidentally, 
Valencia (2002) notes that the Rodriguez case was “unique in that it is the first, and 
only, case of school finance equity to be adjudicated before the United States Supreme 
Court” (pp. 12-13).  
During the case, members of the Edgewood Concerned Parent Association 
representing their children and other similar children claimed that the school finance 
system in place, which allowed districts to provide enrichment to students based on their 
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local tax rate beyond the Minimum Foundation Program (MFP) provided by the state, 
created inequities due to the vast differences in property value from district to district. 
While property-wealthy districts could provide considerably more enrichments at 
considerably lower tax rates, property-poor districts were languishing behind in 
facilities, materials, and overall ability to pay for education. In its argument, Edgewood 
ISD was compared to Alamo Heights ISD, an affluent suburb of San Antonio which 
bordered Edgewood. At the time, Alamo Heights ISD was able to raise an additional 
enrichment of $333 per student above the MFP provided by the state at a tax rate of 
$0.85 per $100 valuation of property. On the other hand, Edgewood ISD was only able 
to provide an additional enrichment of $26 per student while taxing at a rate of $1.05 per 
$100 of valuation. Similar differences could be found throughout the state of Texas. 
Because of the immense differences in the value of property between property-wealthy 
and property-poor districts, wealthy districts were able to raise much more money for 
their students’ education at a far lower rate (Walsh, Kemerer, & Maniotis, 2005).  
A three judge panel agreed with Edgewood parents and ruled that the system of 
school finance in Texas did, in fact, violate the equal protection clause. However, in a 5-
4 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the lower court’s ruling while stating the 
finance system “did not deprive anyone of a fundamental constitutional right, and did 
not discriminate against any particular group in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
equal protection clause” (Walsh, Kemerer, & Maniotis, 2005, p. 35). The Supreme Court 
noted that the school finance system in Texas, while not perfect, did have some 
measures which helped alleviate the discrepancies in the finance system. Despite these 
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measures, the Court implored the Texas Legislature to develop a school finance system 
to end the glaring differences between property rich and poor districts. (Cardenas, 1992; 
Dawn, 1999; Walker, 1990; Walsh, Kimerer, & Maniotis, 2005). 
Rather than creating a fundamental change in the way schools were financed, the 
Legislature began to restructure the system with a patchwork of laws and regulations, 
each time failing to allocate adequate funds to correct the system (Walker & Casey, 
1992; Walsh, Kimerer, & Maniotis, 2005). The largest of the laws passed by the 
Legislature in an attempt to end the inequity issues of school finance was House Bill 72 
(HB72) in the summer of 1984. The intent of HB72 was to create mechanisms which 
fostered equalization through the creation of a basic allotment for each student in the 
state. However, the significant flaws and inequities in the system remained and, in fact, 
increased.  
The Edgewood Cases 
While San Antonio ISD v. Rodriguez was unsuccessful, Edgewood v. Kirby 
became the catalyst for school finance reform in Texas that is still underway today 
(Bingham & Jackson, 2005; Walsh, Kimerer, & Maniotis, 2005). While the Rodriguez 
case attempted to use federal law to as an impetus of change, Edgewood v. Kirby 
attacked the school finance system at the state level. In Edgewood, the plaintiffs argued 
that the system of school finance in Texas failed to provide an equitable and efficient 
system of as required by the Texas Constitution. A key component of the Edgewood 
argument was that school district boundaries were drawn in a way that created vastly 
unequal amounts of property wealth that varied widely from district to district. These 
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boundary drawings created huge discrepancies in the amount of money that could be 
raised through the use of local taxes from district to district and created an inefficient 
system of funding. In Edgewood, efficiency was interpreted to mean both the proper 
distribution of money to secure the best education and the conservation of education 
resources (Walker, 1991). A critical source of inefficiency, as argued by the plaintiff and 
affirmed by the court, was that district boundaries created areas of highly unequal 
property wealth. 
Another major component of the plaintiff’s case sought to establish that the 
system of school finance in Texas was discriminatory towards pupils, particularly 
Mexican-American students, living in property poor districts. As Alemán (2006) notes, 
“poor school districts, which largely are composed of poor people of color, 
are…affected most detrimentally by the funding system” (p. 114). Lawyers from the 
Mexican American Legal and Education Fund (MALDEF) and the Equity Center, a non-
profit organization which analyzes school finance issues, worked together with the 
leadership of Edgewood ISD to argue the case. While MALDEF promoted a race-based 
argument for the inequities in school finance, the Equity Center focused on a wealth-
based discrimination legal argument (Alemán, 2007; Dawn, 1999; Farr & Trachtenberg, 
1999). Both the MALDEF and Equity Center argued that the inequities of the school 
finance system in Texas failed to meet the equal protection under the laws guaranteed by 
the Texas Constitution. 
In 1987, the state district court in Travis County declared the existing system of 
school finance unconstitutional (Dawn, 1999; Walker, 1991; Walsh, Kimerer, and 
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Maniotis, 2005). The judge cited the Article 3, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution that 
provides, in part, that all free men have equal rights. The judge gave the state legislature 
until September 1, 1989 to enact a constitutional finance system. Immediately, state 
official appealed the ruling of the district court to the Court of Appeals, where, citing 
precedent established in the San Antonio ISD v. Rodriguez case, it was ruled that 
education was not a fundamental right provided by the Texas constitution and the Texas 
school finance system should not be subject to strict scrutiny analysis. The Court of 
Appeals also determined that reliance on local property tax was rational and was 
necessary to provide local control of the public schools.  
Edgewood v. Kirby eventually made its way to the Texas Supreme Court, which 
overturned the ruling of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the decision of the district 
court (Addonzio, 1992; Dawn, 1999; Walsh, Kimerer, and Maniotis, 2005). The court 
noted that if a system of finance is not efficient or suitable the legislature has not 
fulfilled its constitutional duty. Therefore, the Texas Supreme Court mandated the 
legislature to correct the inefficiencies in the finance system by May 1, 1990. In the 
ruling, the Court made the observation: 
Efficiency does not require a per capita distribution, but it also does not 
allow concentration of resource in property-rich school districts that are 
taxing low when property-poor districts that are taxing high cannot 
generate sufficient revenues to meet even minimum standards. There must 
be a direct and close correlation to it, in other words, districts must have 
substantially equal access to similar revenues per pupil at a similar level of 
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tax effort…Certainly, this much is required if the state is to educate its 
population efficiently and provide for a general diffusion of knowledge 
statewide (Walsh, Kimerer, & Maniotis, 2005, p. 36) 
It is important to note, however, that the Texas Supreme Court based its decision 
entirely on the ‘efficiency’1 of the state funding system and not the ‘inequity’ of the 
system (Addonzio, 1992; Walker, 1991; Walsh, Kimerer, and Maniotis, 2005). In fact, 
the Texas Supreme Court took steps to avoid ruling on the equal protection analysis used 
by the lower courts. Instead, the Court ruled that school finance system where property-
poor districts end up with less revenue despite taxing at higher levels is inherently 
inefficient. The Court then cited an “implicit link between efficiency and equality” 
(Edgewood v. Kirby, 1989), meaning that it was impossible for an inefficient funding 
system to be equitable. Since the Court had already ruled the finance system was 
inefficient, it did not render a decision on whether or not the state finance system was, in 
fact, inequitable (Walsh, Kimerer, & Maniotis, 2005). 
 Another important ruling made by the Texas Supreme Court in the original 
Edgewood case was the Supreme Court’s decision to lessen the impact of the district 
court’s ruling that districts must be able to raise revenue at the same rate (Addonzio, 
1992; Walker, 1991). Instead, the Supreme Court pointed out that an efficient system of 
finance “does not preclude the ability of communities to exercise local control over the 
education of their children” (Walker, 1990, p. 10). The Court ruled that tax revenues at 
                                                 
1 Efficiency, as defined by the Texas Supreme Court in this case, relates to the ability of a district to 
generate revenue with a similar taxing effort as other districts. This definition of efficiency is different 
than the definition used in this study and a majority of education literature.  
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any given rate need only be “substantially equal” between districts. This clause in the 
ruling is important because it gave the legislature more latitude in developing a finance 
system, and the highly ambiguous phrase opened the door for continued inequities by 
not answering the question as to whether local taxes would be matched by the state 
through an equalizing formula (Addonzio, 1992).  
 Facing a deadline to create a school finance system that was constitutional, the 
Texas Legislature struggled to develop a new plan for school finance. Their solution, 
Senate Bill 1 (SB 1), was passed in the summer of 1990 and soon found its way back to 
the Texas Supreme Court (Addonzio, 1992; Hobby & Walker, 1991; Walsh, Kimerer, & 
Maniotis, 2005). In the case that became known as Edgewood II, the district court held 
that the modifications to the finance system remained unconstitutional and therefore 
invalid. The Texas Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the district court by citing the 
statute failed to rectify the opportunity gaps between property rich and poor districts. 
The Court chided that SB1: 
Leaves essentially intact the same funding system with the same 
deficiencies [the court] reviewed in Edgewood I…The fundamental flaw 
in Senate Bill 1 lies not in any particular provisions but in its overall 
failure to restructure the system. (Edgewood v. Kirby II, p. 495) 
After the Edgewood II case, the Court became more explicit in its directions to the 
Legislature. The Court suggested that systematic change could occur by consolidating 
tax bases through the consolidation of school districts into 188 county districts to levy, 
collect, and distribute property taxes, thus removing administrative waste by eliminating 
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duplicate positions and eliminating interdistrict disparities (Addonzio, 1992; Walsh, 
Kimerer, & Maniotis, 2005).  
 With the threat of consolidation looming, the Carrollton-Farmers Branch 
Independent School District (CFBISD) successfully sued the Edgewood Independent 
School District in a case that came to be known as Edgewood III (Addonzio, 1992; 
Walsh, Kimerer, & Maniotis, 2005). The argument made by CFBISD was that a county 
school district violated constitutional provisions requiring voter approval of property 
taxes and the prohibition of a state property tax. The Supreme Court essentially ruled 
against its own recommendations by affirming that a county district created a statewide 
property tax. As explained by Walsh, Kimerer, & Maniotis (2005), “now expressing 
considerable frustration and uncertainty, the Texas Legislature opted to let the voters 
have a chance to pass a constitutional amendment upholding the [county district] 
plan…The voters rejected the measure” (p. 38).  
 With a new impending deadline following the Edgewood III decision, the 
legislature passed into law Senate Bill 7 in 1993, the fourth school finance bill in just 
over 8 years (Alemán, 2006; Alemán, 2007; Dawn, 1999; Walsh, Kimerer, & Maniotis, 
2005). The objective of SB7 was to comply with the Supreme Court’s mandate for 
substantially equal levels of revenue per pupil at similar levels of taxes. SB7 provided a 
multi-tiered approach to school finance with four tiers.  
1. Per-capita allotment: a per pupil grant of money given to each district regardless 
of the level of wealth of the district 
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2. Tier 1: provided an allotment of $2,300 per student to all districts whose tax rate 
is set at $.86 or higher. The state pays for the difference between the basic 
allotment and revenue collected locally (i.e., a district that collects $1,500 per 
student in local taxes would receive an additional $800 per student from the 
state) 
3. Tier 2: allowed for a guaranteed amount of money for property poor districts that 
choose to tax above the $.86 required tax rate from Tier 1. The state guarantees a 
minimum amount of revenue per weighted average daily attendance for every 
penny of tax rate. 
4. Tier 3: allowed districts to levy additional taxes from the local tax rates to 
supplement the costs of programs. It also set a maximum tax rate for 
maintenance and operations (M&O) at $1.50 and $.50 for debt services (I&S). 
However, the most revolutionary aspect of SB7 was that districts with a wealth level 
above $280,000 per pupil were subject to an Equalized Wealth Level, or recapture of 
their funds, from the state. The statute was quickly termed ‘Robin Hood’ because of its 
purported ability to pull funds from the rich districts to reroute the funds to poor 
districts. Also, provisions were placed in the statue through a weighted pupil approach 
and for the varying costs of local economic conditions known as the Cost of Education 
Index.  
 Once again, it did not take long for SB7 to end up in litigation over its 
constitutionality. Soon after the bill was passed a variety of districts, both property 
wealthy and property poor, argued that the finance system was once again 
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unconstitutional (Dawn, 1999; Walsh, Kimerer, & Maniotis, 2005). Despite evidence 
that showed inequities in the system, Edgewood ISD v. Meno (Edgewood IV) was ruled 
to be constitutional by the district court and upheld by the Supreme Court. The only 
aspect of the finance system that the Supreme Court deemed unacceptable was the 
funding of facilities. A major addition to SB7 was added to address the deficiencies 
found by the Court. These additions, known as Instructional Facilities Allotment (IFA) 
and Existing Debt Allotment (EDA), were intended to help districts build and maintain 
facilities which aid in the “general diffusion of knowledge” required by Texas 
Constitution. Currently under the IFA and EDA program, districts whose local property 
wealth fails to meet the cost of funding school facilities can receive state assistance 
based on need until the funds allocated in the IFA and EDA program (roughly $170 
million) are expended. Once expended, those funds are no longer available to schools.  
West Orange-Cove Consolidated ISD v. Neely 
The provisions under SB7 remained intact until the Supreme Court once again 
began hearing cases in 2003 (Faltys, 2006; Robertson, 2005; Walsh, Kimerer, and 
Maniotis 2005). The case, known as West Orange-Cove Consolidated ISD v. Neely, 
involved more than 300 school districts who sued arguing that they had lost meaningful 
discretion in the setting of their local tax rate. By that time, a majority of districts (70%) 
had a tax rate of between $1.46 and $1.50 per $100 valuation. Districts argued that they 
were neither able to raise their tax rate due to the cap set forth in SB7 and were unable to 
deal with inflation or other uncontrollable costs. The tax rate was no longer being used 
as a means to supplement the education of students and instead became necessary for 
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schools to fund the most basic of programs. Districts argued that the tax rate constituted 
an unconstitutional state property tax because districts were forced to tax at this rate in 
order to provide an education to students. As a result, the $1.50 per $100 of valuation 
became both the floor and ceiling, thus eliminating any local discretion.  
In 2004, District Court Judge John Dietz ruled in favor of the plaintiffs that the 
finance system in SB7 was an unconstitutional system of finance (Faltys, 2006; 
Robertson, 2005; Walsh, Kimerer, and Maniotis 2005). In his decision, Judge Dietz 
“ruled that the costs of meeting the constitutional mandate of adequacy exceeds the 
maximum amount of available revenue to schools, that many schools were forced to tax 
at $1.50 per $100 valuation which constitutes a statewide property tax, which is 
prohibited under the Texas constitution, and finally, that the State’s school finance 
system is not financially efficient” (Robertson, 2005, p. 1). Judge Dietz set a deadline of 
September 15, 2005 for the Texas Legislature to develop a system of finance that was 
constitutional. 
The case was immediately appealed to the Texas Supreme Court, where it affirmed 
in part and reversed in part the decision of the lower court by a vote of 7-1 (Faltys, 2006; 
Intercultural Development Research Association website, 2008). The Court did deem the 
$1.50 per $100 valuation cap set by SB7 as a de facto state property tax, which is 
unconstitutional according to the Texas Constitution. However, the Court disagreed with 
the lower court regarding several of the key components of the argument by the plaintiff. 
In its decision, the Texas Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the lower court when it: 
- Deemed the level of funding for schools as adequate;  
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- Recognized that there was a disparity between rich and poor districts but did not 
deem the disparity as big enough to be unconstitutional; and 
- Suggested consolidation of smaller school districts to increase fiscal efficiency. 
The Court also recognized that the funding gap between property wealthy and property 
poor districts continued to create inequities in the funding of facilities. While admitting 
that property poor districts were unable to provide adequate facilities, the Texas 
Supreme Court would not rule that the funding system was inequitable or 
unconstitutional on those grounds; however, the Court did not rule out the possibility 
that it may do so in the future.  
 So, once again the Texas Legislature was charged with the creation of a new 
finance system. After three specially called sessions, the Texas Legislature was able to 
pass into law House Bill 1 (HB1), which attempted to meet the mandate of the Texas 
Supreme Court to develop a school finance system which once again provided 
meaningful discretion to school districts in setting tax rates (Equity Center, 2006; 
Guenthner, 2007). In HB1, the Legislature designated a large portion of the state’s $8 
billion dollar surplus to buy-down the school districts’ tax rates. HB1 called for the 
reduction of property tax from $1.50 per $100 valuation to $1.00 per $100 valuation and 
allowed schools to tax an additional $.04 of what was termed “golden pennies.” These 
“golden pennies” were not subject to recapture for property wealthy district and 
provided a guaranteed yield of taxes per weighted average of daily attendance (WADA) 
at the same rate as Austin ISD for property poor districts. In addition, HB1 allowed for 
an additional $.13 per $100 to be levied by districts with the approval of voters. The 
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school finance system created in HB1 went into effect in the 2006-07 school year and 
continues to be the finance system in place through the end of the 2012-2013 school year 
and throughout the FAST. .  
Accountability in Education 
The 2002 renewal of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, better known 
as No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), marked the beginning of a dramatic shift in the 
era of accountability in U.S. schools as the Federal government, for the first time, placed 
itself squarely in the realm of public school accountability. Though there had been 
efforts at improving school accountability in the past, never before had the Federal 
government asserted itself in such an overt manner and with such an intensive effort to 
improve student performance. Moreover, the explicit goals of NCLB to improve 
academic performance and reduce the achievement gap between White students and 
students of color, along with the prescribed consequences for schools, districts, and 
states that did not meet the new standard of performance makes NCLB a unique—and 
controversial—piece of legislation. In order to better understand this new era of 
accountability, it is important to first examine the reforms in education over the prior 50 
years to determine how schools have reached this new era of accountability.  
Brown, Sputnik Pave the Way 
 In the years prior to and immediately following World War II, the definition of a 
good school was the efficient use of limited resources which provided a clean building 
with good textbooks where children could learn (Cuban, 2004). However, that notion 
changed when the father of a young African American girl in Topeka, Kansas decided 
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that it was unfair that his daughter had to walk over a mile to a run-down, dilapidated 
“black” school when there was a perfectly good “white” school just seven blocks from 
their house. The resulting lawsuit, combined with four other similar lawsuits regarding 
the segregation of African American and White students, were packaged together and 
became the landmark Supreme Court case known as Brown vs. Board of Education. 
Brown had opened America’s eyes to the fact that “separate but equal” was truly 
unequal,  and while school districts were slow to enact the mandate of the Court, the 
floodgate of awareness and activities that lead to the civil rights movement in the 1960’s 
had opened. 
 A few years later, a beach-ball-size satellite, known as Sputnik, proved the ability 
of the Soviet Union to create rocket propelled objects which travelled through space; 
objects that might one day transport intercontinental missiles onto the heads of innocent 
Americans on U.S. soil. This perceived display of aggression led then President Dwight 
D. Eisenhower to sign the National Defense Act in 1958 which brought a deluge of 
reforms to American schools (Cuban, 2004). Over the next decade, the rigor of math and 
science programs increased dramatically, while advanced placement courses and 
programs for the gifted and talented were added in an effort to meet the Communist 
threat.  
 The combination of the civil rights movement and the increasingly ‘warm’ Cold 
War led to a series of federal laws, culminating with the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act (ESEA) of 1965 (Cuban, 2004). According to Cuban (2004), the ESEA 
“provided for the first time funds for poor schoolchildren to get a better education and 
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improve their life chances. Senator Robert F. Kennedy (NY), fearful of districts’ 
diverting and wasting federal funds, attached and amendment to Title I of ESEA that 
required annual evaluations” (p. 23). For the first time, schools were asked to provide 
more than just a clean, well-run building with instructional materials. They were 
required to provide a quality education which would lead to high student performance.  
 Despite the stated goals of the ESEA and the billions of dollars which was 
poured into schools, critics from both ends of the political spectrum argued that schools 
were failing students (Cuban, 2004). National scores on the Scholastic Aptitude Test 
(SAT) were falling and many felt that the social permissiveness of the late-60’s and 
70’s—and schools’ efforts to increase equity—was watering down the standards for 
students rather than raising standards (Harris & Herrington, 2006). While the new 
“Title” programs of the 70’s may have given some financial accountability to schools, 
schools were left on their own to assess the academic performance of their students. 
A Nation at Risk 
 Like Sputnik 25 years earlier, a report by the National Commission on 
Excellence in Education, titled A Nation at Risk (NCEE, 1983), highlighted and once 
again brought to the fore many of the shortcomings of the American educational system. 
Unlike the calls for equity brought forth by the Brown decision and civil rights 
movement, A Nation at Risk called for higher standards, better content, greater time on 
task, and an increased focus on teaching. According to Harris and Herrington (2006), 
“the ideas expressed in NAR [A Nation at Risk] represent not just a lack of interest in 
equity, but subtle opposition to the weakened standards that apparently resulted from the 
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previous equity focus” (p. 213). When addressing the needs of disadvantaged students, A 
Nation at Risk suggested that a greater emphasis on resources and content is the only 
way to increase equity.  
Standards Based Movement 
 The result of A Nation at Risk was a wave of educational reform which came to 
be known as the standards based movement. According to Smith and O’Day (1991), the 
standards movement that began in the early 1980’s was a “top down” effort that resulted 
in very little gains in the educational performance of students. The initial efforts focused 
on many of the suggestions made by A Nation at Risk: increased graduation 
requirements, longer school days, higher standards for teachers, and more testing for 
students. These early efforts also resulted in national standards in the areas of math and 
reading yet did little to change the content of teaching. The early testing requirements 
were focused predominantly in the competence of basic skills.  
 As a result, a second “wave” of standards based reform was adopted, which 
based on “bottom up” reform (Smith & O’Day, 1990). This second wave was 
characterized by a call for the decentralization of decision making, a movement towards 
the professionalization of teaching, and an emphasis on the individual schools as the 
basic unit of change. The argument for this type of reform was that a bottom-up 
approach to reform leads to a greater sense of ownership and enthusiasm for reform by 
both teachers and students which would lead to a greater level of engagement by both 
parents and communities. While the merits of this type of reform are clear, Smith and 
O’Day cite two major factors which prohibit this type of movement from creating a true 
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systematic change in schools: 1) a lack of coherence in the educational system, and 2) 
the pervasiveness of a basic skills mentality that still existed in schools. The multifaceted 
layers of policy making at the federal, state, and local level sent conflicting policies 
which could not be integrated in a manner which guaranteed student achievement. This 
fragmentation, as argued by Smith and O’Day, caused school officials to either “ignore 
or subvert some policies” (p. 3). In addition, the minimal competency tests developed by 
states at the time focused on “low-level skills and standards and mandated or encouraged 
the use of such tests as criteria for promotion or graduation” (p. 3). This fragmented 
structure of the school environment provided little support for improvement and 
undermined the ability to create systematic change.  
The Era of No Child Left Behind 
 While some studies would argue that standardized tests have little impact on 
student performance (Hanushek & Raymond, 2006) or that the use of standardized tests 
to evaluate schools is flawed (Jones, 2004), there is little debate NCLB has ushered in a 
new era of accountability unlike any seen since the Brown decision. Also without debate 
is the fact that NCLB has placed the academic performance of historically disadvantaged 
students in a position of prominence never before seen. According to Torres (2004), this 
is due to the fact that “core to the act are provisions requiring local education authorities 
to ensure that all students, particularly those from disadvantaged backgrounds and 
minority populations, are performing proficiently in reading, mathematics, and science 
assessments” (p. 250).  
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 NCLB has done the opposite of what Smith and O’Day (1990) pointed out as 
weaknesses in the earlier waves of standards based reform. It has given specific 
performance measures that require standardized tests which call for student performance 
beyond the basic competencies tested under prior systems. More importantly, NCLB 
holds schools accountable for many of the enduring issues in education, such as the 
achievement gap between White students and students of color, curricular issues, and the 
lackadaisical attitude that exists in many educators. NCLB forces schools, through a 
defined set of penalties, to address the needs of disadvantaged students who have 
historically been overlooked by schools.  
 While the social justice aspect of NCLB is often overlooked by educators and 
policymakers—either intentionally or unintentionally—the moral justification of NCLB 
is evident (Torres, 2004). The mandated reporting of student performance scores, not 
just as a whole but in several different subpopulations of students, is meant to show 
schools and districts are teaching all their students, not just certain groups of students. 
The reporting of the ‘adequate yearly progress’ of students is intended to show that 
schools and districts are not only intent on making a minimal score but are making effort  
to show growth and improvement of students. Despite its flaws, NCLB has forced 
schools to make conscious decisions about how to improve the education for all 
students.  
The Next Wave 
 Gaining interest over the last two decades is the use of a ‘value-added’ model of 
student assessment (Kane & Stager, 2002; Rubin, Stuart, & Zanutto, 2004; Sanders, 
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1998). Under this model, students are no longer expected to only reach a certain standard 
of achievement on a given test. Students are expected to show a level of annual 
academic gain, no matter if the student is high-achieving, low-achieving, or shows 
average achievement (Sanders, 1998). While these types of state accountability tests are 
being used in some states (i.e., Tennessee) they are not yet being widely used as a means 
to measure student performance.  
The new state accountability test in Texas—called the State of Texas Assessment 
of Academic Readiness (STAAR)—is one such test. The STAAR test, in addition to 
being designed in such a way to facilitate comparison of the growth of a student across 
time, will also be linked to teachers as a way of measuring teacher effectiveness. The 
concept is that the more growth a classroom of students’ display, the more effective the 
classroom teacher is. The STAAR test has been administered since in the 2011-2012 
school year, but it remains to be seen how effective it is in measuring either student 
growth or teacher effectiveness. 
Despite the growing support for the use of value-added assessments, it is not yet 
known whether this is simply a fad or a wave of the future. However, what is known is 
the fact that NCLB created a new era of accountability, and it is highly unlikely that the 
push towards greater accountability will change any time soon.  
Factors Which Effect School Efficiency 
 There are myriad numbers of factors, both internal and external, which affect the 
efficiency of school districts. In order to better understand efficiency, it is important to 
review what the current literature says on these various factors in order to provide a 
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contextual background for this study. The following section reviews the current 
literature for the variables which will be analyzed for this record of study. 
Does Money Matter? 
 The first and most widely debated topic in school finance is the question as to 
whether or not additional money in public education makes a difference in the 
performance of students. This debate can trace its roots back to the Coleman report 
(1966) which concluded that the strongest correlation with student achievement were not 
a result of the school but were related to the educational levels and resources in the home 
of students. The implication of this finding was that the school itself did not matter and 
that allocating more money to schools was not likely to have an impact on achievement. 
 This stance has faced substantial criticism through the years. Recent re-analyses 
of the Coleman report by Borman and Dowling (2010), which used more modern 
statistical methods, found that even when controlling for student characteristics, a large 
portion of student achievement can be explained by differences in the schools. This 
finding is also supported by the work of Konstantopolous and Borman (2011) who 
concluded that schools do, in fact, play meaningful roles in the delivering equality or 
inequality of educational outcomes, especially to females, minorities, and disadvantaged 
students. While the socioeconomic status of students and their families continue to be 
seen as the driving factor in student achievement, there exists considerable research 
which suggests that school quality has a substantial effect on student outcomes.  
 Perhaps the most widely cited source for the assertion that money does not matter 
in schools comes from the work of Hanushek (1986). Hanushek conducted a meta-
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analysis of the existing studies on school finance and recorded the findings of those 
studies from both within the U.S. and outside the U.S. Some of the findings found a 
positive relationship between spending and student achievement, while many others 
found either a no relationship between spending and achievement or a negative 
relationship. This contradictory evidence led Hanushek to conclude that “there appears 
to be no strong or systematic relationship between school expenditures and student 
outcomes” (p. 1162). This statement has become repeated by many politicians, interest 
groups, and has been used in throughout state and federal courthouses where school 
funding cases have been deliberated (Baker, 2012).  
 As can be expected, Hanushek’s findings and conclusions have been widely 
criticized by public education advocates and researchers since its release (Baker, 2012). 
To begin, there has been much criticism of the studies reviewed by Hanushek, which 
were published in the 1960s and 1970s, which lack the advanced methodology used by 
today’s researchers. In addition, critics of Hanushek cite the advancement of data 
quality, statistical techniques, and the overall understanding of educational production 
functions as reasons to dismiss Hanushek’s findings. Other criticisms of Hanushek’s 
work argue that Hanushek fails to differentiate between inconsistencies in the studies—
which can be attributed to differences in the quality and scope of a study—and that 
Hanushek’s conclusions are too far-reaching due to the lack of high-quality evidence. 
Hedges, Greenwald, and Laine (1996) directly challenge Hanushek’s findings by 
performing their own meta-analysis of school production. In the Hedges et. al. paper, the 
authors developed quality parameters to ensure that only high-quality research was 
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included in their meta-analyses. These quality parameters included only the research 
which: 1) was presented in peer-reviewed journals using U.S. data, 2) included academic 
measures as outputs, 3) used only district- or campus-level data, 4) controlled for student 
socioeconomic characteristics, and 5) fit with longitudinal data. Hedges et. al. reduced 
the number of studies significantly and found that a majority of studies did find a 
positive relationship between spending and outcomes and that only “moderate increases 
in spending may be associated with significant increases in achievement” (p. 361). 
Research completed by Wenglinsky (1996) confirmed the findings of Hedges et. al. 
(1996) by finding that increases in the per-pupil expenditures in instruction and 
administration were associated with achievement due to their association with smaller 
class sizes, which raised achievement. 
Hanushek (1997) responded to these criticisms by further refining his initial 
meta-analysis and responding to his critics. His findings further substantiate his initial 
claim “that there is not a strong or consistent relationship between student performance 
and school resources” (p. 141). He also criticizes the methods of Hedges, Greenwald, 
and Laine (1996) as using weak statistical methods on their sampling and that they had 
to make considerable manipulations to their studies in order to create their findings.  
Researchers have continued to make adjustments to production function analyses 
by making incremental changes to both the inputs and selected outputs. Taylor (1998) 
included regional and geographic differences in costs as a method to control for varying 
differences in labor costs across states and regions. Figlio (1999) argued that the 
production function literature at the time was lacking due to the restrictive assumptions 
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used by researchers and that the impact of school inputs may be higher than estimated. 
Dewey, Husted, and Kenny (2000) contended that previous studies of school resource 
effects on student achievement incorrectly control for both student socioeconomic status 
and parent educational level. Dewey et. al. believe that this method is incorrect due to 
the fact that parent educational level directly impacts the demand for resources in school, 
thereby diminishing the effect of schools on student outcomes. It is important to note 
that all three of these studies found a positive, though sometimes small, relationship 
between financial expenditures and achievement.  
These and other researchers have highlighted several new, important difficulties 
that researchers involved with production function literature must now address. These 
are only a few of the many examples of the complexity of finding a direct correlation 
between school expenditures and student outcomes. As noted by Baker (2012), these 
difficulties include the varying geographic and economic contexts of schools, as well as 
the need to accurately account for the students’ family backgrounds, which are often the 
driver of the level of local funding.  
Programmatic Expenditures in Relation to School Efficiency 
 In addition to the debate as to whether money matters to schools as a whole, 
there is great debate as to where and how money is spent in schools. The State of Texas’ 
funding mechanism, known as the Foundation School Program (FSP), recognizes and 
funds certain programs in schools which are intended to benefit specific student 
populations. According to the Texas Education Agency, those programs included:  
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1. Regular Education: programs intended for students in a district who are not 
receiving special education or career and technology education services. 
2. Special Education: programs designed for students who have a federally defined 
disability and receive special education services. 
3. Career and Technology Education: courses and programs designed to teach the 
skills necessary to gain entry-level employment  in high-skill, high-wage jobs 
4. Bilingual/English as a Second Language: programs designed to help students 
who primary language is other than English 
5. State Compensatory Education: programs and services intended to supplement 
regular education students which are identified as at-risk 
6. Gifted and Talented (GT): provides educational experiences beyond those 
provided by the regular school program who are identified as gifted and talented 
These 6 programs, along with Cocurricular activities and Accelerated Instruction—
which are both programs that receive no additional state funding—encompass 
programmatic expenditures made by school districts in their data reporting. 
 A review of the history of Special Education (SE) by Winzer (2009) describes 
the history of SE and its integration into the school system. Winzer explains how SE 
began as a result of World War II, when the contributions of adults with disabilities 
changed the view of many policymakers and educators in America. The Civil Rights 
movement of the 1960s pushed for the inclusion of students with disabilities and 
culminated with the passage of the Education of All Handicapped Children Act and the 
Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA). These laws established the right to a free and 
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appropriate public education for all children, regardless of their disability, and required 
schools to provide individualized education for students with disabilities. The special 
education movement has evolved from being a movement of integration to one of 
inclusion.  
 There have been numerous studies done with the intent of calculating the cost of 
special education. Though the cost of SE varies by the need of the student, there is 
general consensus that SE costs roughly 2.3 times that of a general education program 
(Chaikind et. al., 1993; Sofko, 1997). Chaikind et. al. found that the cost range for 
students with disabilities above their non-disabled peers ranged from less than $1,000 
per pupil for students receiving speech services to over $30,000 per pupil for those with 
deaf-blindness. The differences in costs are largely associated with the need for 
additional staff to work with SE students and the additional materials—technology, 
ambulatory devices, specialized instructional materials, etc.—that are often needed to 
effectively teach SE students.  
 While there is general consensus that it costs districts more to educate SE 
students, the effectiveness of SE programs is largely dependent on the instructional 
practices of educators. The findings of Russ et. al. (2001) suggest that larger caseloads 
on teachers and larger instructional group size has a negative effect on math and reading 
achievement while teacher attrition increases as the number of students served increases. 
However, Tremblay (2013) found that an inclusion model appeared to be more effective 
compared with the SE classroom setting.  
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 Much like special education, the existing research on the effectiveness of career 
and technology education (CTE) is mixed at best. Silverberg et. al. (2002) found that 
student’s enrolled in vocational coursework were less likely to complete a college prep 
curriculum than did graduates who did not participate in a vocational training program. 
Although, as pointed out by Cohen and Besharov (2002), it is important to consider that 
the design of CTE is to prepare students for workplace readiness and not necessarily 
academic achievement and that students who worked while in high school tend to be 
much more successful in the labor market than those who did not work. 
 The effectiveness of bilingual education is especially important in Texas due to 
the number of students who are English-language learners (ELL) in Texas. In Texas, the 
number of non-English speakers in Texas is 34% with over 90% of those students 
attending public schools (US Census, 2007). According to Han (2011), a lack of English 
fluency is often considered a major contributor to the long-held finding that ELL 
students have lower academic performance than do their English speaking peers, and as 
a result, it has been historically been the policy of educators to increase English 
proficiency as fast as possible. However, Han cites research by August and Shanahan 
(2008) as reason to reexamine the use of bilingual education as the best way to increase 
achievement in ELL students.   
 There have been multiple studies which have shown the positive effect of 
bilingual education to promote ELL students’ performance. Research by Golash-Boza 
(1998) and Portes and Hao (2004) have found a positive relationship between bilingual 
fluency and higher math and reading scores, as well as the positive effects of 
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bilingualism and abstract thinking (Bialysok, 1988; Rumbaut, 1995). Bilingual education 
has also been found to improve self-esteem (Portes & Hao, 2002) and an improved 
feeling of “cultural capital’ in ethnic communities (Bankston & Zou, 1995; Portes & 
Rumbaut, 2006). Finally, studies by Fuligni, 1998) provide context to the importance of 
speaking the same language as one’s parents has on the parent-child relationship and the 
improvement of communication in the home. Collier and Thomas (2004) studied the 
student records of over 700,000 students and found that students which received 
academic support in both their first and second language decreased the achievement gap 
when compared to students who were involved in pull-out or mainstream classes. Han 
(2011) concludes that bilingual programs encourage parent participation and help 
schools reach their overall educational goals. 
 The next program which receives funding from the FSP is Compensatory 
Education. Under §29.081 of the Texas Education Code, compensatory education 
programs are supplemental programs which are designed to help at-risk of dropping out 
of school. Compensatory education programs include programs such as Head Start and 
Title I programs (which receive federal funding). According to Beatty and Zigler (2012), 
the funding of such programs is largely dependent on the competing policies and 
political ideologies of the party in power. Zigler describes his time as the director of the 
Office of Child Development during the early 1970s when the transition from the 
Johnson to Nixon administration led to changes in compensatory education and child 
welfare policies. Zigler described how bureaucratic infighting and the increased financial 
pressures of the Vietnam War nearly led to the closing of the Head Start program.  
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 Though the Head Start Program survived, compensatory education programs 
continue to be funded based on the political will of the party in power, and the results of 
these programs remain mixed. Slavin (1989) calls for major restructuring of programs in 
early grades as a means to ensure that all students receive an adequate level of basic 
skills for later in life. Slavin also asserts that the effectiveness of compensatory 
education is based on the effectiveness of the individual programs used. 
 The final program which receives additional funding from the state is gifted and 
talented education (GT). According to the National Association of Gifted Children 
(2013), gifted and talented education evolved after the Soviet Union’s launch of Sputnik 
in the late 1950s and were further bolstered by the findings of A Nation at Risk (1983), 
which called for the raising of academic standards and promoting an appropriate 
curriculum for gifted learners. The 2002 passage of the No Child Left Behind Act 
expanded the availability of federal grants for GT education and modified the definition 
of GT students.  
 The question for many school programs, including GT, is whether the 
participation in such a program increases student achievement. To this end, research on 
the effectiveness of GT is mixed. Research by Bhatt (2009) indicates that participation in 
GT programs is associated with a significant increase in math standardized test scores 
and future participation in Advance Placement courses. Similar research conducted by 
Ruggeiro (2012) found that students participating in GT programs scored higher in state 
level reading assessments. However, research by Bui, Craig, & Imberman (2011) 
discount the gains in both math and reading and claim that only science achievement 
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scores improve with the enrollment in GT programs. A majority of researchers—
Renzulli (2012), Reis & Renzulli (2010), Dai (2013) to name a few—speak only to the 
social capital benefits associated with enrollment in GT programs. These results lead 
school leaders and policy makers to question the efficiency of GT programs and their 
overall impact on educational outcomes.  
School District Size and Efficiency 
 School district size and consolidation continues to be a controversial topic in 
Texas and throughout the country for the last 100 years. This conflict is largely amongst 
advocates of local control and those who believe that quality and efficiency is increased 
as school districts become larger (DeYoung, 1987). Early advocates of the consolidation 
of schools arguments were threefold: 1) that larger schools allowed for a more efficient, 
centralized administration, 2) larger schools were able to divide children by grade-level, 
thereby allowing for more specialized instruction, and 3) better facilities could be 
provided at a lower cost (Cubberley, 1922). Cubberley and other advocates of 
consolidation were successful in their arguments as evidenced by the reduction of the 
number of school districts from approximately 125,000 in 1930 to less than 20,000 in 
2000 (Berry, 2006).  
 Despite the call for consolidation, little empirical evidence existed for the 
financial savings that were predicted by Cubberley and consolidation advocates. Since 
that time, a number of studies have been conducted to in an attempt to find an “optimum 
size” of school districts. Riew (1966) found that financial advantages existed when 
increasing size due to lower costs per student and that high schools with enrollment of 
 
 
42 
 
less than 900 would be most likely to benefit from consolidation. Sabulao and Hickrod 
(1970) calculated that the ideal size for efficiency was an enrollment of 750 for grades 
K-8, 500 for high schools, and 5,000 students in a district. Templeton’s (1972) review of 
optimal size led to the conclusion that K-8 schools should be approximately 300-800 
while high school enrollment should be between 1,000 – 1,500 students. The Illinois 
State Board of Education study (1985) found that high school enrollment should be 
between 500 and 1,300 due their ability to provide an array of course offerings, peak 
student achievement levels, and financial efficiency over smaller schools.  
 There have also been a number of studies which have supported the concept of 
the economies of scale due to the cost of maintaining schools that are at less than 
capacity or are redundant. McGuffey and Brown (1978) found that plant maintenance 
costs were 30% less per pupil than schools which were at 90 percent capacity and cost 
50% less per pupil than did schools which were at 80 percent capacity. Nelson (1985) 
recognized the financial benefits associated school consolidation due to the savings in 
the maintenance of duplicate facilities.  
 Despite the apparent efficiencies found in larger schools, there is also 
considerable research that suggests that, at a certain level, diseconomies of scale begin to 
be seen for districts. Studies by Duncombe et al. (1995, 1996) and Reschovsky and 
Imazeki (1997, 1999) found that a U-shaped cost curve exists for most types of 
expenditures, meaning that efficiency rises until enrollment reaches a certain level and 
then begins declining. These studies found that an enrollment of approximately 6,000 
students in a district yield that highest level of efficiency in total cost; however, 
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Duncombe et. al. (1995) found that 90% of the savings were seen by the time a district 
reached an enrollment of 1,500 students.  
The studies also found that different types of spending could have different levels 
of optimization. Operating or instructional costs of a district is maximized between 
2,000 and 3,500 students, whereas transportation cost efficiency is seen just over 1,000 
students. In one area—administrative costs—the studies found that savings in 
administrative costs could be seen across all levels of enrollment and that as much as 
one-half the cost decrease in the additional enrollment could be attributed to savings in 
administrative costs. However, Duncombe et. al. (1995) does conclude that without a 
reduction in the number of buildings used or the number of staff, consolidation is 
unlikely to save very much money.  
Property Wealth and Efficiency 
 As noted previously, the ability for a district to generate revenue has been a 
source of both debate and litigation in Texas and throughout the country. Edgewood v. 
Kirby and West Orange-Cove Consolidated ISD v. Neely were both cases which relied 
heavily on the argument that state’s funding mechanism was flawed due to the lack of 
equity as a result of differing property wealth of districts in Texas. While there have 
been numerous studies relating to wealth equalization efforts in Texas, there have been 
few studies which have tried to establish a connection between property wealth and 
efficiency.  
 A study based in Texas conducted by Miller (2012) found that property the level 
of property wealth of districts in Texas was associated with spending in only certain 
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areas. Miller found that property wealthy districts spend more of their budgets in the area 
of capital outlay projects, which property poor districts expended more resources in 
payroll costs. Miller also found that mid-level districts—districts which were not 
considered property wealthy or property poor—spend a greater portion of their budget in 
the areas of contracted services, supplies and materials, other operating expenses, and 
debt service.  
 One study, Houck, Rolle, and He (2010), studied efficiency in the state of 
Georgia. Houck et. al. saw that higher wealth districts were actually more efficient than 
their peers. These high wealth districts had greater student performance on Advance 
Placement tests and coursework as well as graduation rates, but did not see a statistically 
significant difference on the state assessment in math or SAT scores. Houck et. al. 
conclude that exogenous district characteristics were significant predictors in the overall 
efficiency of districts. 
Administrative Costs and Efficiency 
  There is a widely-held belief that poor educational performance in U.S. schools 
can be traced to the abundance of school administrators. These overblown bureaucracies 
not only take much needed financial resources from the districts, but they also create 
overly burdensome regulations on teachers which stifle creativity and the teachers’ 
abilities to control their classrooms. Of course, these assertions are often made without 
empirical evidence because there is little evidence that suggests that the administrative 
bureaucracies have over-expanded their role in modern schools (Marlow, 2001).  
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 The research of Brewer (1996) attempted to estimate the effects of administration 
costs on student output. Brewer hypothesized that there were two possible effects of 
administrative expenditures on student performance. Brewer’s first hypothesis was that 
spending on administration actually lowers the output of students by reducing teacher 
productivity due to unwieldy policies and regulations. Brewer’s other hypothesis was 
that administrative costs did not lower student output per se, but that administrative 
expenditures displace funds that might be used in a more efficient manner. Despite 
Brewer’s hypothesis, he was not able to find a systematic significant relationship on the 
effects of school administration and educational productivity. According to Brewer, 
most of his models found that central administrative costs had a negative impact on 
output while building level administration tends to have positive effects.    
 Further research which supports the assertion that administrative costs are 
negatively associated with student performance is the work of Jacques and Brorsen 
(2002) which saw test scores negatively related to expenditures in school administration. 
Unlike the Brewer model, Jacques and Brorsen saw that administrative expenditures at 
the campus level did, in fact, create a lower output for students, while spending at the 
central office had no effect on student output—though Jacques and Brorsen did assert 
that the money could be spent more efficiently in other places. Another study, this one 
completed by Baker (2003), into the policy influences on the allocation of school district 
resources found that larger districts tend to spend less on administration and that districts 
which spend more money per pupil tend to spend that money on administrative costs 
rather than instruction. Baker further found that the amount of federal aid received by 
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districts was negatively associated with central administrative and total administrative 
costs, suggesting that districts receiving more money from federal sources tend to spend 
more on administrative costs.     
 Despite this somewhat negative research, there are studies which suggest that 
spending in administration actually improves educational achievement. Marlow (2001) 
found that higher employment of administrators was found to raise verbal SAT scores 
and lower dropout rates. Marlow went so far as to suggest that there are too few 
administrators employed by school districts. Research conducted by Wenglisnsky (1997) 
also support the belief that increased spending in administration leads to high 
educational output.  
Student/Teacher Ratio and Efficiency 
 The number of students in a class has the potential to affect the achievement of 
students in a number of ways. The number of students in a class effects how the 
classroom teacher interacts with students, how students interact with each other, and the 
overall level of social engagement of the classroom. The level of engagement in the 
classroom could have a direct impact on the level of noise in the classroom and the 
amount of disruptive behavior, which has an impact on the activities that the teacher is 
able to utilize. The number of students in a classroom also influences the ability of 
teachers to interact with individual students and small groups. Due to the widely held 
belief that students learn more when they are able to receive more attention from 
teachers, class size is one of the key variables in producing learning in students. Also, it 
is one factors that can be controlled by policymakers and school leaders (as opposed to 
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family socio-economic background or parental involvement). Therefore, it becomes 
necessary to understand the current research on class-size and its effects on student 
achievement.  
 Between 1969 and 1997, the average pupil/teacher ratio in elementary and 
secondary schools declined from 22.7 to 16.6, a decline of nearly 27% (Campbell et. al., 
2000). With such a large decline in the student/teacher ratio, many in the public might 
have expected to observe a large increase in student learning over the same period. 
However, what Campbell et. al. found was that scores from the National Assessment of 
Educational Progress (NAEP) did not see large increases in student test scores which 
were commensurate with the decline in the average student/teacher ratio. Science scores 
for students 17 years of age were lower in 1999 than in 1969, math scores were constant, 
and reading scores were only slightly higher. This might lead one to conclude that 
student/teacher ratio has little effect on achievement.  
 In reviewing Campbell et. al.’s work and others, Ehrenberg et. al. (2001) cited a 
variety of reasons as to why this conclusion should not be drawn. While Ehrenberg et. al. 
acknowledges that student test scores are measure of the performance of schools, they 
cite a number of other measures which should also be included in assessing the 
importance of smaller classes. Ehrenberg et. al. note that the student drop-out rate 
dropped from 15% to 11% over the same time period, meaning that more students—
especially more struggling students who might have dropped out before the age of 17—
took the NAEP test in 1999 than did in 1969. Ehrenberg et. al. also point to the 
percentage of high school students who attended college rose from 51.8% to 67% over 
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the same period of time. Ehrenberg et. al. comment  that the number of students living in 
a two-parent household dropped from 85% to 68% from 1969 to 1999, meaning more 
students living in households where parents were working as opposed to staying at 
home. Finally, Ehrenberg et. al. note that the number of families in poverty increased 
from 14.9% to 20.2% during that period. Ehrenberg cites this decline in “social capital” 
as factors which tend to make it more difficult for some students to learn and reduce the 
parents’ ability to support educational efforts. Ehrenberg et. al. conclude their review by 
stating that in order to determine the true effects of class size, researchers must use 
statistical methods to control for these and other factors or conduct a true experiment 
where students are randomly assigned to different class sizes to determine the effect of 
the student/teacher ratio.  
 Perhaps the most widely cited experimental study into the effect of class size 
came from the state of Tennessee in the form of Project STAR (Student/Teacher 
Achievement Ratio). Began in 1985, Project STAR was a state-sponsored 
“demonstration” where students entering kindergarten where randomly assigned into one 
of three classroom settings—a class of 13-17, a class of 22-26, or a class of 22-26 with a 
full time aide—for 4 years. Teachers were randomly assigned and there were no special 
interventions, i.e. curriculum, professional development, that were given to the teachers 
at the time. After 4 years, the students were returned to a regular-sized classroom (Finn 
& Achilles, 1999).  
 Project STAR found statistically significant differences in achievement between 
students in small classes and large classes but no differences between classes with aides 
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or without them. These differences began to be seen in the 1st grade and persisted for 
students in grades 5-7 even after the students were returned to normal classrooms. In 
addition, those differences were greater for minority students who seem to show a 
greater benefit in smaller classes than do their non-minority peers. Further work by Finn, 
Gerber, Achilles, and Boyd-Zaharias (2001) suggest the more years spent in small 
classes the longer the benefits for achievement last.  
 Another program which intended to study the effects of class size comes from the 
SAGE program in Wisconsin (Molnar et. al., 1999). In the SAGE program, several 
specific interventions, including class size reduction, extended hours, and “rigorous” 
curricula and staff development, were used at targeted schools which had more than 50% 
of the students below the poverty line. Class sizes were reduced to 12 to 15 students per 
class (average of 13.47) compared to 21 to 25 students (average of 22.42) in non-SAGE 
schools. Results of the SAGE program suggest a positive relationship between smaller 
class size and student achievement with larger gains going to African-American 
students. Though much smaller in scale than Tennessee’s STAR Project, the SAGE 
program in Wisconsin seemed to support the findings in the STAR Project.  
 As always, there are many critics of both the methodology and findings of class 
size studies. Hanushek (1999) points out that social experiments “are very difficult to 
design and implement, making it even less likely that a single trial will provide definitive 
answers” (p. 17). Hanushek also argues that the gains seen in smaller classroom sizes 
were found in the first or second year and remained steady through the remainder of the 
study, suggesting that the effects of smaller classrooms are consistent with a one-time 
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effect as opposed to a cumulative effect. Another criticism, specifically of Tennessee 
STAR Project, was the non-random selection of schools there is a concern as to the 
generalizability of the findings.  
 Others have attempted to study the effects of smaller classroom sizes on teachers 
in order to explain any variation of student performance. Smith and Glass (1980) 
conducted a meta-analysis of the existing research at the time and concluded that smaller 
class size was associated with better teaching. Filby, McCutcheon, and Kyle (1983) 
studied the effects of smaller class size on teachers in schools in California and Virginia. 
In their research, two second grade classrooms were divided into three, therefore 
reducing class size by about one-third. The investigators then observed teacher behavior 
before and after the class-size reduction. The author’s found that the teachers’ 
instructional approaches were largely the same before and after and that instructional 
content and the way it was presented had not changed.  
 An analysis of the National Educational Longitudinal Survey (NELS) by Rice 
(1999) found that there was a slight change in teacher practices in secondary math and 
science teacher who had smaller classes, leading to more time with individuals and small 
groups and more innovative—film, student-led discussions, oral reports, small groups—
compared to teachers in small classes. Betts and Shkolnik (1999) conducted a similar 
study and found, like Rice (1999), that teachers spent more time on individualization. 
However, Betts and Shkolnk (1999) found that teachers in smaller classes spend more 
time reviewing and that there was no association between class size and the amount of 
material covered by the teacher. Betts and Shkolnik conclude that the association 
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between class size and instruction is small and had little practical significance. Finally, 
research completed by the CSR Research Consortium (1999) found that teacher practices 
in small classes were similar to those in large classes. In addition, content coverage did 
not differ by class size, though small classes received slightly more small-group and 
individualized instruction than did larger classes.  
Finally, other recent studies (Cho, Glewee, & Whilter, 2012; Hoxby, 2000; 
Jepsen & Rivkin, 2009) on the effect of class size on achievement have been mixed. 
Cho, Glewwe, and Whitler (2012) results showed positive effects of smaller classes on 
mathematics and reading scores in Minnesota, though the effects were relatively small. 
The researchers found that a decrease of 10 students would increase scores by only 0.04 
to 0.05 standard deviations. Cho et. al. conclude by stating that reductions in class size 
alone are unlikely to lead to sizeable increases in student learning.  
While Jepsen and Rivkin (2009) found that smaller class size does have a slightly 
positive effect on student achievement, those effects were often negated by the poor 
quality of the new teachers hired to fill positions, especially in schools with high 
populations of economically disadvantaged students. Jepsen and Rivkin investigated the 
direct and indirect effects of the California Class Size Reduction (CSR) program.  The 
CSR program in California called for the reduction of class size across the state and 
caused an immediate need of 25,000 new teaching positions in the state. As a result of 
the high need for new teachers, schools were inundated with large numbers of teachers 
who lacked experience and proper certification. These staffing problems were especially 
seen in high poverty, high minority districts. Despite the questions regarding teacher 
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quality, Jepsen and Rivkin found that the CSR did increase achievement in early grades, 
but those gains were not maintained through the letter years.  
Hoxby (2000) found that small class size did not have a statistically significant 
effect on student achievement. Hoxby used longitudinal data from 649 elementary 
schools in Connecticut and found that a 10 percent reduction in class size produced less 
than a 2 percent gain in achievement. Moreover, Hoxby found no evidence that class 
size reductions were beneficial to low income or African-American students. 
From an efficiency standpoint, it is important to consider the cost of reducing 
class size versus the benefits of having smaller classes. The cost of hiring additional 
teachers is substantial, and the benefits of having smaller class sizes may not be seen 
immediately. As argued by Krueger (2003), anyone expecting large gains from reducing 
class size might be disappointed in the low returns. It is important therefore for 
researchers to be able to distinguish between studies which show gains in achievement 
compared to those which test for efficiency. Though high gains are possible, it is likely 
that those gains are not going to be seen as efficient.  
Teacher Experience and Turnover and Efficiency 
 When studying teacher productivity and student achievement, nearly all recent 
studies include some measure of teacher experience (Harris & Sass, 2007). Results for 
these studies across a variety of grade configurations to have little or no effect. For 
elementary students, the relationship between teacher experience and student 
achievement for elementary math to be evenly split between positive and insignificant 
(Betts et. al. 2003; Boyd et. al., 2006; Clotfelter et. al., 2007; Hanushek et. al., 2005; 
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Jepsen, 2005; Rivkin et. al., 2005; Rockoff, 2004). However, a majority of these studies 
(Boyd et. al., 2006; Clotfelter et. al., 2007; Jepsen et. al. 2005; Rockoff, 2004) found that 
the relationship between teacher experience and reading to be positively correlated in 
elementary years. Findings for the relationship between experience and success were 
opposite when studying middle school teachers. Students math achievement was 
positively associated with teacher experience while split in reading achievement. At the 
high school level, Betts et. al. (2003) and Aaronson et. al (2007) find no significant 
relationship between teacher experience and student achievement while Clotfelter et. al. 
(2007) found positive effects.  
 Rockoff (2004) found that teacher experience had a significant positive effect on 
student achievement for both reading and math at the elementary, with stronger gains 
seen in reading. On average, Rockoff found that reading test scores were an average of 
0.17 standard deviations higher for teachers with 10 or more years experience compared 
to beginning teachers. In mathematics, the effects were smaller with significant gains in 
achievement for the first two years but little or no effect beyond that. This finding was 
supported by the work of Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2005) and Hanushek et. al. 
(2005). Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2005) saw elementary teacher effectiveness 
increase during the first year or two but level off after three years with a greater effect on 
reading achievement, while Hanushek et. al. (2005) found that middle school teacher 
experience was only positively correlated for the first few years of teaching and that 
achievement gains ceased to be significant after that. 
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 Other studies have found that there is no relationship between experience and 
achievement at any level. Munoz and Chang (2007) used HLM to research the effects of 
teacher characteristics on high school reading achievement in urban schools. They found 
that there was no predictive relationship between teacher experience and achievement. 
Heistad (1999) used a value-added model to determine the relationship between teacher 
characteristics and student achievement and found no significant correlation between the 
two. Finally, Stonge, Ward, and Grant (2011) did not find any relationship between 
teacher experience and effectiveness in their value-added study. Stonge et. al. even 
compared the achievement results for teachers with less than 5 years experience, 5 to 10 
years experience, and more than 10 years experience and concluded that there were no 
significant differences between these groups. In summary, the preponderance of the 
literature shows that teacher experience has little or no effect on achievement and what 
effect there is exists only in the first few years of a teacher’s career.  
 Another teacher characteristic that can play an important role in the achievement 
of students is the teacher turnover rates in schools. Nationwide, new teachers leave the 
profession at a rate of 30 percent after the first 5 years and at a rate 50 percent higher in 
high-poverty schools versus more affluent schools (Ingersoll, 2001). This turnover tends 
to be higher in urban and lower performing schools (Hanushek, Kain, & Rivkin, 1999).  
Most existing research shows a negative relationship between turnover and 
achievement. Guin (2004) studied the effects of teacher turnover in elementary schools 
in a large urban district and found a significant, negative relationship between teacher 
turnover and the percentage of students who met statewide assessment standards in 
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reading and math. Similar findings were made by Boyd et. al. (2011) and Hanushek, 
Kain, and Rivkin (1999). This negative impact is compounded, as argued by Darling-
Hammond and Sykes (2003), in low-income schools where teachers leave prior to 
gaining the needed experience to become effective.  
 However, there are studies which suggest that teacher turnover may not be a 
detrimental to student achievement as some suggest. Hanushek and Rivkin (2010) 
researched the impact of teacher turnover in schools which predominately serve 
disadvantaged students. Hanushek and Rivkin conclude that these schools do experience 
greater turnover; however, the impact of that turnover is offset by the quality of the 
teachers who leave. The authors suggest that teachers who remain at their schools tend to 
have higher performance that those who leave, which suggests that high turnover is not 
nearly as damaging as many assume. Their findings do not support the view that teacher 
exits negatively affect the quality of education in schools.  
Athletics and Efficiency 
 According to the National Federation of State High School Association (2008), 
over 7.6 million high school students participate in interscholastic athletics every year. 
Advocates of extracurricular sports programs often tout sports as programs which 
contribute to the overall education and the school experience of students. In order to 
participate in these sports, 48 of the 50 states have established eligibility requirements 
(Bukowski, 2010). According to Callari (2002), the most commonly used eligibility 
standards include a pass-to-play, a minimum grade point average, and a requirement that 
only allows for a specified number of failing grades. Researchers (Jansen, 1992; 
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National Federation of State High School Associations, 2008) have claimed that these 
standards have resulted in participants who have higher grades, higher attendance, fewer 
disciplinary problems, and lower dropout rates.  
 There have been several studies which reported the effect of extracurricular 
participation on academic performances. Camp (1990) found that females participating 
in more in extracurricular activities made better grades than their male counterparts and 
that their academic achievement was improved by their participation. Kilrea (1998) 
examined the relationship between ACT scores between extracurricular participants and 
non-participants and found that ACT composite scores were significant and positively 
related to participation in extracurricular activities. Kilrea concluded that these benefits 
were especially seen in students who have academic difficulties whose extracurricular 
participation positively influenced their academic success.  
 Large scale studies into the link between extracurricular participation and 
achievement show similar results. McCarthy (2000) compared the attendance and GPAs 
of participants and non-participants in Colorado and found that participants had higher 
GPAs and lower absenteeism than did non-participants. Van Duyne (2004) made a 
similar conclusion when comparing achievement between participants and non-
participants in on statewide assessments. Van Duyne found a positive correlation 
between achievement on the Indiana Student Test of Educational progress and 
participation in extracurricular activities. Corbett (2007) also found higher achievement 
in students who participated in extracurricular activities on statewide assessments in 
New Jersey.  
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 Of course, there continues to be the question as to what degree participation in 
extracurricular activities has on increased achievement. Research by Lumkin and Favor 
(2012) found that high school athletes scored an average of only 5 points higher in math 
and social studies, 4 points higher in reading, and three points higher in science on Grade 
11 statewide assessments than did non-athletes. Results were mixed with regards to ACT 
scores, with male non-athletes outperforming male athletes in English, reading, and 
composite—though it should be noted that female athlete outperformed female non-
athletes in all areas but reading. Lipscomb (2007) found that athletic participation is 
linked to a 2 percent increase in math and science standardized test scores.  
School Efficiency as an Economic Model 
 While the current economic climate helps explain the need for schools to be more 
efficient, there is little consensus amongst researchers as to how to best determine what 
it means to be efficient in schools. They might be able to define it, but creating an agreed 
upon methodology has been harder to produce. Normative economic theories attempt to 
create a predictive model to determine how much it costs to produce at given result 
(Rolle, 2004). While this knowledge is important for educators and policymakers 
wishing to determine what the cost of education is, the mixed results of such studies 
have led others to develop different approaches to determine the efficiency of schools 
beyond traditional economic theory.  
 One such methodology used to study the efficiency of a school district can be 
credited to Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) and is known as Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA). DEA is designed to measure the efficiency of decision making units 
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(DMUs) when the production function has multiple levels of both inputs and outputs. 
DEA compares the efficiency of an DMU relative to the highest performing DMU and is 
especially useful in not-for-profit DMUs such as schools because it is structured to 
control for multiple inputs (i.e. socio-economic level, family background) to 
organizations which have multiple outputs (i.e. standardized test scores, graduation 
rates). Some advantages of this type of methodology include the fact that DEA does 
create a predictive model of “what various DMU’s should be able to produce in the way 
of outputs given the factor amounts and/or the relations between various inputs that may 
be described to them” (p. 440).  Disadvantages, as noted by Berg (2010), are that results 
are reliant on the selection both inputs and outputs, the belief that it is not possible to test 
for best specification, and that the level of efficiency is likely to increase as more input 
and output variables are inputted.  
 While there have been a number of studies which use DEA to study school 
efficiency (Besent et al., 1982; Ray, 1991; Chalos & Cherian, 1995; Ruggiero, 1996; 
Duncombe, Miner, & Ruggiero, 1997) the results have been mixed. In Besent et al. 
(1982), the researchers analyzed 167 Houston elementary schools and included input 
factors such as prior year test scores, economically disadvantaged students, teacher 
student ratio, and teacher experience. Output data were aggregated scores on 
standardized tests. In their study, Besent et al. found that 78 schools (47%) operating 
inefficiently and 89 schools (53%) were found to be efficient. Ray (1991) analyzed 122 
Connecticut high schools and used input factors which included teacher student ratio, 
administrator student ratio, family educational background, and socio-economic status. 
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Ray’s analysis found that the productivity of schools varied widely across districts and 
can be ascribed to the differences in the socio-economic background of the communities. 
Chalos and Cherian (1995) studied 207 Illinois school districts and included inputs such 
as operating expenditures per pupil, attendance rate, teacher education, student/teacher 
ratio, and teacher experience. Output factors were math and verbal scores on 
standardized tests. Chalos and Cherian found that 71 districts operated above the median 
efficiency level and 81 operated below. In addition, they found that local property 
revenues and tax bases were positively correlated with efficiency.  
 Ruggiero (1996) analyzed 556 New York state school districts with input factors 
including teacher salary expenditures, personnel instructional expenditures, other 
instructional expenditures, and parent education level. Ruggiero’s output facts were 
reading, math, and social studies test scores, as well as the dropout rate. Ruggiero’s 
analysis found that 443 districts were inefficient and that those inefficient districts could 
reach the same level of results with 80% of the observed level of inputs. Districts where 
more residents had college degrees were found to be more efficient than districts with 
fewer college graduates. Finally, Duncombe, Miner, and Ruggiero (1997) used DEA to 
analyze 585 New York state school districts with the inputs of operating expenditures 
per pupil, average reading math scores, drop-out rates, percentage of households in 
poverty, students at-risk, students from single-parent homes, and limited English 
proficient students. Like the Ruggero’s (1996) previous study of New York state school 
districts, Duncombe, Miner, and Ruggeiro (1997) found a high percentage of districts 
(88%) operating inefficiently with the average efficiency rate of those districts to be 
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76%. They also found that there is a negative relationship related between efficiency and 
school district size, percent of tenured teachers, and district wealth. Interestingly, the 
group also found that efficiency was negatively correlated to districts with high numbers 
of private schools, suggesting that competition between public and private schools does 
not increase efficiency.  
 Related to DEA is a methodological process to determine the relative efficiency 
of an organization known as stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). In SFA, researchers use 
cost functions and more dynamic statistical techniques in order to calculate the 
efficiency rate (Rolle, 2004). Rolle continues to explain that “the focus of stochastic 
frontier analysis lies in determining statistically the best-performing organization(s). If 
the statistically determined best-performing organization has lower costs than the 
remaining organizations, the residual organizations are labeled as inefficient” (p. 50-51). 
Unlike a DEA, SFA takes into account the statistical noise of the sample, and therefore 
tends to have a lower inefficiency rate (Barrow, 1991). SFA also allows the researcher to 
determine the allocative and technical efficiency of an organization depending on the 
availability of data and the form in which the output is measured.  
 As with DEA, several studies have used SFA to determine the efficiency of 
schools (Barrow, 1991; Deller & Rudnicki, 1993). In the Barrow (1991) study, Barrow 
studied 57 local DMU’s in England over a four year span. Input variables for Barrow 
included the average cost per pupil, student enrollment, percentage of students on free 
and reduced lunch, percentage of students passing, at-risk students, and change in school 
roll over a two year period. Using a SFA model, Barrow found that school inefficiency 
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ranged from 4% - 7%.  More research using SFA included the work of Deller and 
Rudnicki (1993) who studied the production efficiency of elementary schools in Maine. 
In their findings, Deller and Rudnicki concluded that most Maine elementary schools 
were operating relatively efficiently, with the average efficiency level of 91%, with a 
high of 97% and low of 77% efficient. Deller and Rudnicki’s data suggested that larger 
schools operated more inefficiently than smaller schools, and that increased non-
instructional costs lead to inefficiency.  
Another more recent study using stochastic frontier comes from Gronberg, 
Jansen, and Taylor (2011). Their results indicated that, unlike Deller and Rudnicki, the 
predicted per student cost of operating smaller schools is higher than the per student cost 
of operating larger school districts. Gronberg et. al. found that a district with 500 
students is predicted to cost 11 percent more per student than a district with 1,600 
students. The same 500 student district costs 16 percent more per student to operate than 
districts with 5,000 or more students. The Gronberg model indicates that the per-student 
costs continues to decline even as enrollment numbers exceed 200,000 students.  
  A third common technique used by researchers to study school efficiency is 
known as corrected ordinary least-squares (C-OLS). In this approach, “researchers use 
OLS regression to estimate a production, cost, or distance function, and then make a 
correction to the intercept term to reflect school inefficiency” (Taylor, 2010). In this 
approach, rather than comparing a school’s efficiency to the highest rated school, the 
efficiency of a school is based on its performance compared to the average school. 
Again, as opposed to assuming that there is a frontier of school efficiency, which is done 
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on both DEA and SFA, C-OLS assumes that the efficiency is distributed along a normal 
curve. Similar to both DEA and SFA, researchers applying C-OLS methodology must 
determine both the inputs and outputs which are to be measured.  
FAST Approach to School Efficiency in Texas 
 In order to examine the cost-effectiveness of Texas public schools, the 81st 
Texas Legislative session passed House Bill 3 (HB3), which directed the State 
Comptroller of Texas to “identify school districts and campuses that use resource 
allocation practices that contribute to high academic achievement and cost-effective 
operations.” Though a better understanding of cost-effectiveness of Texas Schools was 
not the only goal of HB3, the Financial Allocation Study of Texas (FAST) was created 
in order to examine the relationship between resource allocation and student 
achievement in a way that no other study ever has. 
The Need for FAST 
The task of creating an efficiency model in Texas was complex due to a variety 
of factors. To begin, the diversity of Texas students and school districts made it difficult 
to develop an efficiency model which was able to account for the variety of factors 
which influence both student achievement and resource allocation. Complicating the 
issue further is that fact that many of variables which influence both achievement and 
cost of education are beyond the control of school districts. Therefore, FAST researchers 
consulted a wide range of experts and interest groups—experts in the field of academic 
achievement and school finance, school superintendents, school board members, 
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teachers, principals, and education groups—in order to create a model to explain 
efficiency.  
FAST researchers developed methods to rate Texas districts and campuses on a 
“level playing field” for comparisons in both spending and student performance in order 
to identify school districts, charter schools, and campuses that yielded high academic 
achievement while keeping low-operational costs. Certain factors which are beyond the 
control of districts, such as geography and demographics, were weighted and controlled 
for in both the academic and financial aspects of the FAST study. Once a district’s 
education achievement and spending index were calculated, FAST researchers 
developed a matrix which enabled every district, charter school, and campus to be rated 
on a scale of 1- to 5-stars.  
However, it is important to note that the ratings used by the FAST are not meant 
to make judgment on the value of spending versus achievement. Priorities vary amongst 
districts. Some districts/campuses may find it valuable to offer chess, Latin, or other 
advanced coursework that come with a cost to a district. These expenditures may be 
valuable to those communities, but they might not have a direct effect on the measured 
achievement of students within the district. Those expenditures, though they may be 
measured as inefficient in terms of the FAST, may have a tremendous value to those 
districts and/or campus. 
A second aspect of the FAST was the mandate to “identify potential areas for 
districts and campus improvement” (H.B. 3). FAST researchers, in addition to the rating 
of districts/campuses, evaluated the study outcomes and contacted districts which have 
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succeeded in improving student achievement while keeping costs low. FAST researchers 
developed an extensive list of “smart practices” designed to help school districts 
improve their overall efficiency. These practices are tips shared by school districts across 
Texas as a way to produce cost savings. The FAST “smart practices” are intended to 
show other districts how they might be able to improve the effectiveness of their 
operations and educational programs. They are practical and many can be replicated by 
districts wishing to save money in a variety of areas. (See FAST Smart Practices below 
for further explanation) 
Overall, the need for FAST is a direct result of the continued need for districts in 
Texas to provide an adequate education in an efficient manner. FAST ratings were not 
designed to be used as a ranking system which ranks the most efficient district down to 
the least efficient district. It was designed as a way for districts and campuses to be able 
to study how their expenditures compare with other similar districts and campuses to 
determine their relative efficiency and hopefully make changes in order to increase their 
own efficiency.  
FAST Approach to Academic Achievement 
 FAST researchers understood the complications of creating a productivity model 
of education and took steps to ensure that problems which inevitably arise from the use 
of multiple inputs and outputs were resolved. As a result, the FAST measures the 
academic progress of schools using a value-added model (VAM) approach to 
educational outputs. Rather than measuring student achievement at a given level (i.e. 
passing rate or standardized test scores), VAMs measure student growth by controlling 
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for a variety of characteristics of the students, campuses, and districts. As noted in its 
appendix, the FAST model “was used to measure annual academic growth and produce 
Academic Progress scores in math and reading for each campus and district. FAST 
researchers then combined progress in math and reading to create a composite academic 
progress score” (p. 8). The VAM approach has been used by several studies (Aaronson, 
Barrow, & Sander, 2007; Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2007; Biancarosa, Bryk, & Dexter, 
2010), so its use in the FAST is not unique.  
 The first step in developing an academic progress score was for FAST 
researchers to determine how to best control for the vastly different demographic make-
up that existed between both districts and campuses2. FAST researchers included several 
input factors for the model which were designed to control for the demographic make-up 
of students. These factors were based on a model for academic growth model used by 
Dallas ISD due to its long track record of use, its use of readily available data provided 
by the TEA, and the fact that TEA uses the Dallas ISD model in its own assessment of 
school districts. Input factors included:  
 prior-year TAKS math score 
 prior-year TAKS reading score 
 gender 
 English proficiency 
 ethnicity 
 family income (measured by those receiving free or reduced-price lunches) 
                                                 
2 The description of FAST in this and subsequent paragraphs comes from the Overview section of the 
FAST report.  
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 Special Education status 
 Gifted and Talented program status 
 language of TAKS administration (English or Spanish for grades 4-6) 
 grade level 
The factors chosen for the FAST model are standard in the literature (Bembry et. al., 
1997; Mendro et. al., 1994; Orsak et. al., n.d.) which uses such data as a way to create a 
school effect indicator on student achievement. The FAST model also included 
interaction terms made from the factors listed above in order to provide further control 
for the affect those factors had on academic progress.  
To allow for a fair comparison of all students, FAST academic progress 
methodology used a two stage process, known as multi-level, random intercepts mixed 
model, in order to better represent the growth a student that can be attributed to the 
students’ school district or campus. The first stage adjusted for the demographic make-
up, while the second stage separated out the contributions of students and campuses to 
academic growth.  
Once the control factors were determined and were able to be adjusted, 
researchers were then able to use linear regression analysis, specifically a hierarchal 
linear model (HLM), to quantify the relationships between an observed score and factors 
which affect the score. HLM models allow for the application of multiple regression 
analysis that enables the researcher to create different equations based on the level of 
observation (i.e. campus, district). Since educational data are often hierarchal—students 
are grouped at the classroom level, then campus level, then the district level—HLM 
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modeling recognizes this structure and allows the researcher to include variables from all 
levels (Webster, Mendro, Almaguer, 1994). As a result, equations may be calculated at 
the class, school, or district level (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992).  
HLM measures academic growth by comparing students achievement based on 
current year scores on the state assessment—the Texas Assessment of Knowledge and 
Skills or TAKS—and prior year performance. The current year scores became the “post-
test” while the previous year was considered the “pre-test.” After researchers controlled 
for the other factors, the influence of a campus or district on students’ academic progress 
was able to be scored. 
Scoring involved a three-level campus model and a two-level district model. The 
first level of the model represents students while the next two levels are representative of 
the districts and campuses. According to the FAST appendix, “to produce estimates for 
each model, the levels were algebraically combined into a single equation called the 
mixed model. Estimates were then produced from statewide TEA data, with effects 
partitioned between districts, schools, and individual students” (p. 4). The researchers 
noted that the estimates were based the use of the maximum likelihood and were the best 
linear unbiased predictions—or Bayes residuals—which formed the basis for estimating 
campus effect on achievement.  
FAST Approach to Resource Allocation 
 Like the Academic Progress scores, FAST researchers used multiple techniques 
to account for the difference costs associated with supplying educational services in 
diverse Texas communities. Cost of education varies in communities based on a variety 
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of factors, including cost of living, geographic size, demographic make-up of students, 
and size of districts. In order to account for these vast differences, FAST researchers 
chose to compare districts and campuses to other districts and campuses which have 
similar characteristics—which they termed as “fiscal peers”—in order to gain a more 
accurate picture of resource allocation.  
 To begin, FAST researchers used an updated version of the National Center for 
Education Statistics’ Comparable Wage Index (CWI) to account for differing wages and 
differing costs of living which exist between areas. The CWI was used to measure the 
price of both professional staff and the non-professional staff of a district. In addition, 
FAST researchers included two measures of district size to control for the per pupil costs 
of districts, especially for small schools which have a much higher cost per pupil than do 
larger districts. FAST researchers controlled for both the enrollment of students and the 
number of square miles of a district as a method to adjust for the size of districts. Finally, 
FAST researchers included measures to explain the student population costs associated 
with diverse school districts. Student demographic data included in the FAST were the 
number of: 
 limited English proficient (LEP) students 
 economically disadvantage students 
 high-needs special education students 
 other special education students 
FAST researchers recognized that these student factors require additional resources and 
can have a tremendous impact on the overall resources expended by a district and are 
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common to cost function analyses in the literature (Costrell, Hanushek, & Loeb, 2008; 
Duncombe & Yinger, 2005; Gronberg et. al., 1994; Imazeki, 2004). As a result, FAST 
researchers controlled for these inputs when calculating the overall resource allocation of 
a district.  
 In order to create fiscal peers, FAST researchers used propensity score matching 
as a way to identify the fiscal peers of a district. Propensity score matching was used to 
identify a control group of up to 40 fiscal peers for each district. These fiscal peers were 
considered the 40 most similar districts and/or charter schools with regards to cost of 
living, size, and student demographics. Once the fiscal peers were established, FAST 
researchers were then able to provide a more accurate picture for resource allocation 
comparison. Similar methodology was used in the creation of campus level fiscal peers. 
FAST researchers noted that, due to the volatility and ever changing characteristics of 
both districts and campuses, fiscal peers for campuses were recalculated every year of 
the study and that the campus fiscal peer groups changed every year based on additional 
data.  
 As part of the creation of fiscal peers, FAST researchers divided school districts 
and charter schools were stratified into 7 stratum (Special Education Districts, very small 
K-12, very large K-12, Alternative Education Accountability districts, no elementary 
grades, no high school grades, and all other districts). Some of the stratum—i.e. very 
large K-12—had less than 40 districts or charter schools which fell into the stratum. 
These districts did not have 40 fiscal peers and were only compared to the other districts 
and/or charter schools which were part of the stratum. According to the FAST appendix, 
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“each district can have a unique peer group, so that the peer groups of a particular 
districts’ peers will not necessarily be the same” (p. 10), meaning that just because 
District A had District B in its peer group did not necessarily mean that District A was in 
District B’s peer group. As a result, FAST researchers developed over 1,000 unique 
fiscal peer groups for the study. A similar method was used for the creation of campus 
level fiscal peer groups.  
 Once the fiscal peer groups were established, each of the fiscal groups were 
sorted into quintiles and each district was given a rating based on its position in the 
quintile. Quintile ratings ranged from “very low” spenders to “very high” spenders, with 
“average” districts having 40% of their peers spending less than them and 40% of 
districts spending more than them. See Table 1. 
FAST Ratings 
 Once both the Academic Progress measures and the spending index were 
calculated, the FAST research team created a FAST rating matrix which integrated the 
academic performance and spending measures to distinguish districts which were 
responsible for strong academic performance at low costs. (See Figure 1) Once both the 
Academic Progress measures and the spending index were calculated, expenditures and 
 
Table 1: 
District Expenditure by Spending Index 
Spending Index Districts Core Spending 
Adjusted Core 
Spending 
Very Low 193 $7,550 $7,675 
Low 277 $8,613 $9,371 
Average 282 $9,068 $10,260 
High 254 $9,728 $11,315 
Very High 195 $11,680 $14,066 
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outcomes were charted graphically to determine where respective districts were plotted 
in comparison to their fiscal peer groups. The FAST assigns a rating of one- to five-stars  
in terms of their educational outcomes and their financial inputs. 5-star districts were the 
most efficient in their use of resources and had a composite academic progress rating 
above 80 and have a spending index of “Very Low”. 1-star districts were considered 
least efficient in that they had a composite academic progress rating of less than 20 and a 
spending index of “Very High.” Districts were charted graphically to determine their 
overall rating. Figure 2 below shows where Austin ISD falls on the FAST rating graph, 
with the red diamond representing Austin ISD and the black dots representing Austin 
ISD’s fiscal peers. 
FAST Smart Practices 
  In addition to determining the efficiency of schools and school districts in Texas, 
one of the mandates of the FAST study was to find smart practices for districts to use to  
Figure 1: 
FAST Rating Matrix 
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increase their efficiency. The FAST found 4 areas of smart practices that are intended to 
improve both the efficiency and effectiveness of schools. Those areas are: 1) instruction 
and staffing, 2) financial management and technology solutions, 3) purchasing and 
student services, and 4) facilities.  
In the area of instruction and staffing, the FAST found that many districts were 
able to save money by increasing class size to help manage payroll costs. In addition, the 
FAST notes that the use of online education and distance learning is an area in which 
Figure 2: 
FAST Rating – Austin ISD 
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schools can save money by limiting the number of teaching positions needed to provide 
courses and by using web-based programs to provide both coursework to students and 
professional development for teachers. The use of technology to aid districts in 
evaluating student achievement and to identify students at-risk of failing or dropping out 
was also cited as a smart practice by the FAST. Finally, the use of staffing analysis to 
compare staffing patterns across districts was also noted as being a possible method for 
schools to use to save money.  
 Under financial management and technology solutions, the FAST names the 
ability of district to refinance bonded indebtedness at lower rates as a way for districts to 
save significant money. Other solutions mentioned were conducting technological 
upgrades—such as switching to virtual servers—as a way for districts to save the cost of 
having multiple servers. Possibly the biggest area of savings, as shown by the smart 
practices in the FAST, was the use of cooperatives to save on purchases and of services 
provided to students. Purchasing cooperatives offer a way for small districts to purchase 
products by pooling their orders with other districts, thereby receiving a discount in 
economies of scale. Personnel cooperatives—either by sharing the cost of providing a 
service or sharing personnel with other districts—can provide significant savings to a 
district. Finally, contracting out services, such as transportation, food services, or 
maintenance services, are given as a smart practice for districts wishing to save money.  
 With regards to facilities, districts which use architectural prototypes to save 
money of building design fees is noted as a smart practice for large districts which are 
forced to build multiple campuses due to either enrollment growth or the need to 
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upgrade from older, less efficient buildings. Districts are also saving money by acting as 
their own general contractor when building and repurposing buildings rather than 
constructing new ones. All of these smart practices are ways in which districts are saving 
money.  
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
 This chapter begins with an explanation of the design of the study along with a 
review of the research questions that will be studied. Next, an explanation of the 
research hypotheses and variables that will be tested, along with the rationale for each, is 
given. An explanation of the data is given including the source of the data, why the data 
were chosen, and the transformation of the data before analysis. From there, an 
explanation of the methods of analysis is provided, describing how the data will be 
tested to prove or disprove the given hypotheses. Finally, the methods used to ensure the 
trustworthiness and reliability of the data are discussed.  
Design of the Study 
 The design of the study is to examine the effect of how school districts spend 
money on their overall efficiency rating as measured by the Financial Allocation Study 
of Texas (FAST). The per-pupil expenditures of each of the major financial function 
codes for each district will be examined, along with specific object financial codes that 
have been shown through literature to have an effect on the efficiency in district. The 
research design will use quantitative methods by conducting multivariate analyses to 
uncover possible connections between spending patterns and FAST rating.  
Research Questions 
 The previous review of literature focused on the evolution of school finance in 
Texas and the emergence of school accountability. The review of literature also 
 
 
76 
 
discussed the economic concept of school efficiency and the approach to school 
efficiency in Texas. This research and its design were designed to answer each of the 
following research questions:  
1. Based on the FAST study, what are the spending patterns of school districts at 
each of the 5 rating levels of the FAST? 
2. Does the district’s allocation of resources predict the district’s efficiency as 
measured by the FAST?  
3. How do efficient districts compare in their resource allocation across the function 
and program versus less efficient districts? 
4. Do other factors—district size, property wealth, administrative costs, teacher 
experience, student/teacher ratio, cocurricular spending—explain differences in 
the FAST measure of efficiency? 
Research Hypotheses 
 The research hypotheses were established to analyze the possible implications of 
school spending in Texas in order to create a predictive model as to how schools in 
Texas are considered efficient when measured by the FAST. The current economic 
climate in Texas makes it essential for school leaders to be as efficient as possible with 
their funds. As schools are now expected to do more with less, there are increasing calls 
from state legislatures for districts to prove that they are doing all that can be done to 
provide their services in a cost effective manner (Lewis, 2008). While there is 
considerable debate amongst researchers as to which methods can or should be used to 
test for efficiency (Hanushek & Raymond, 2006; Jones, 2004), there is little debate as to 
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the need for districts to be more efficient. It is important to remember that amongst many 
calling for more efficiency in school districts, there is an assumption that greater 
efficiency can be gained by school through organizational changes (Levin, 1997). There 
is also an assumption that efficient school districts allocate their resources differently 
than do inefficient school districts. An analysis of how districts spend money can explain 
some of those inefficiencies.  
Differences in spending can come in a variety of ways, including programmatic, 
curricular, and personnel decisions, and it is important for school leaders to know what 
those differences are in order to better understand how to make decisions that lead to 
greater efficiency. The explanation of how and why schools are efficient can come from 
a variety of sources—academic research, politicians, practicing administrators, the 
general public, etc.—and the first step for researchers is to determine which variables are 
to be tested and create a logical rationale for testing each variable.  
 One of the most widely mentioned source of inefficiency in schools is the belief 
that schools have too many administrators and not enough money is spent on instruction. 
Research by Walters (2005) found that a statistically significant relationship exists 
between high achieving districts and low administrative costs per student, and that those 
same districts had the highest percentage of expenditures for instruction. Walters’ 
findings were consistent with other research (Roper, 1996; Tuner, 1999) which found 
higher instructional spending was related to higher student performance.  
In 2005, Texas Governor Rick Perry famously announced Executive Order 
RP47, which directed the then-Texas Commissioner of Education Shirley Neely “to 
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develop an indicator requiring school districts to spend at least 65 percent of their budget 
directly on classroom-related expenditures” (2005). The “65% Rule,” as it came to be 
known, gave Texas school districts three years to ensure that 65 percent of all 
expenditures were expended for instructional services as specified by the National 
Center for Education Statistics (NCES). Despite outcries from public education 
advocates and parents (Center for Public Policy Priorities, 2005), Perry pushed forward 
with his plan. However, in 2009 Governor Perry decided to scrap the 65 percent rule in 
favor of a better way to measure efficiency (Embry, 2009).  
While Governor Perry admitted that the 65 percent number was an arbitrary 
number, it is still a widely held belief that money spent on instruction is a more efficient 
use of school resources. Therefore, as part of this study, an analysis of percentage of 
expenditures on instruction will be conducted. Additionally, it is assumed that more 
efficient schools spend less on administrative costs per pupil than do less efficient school 
districts. An analysis of administrative costs per pupil and efficiency as measured by the 
FAST will also be conducted and it is believed that the analysis will reject the null 
hypothesis that there is no difference between administrative costs per pupil and 
efficiency rating.  
One of the key components of the definition of school efficiency is that school 
districts produce a certain level of output at a given cost. According to the FAST study, 
the output for schools is student achievement and academic progress on a variety of 
measures, including state accountability tests, graduation rates, and college entrance 
exams. One of the factors most often mentioned as increasing student achievement is 
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strong staff development. Though there are a considerable number of studies that link 
professional development by teachers to increased student achievement (Kirjavainen, 
2009; Ross, 1992; Sanborn, 2002), there is also a considerable body of literature that 
states that the professional development must be extensive and requires a large 
investment in order to be effective (Jacob & Lefgren, 2004). Therefore, it is expected 
that is a relationship between districts’ spending on staff development and efficiency and 
that the analysis will reject the null hypothesis.  
There are many other student characteristics that have been associated with high 
student performance and greater efficiencies in schools. Research has shown that schools 
with high numbers of low-socioeconomic students are less efficient (Ray, 1991) and that 
student attendance has an effect on the efficiency of schools (Chalos and Cherian, 1995). 
Also, districts with high number of Limited English Proficient (LEP) students are more 
likely to be inefficient (Dunbumbe, Miner, & Ruggerio, 1997). It is expected that 
districts with low levels of poverty, low numbers of LEP students, and high attendance 
rates are shown to be more efficient as measured by the FAST and that this study will 
reject the null hypothesis.  
There has been great debate as to the extent to which the wealth level of a 
district, most often measured by property value, has on the efficiency of schools. 
Duncombe, Miner, and Ruggeiro (1997) found a positive relationship between efficiency 
and property wealth, meaning that as property wealth increases the efficiency of a 
district increases. Therefore, it is expected that the null hypothesis that there is no 
relationship between efficiency and property value will be rejected.  
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Another factor relating to the efficiency of schools is the size of a district. 
Researchers (Andrews, Duncombe, Yinger, 2002) have shown that there is potential cost 
savings when very small districts—500 or less pupils—grow to an enrollment of 2,000 
to 4,000 students. Saving costs are primarily come from administrative and instructional 
savings. The authors continue to show that per pupil costs continue to decrease until 
enrollment levels reach approximately 6,000 students when the effects of diseconomies 
of scale begin to be seen. Andrews, Duncombe, and Yinger found that sizeable 
diseconomies of scale emerge once the enrollment of a district reaches 15,000.  
Another argument made is that extracurricular activities, specifically athletics, 
are a misallocation of money and those activities should be funded outside the regular 
school funding mechanism (Miles, 2010). However, Scott Milder (2011), President and 
CEO of the non-profit agency Friends of Texas Public Schools, writes in his newsletter 
about a case study done in Northside ISD which shows that athletes have a higher 
attendance rate, higher graduation rate, and higher standardized test scores than do  non-
athletes. He further cites the data which show that athletes in Northside ISD have lower 
discipline referrals and that it is a myth that athletics and extra-curricular activities cost 
too much. While Milder points out that Northside ISD spent over $3 million in athletics 
in 2011, that amount represented only 1.47% of total expenditures in the district. 
According to the 2010-2011 Academic Excellence Indicator System (AEIS) report, 
school districts in Texas spent $1.15 billion dollars as a whole on extracurricular 
activities, which was approximately 2.6% of the total expenditures in the state. It is 
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expected that schools that spend more money on athletics will be as measured more 
efficient by the FAST study and that the null hypothesis will be rejected.  
Data Collection 
 The data to be used for this study comes from financial data available from the 
FAST study. Each year, the Texas Education Agency (TEA) releases data through its 
Public Education Information Management System (PEIMS). This data, which free to 
the public and is located on the TEA website, “encompasses all data requested and 
received by TEA about public education, including student demographic and academic 
performance, personnel, financial, and organizational information” (TEA website, 2012). 
This voluminous source of information allows researchers a vast supply of information 
that can be analyzed and manipulated as needed.  
The researchers who conducted the Financial Allocation Study of Texas (FAST) 
used PEIMS data in order to conduct their study. The choice to use the FAST as a 
framework to study efficiency in Texas school districts is due to the fact that, currently, 
the FAST is used by the Texas Comptroller as the measure of efficiency in Texas. The 
FAST is an easy-to-use tool for practicing administrators and policy-makers to compare 
the relative efficiency of school districts. A knowledge of what efficient school districts 
do is important for decision makers who are trying to do more with less. It also allows 
for a comparison of districts on a per-student basis, not simply spending as a whole. The 
ability to compare districts at a per student basis is important because the total spending 
per district varies widely across the state relative to the size of each district.  
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For this study, the data collected were from data which are commonly used 
throughout education finance studies. These data included all spending by districts and 
charter schools to determine if the spending patterns existed between the most efficient 
districts and those districts which were rated less efficient. In addition, data were 
collected regarding the programmatic spending patterns of districts and charter schools 
to create a better understanding of the effects of programmatic expenditures and 
efficiency. The data on program spending included per pupil spending on each of the 6 
programs reported by districts and charter schools to the TEA. Data were also gathered 
on the enrollment of districts and charter schools to ascertain whether the size of a 
district or charter schools had an effect on its efficiency. Data on the property value per 
pupil and property tax value were included to establish whether or not property wealthy 
districts were more efficient than those with less property value per pupil.  
In addition to collecting data on the size, wealth, and spending patterns of 
districts, data were collected on a variety of other spending patterns were used in this 
study. The data regarding administrative spending of districts, including the overall 
spending on administration, the salaries of both central and campus level administrators, 
and the percent of both campus and central level administrators, were collected for 
analysis in the study in an attempt to clarify whether school districts waste money on 
administration. Data on teacher characteristics, including student/teacher ratio, teacher 
experience, and teacher turnover, were collected. This data were used to determine 
whether or not these teacher characteristics had an effect on the efficiency of districts. 
Finally, data were collected on the spending by districts on athletics. Athletic  
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expenditures, especially in Texas where high school football is such an important part of 
the culture, are often cited as source of inefficiency in public schools. Therefore, it was 
necessary to collect data in this area to make conclusions as to whether spending on 
athletics was, in fact, an area of waste in public schools.  
Data Analysis 
 STATA 12 for Windows© was used for data analyses. To begin the analyses, the 
FAST data was divided into the 5 data sets of district data based on their rating. The 
FAST rated districts in 9 different categories: 1-star, 1.5-star, 2-star, 2.5-star, 3-star, 3.5-
star, 4-star, 4.5-star, and 5-star districts. Over three years of FAST data, there were 3,399 
school districts and charter schools that were rated in the FAST. Of those, there  
were 96 (2.82%) 1-Star rated districts and charter schools. 267 (7.86%) school districts 
and charter school were rated 1.5-star. There were 421 (12.39%) 2-star rated districts 
and charter schools. There were 589 (17.33%) 3-st rated school districts and charter 
schools and 671 (19.74%) 3.5-star districts. There were 420 (12.36%) districts were  
 
Table 2: 
Overview of FAST Rated Districts 
FAST Rating 2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011 Total Percent 
1-star 24 37 35 2.82% 
1.5-star 83 89 95 7.86% 
2-star 145 142 134 12.39% 
2.5-star 201 199 189 17.33% 
3-star 225 218 228 19.74% 
3.5-star 186 163 166 15.15% 
4-star 138 140 142 12.36% 
4.5-star 86 104 97 8.44% 
5-star 43 46 45 3.91% 
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rated 4-star, while 287 (8.44%) were rated 4.5-star. Finally, there were 134 (3.91%) 5-
star rated school districts and charter schools. See Table 2.  
The next step in the analyses was to conduct multivariate analyses of districts 
across each of the 5 rating scales of the FAST. An ordered logit model was used to 
analyze data in the multivariate analyses. A multivariate analysis is a statistical method 
which entails observation and analysis of multiple variables at one time. Unlike 
univariate analyses, which describe the characteristics of only one category, a 
multivariate ordered logit technique allows study across multiple measurements while 
calculating the marginal effects and statistical significance of all the various independent 
variables on the dependent variable. This method helps the researcher to determine what 
is similar and what is different about the spending patterns for the district.  
The multivariate analysis technique that will be used in this study is the ordered 
logit. The ordered logit is especially useful because, like other multivariate analysis 
techniques such as ordinal least squares (OLS) or an analysis of variance (ANOVA), 
ordered logits are able to identify statistically significant variables. However, unlike  
other multivariate techniques, ordered logits are able to discern differences between 
ordinal categories of the dependent variable. For example, the ordered logit does not 
assume the difference in spending between a 5-star district and a 4-star district is the 
same as the difference in spending between a 2-star district and a 1-star district. This 
differentiation is important because it allows for a more complete picture of the spending 
differences. An ordered logit is also appropriate for modeling FAST ratings because the 
ratings are categorical dependent variables—meaning the district rating will fall into one 
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of the 5 ratings shown by the FAST—and because ordered logits are able to take into 
account the fact that some categories are more desirable than others, i.e. it is more 
desirable to be a 5-star district than a 1-star district. The ordered logit model is able to 
estimate both the statistical significance and direction of the relationship between the 
independent and dependent variable, as well as the marginal effect of each relationship. 
This technique increases the estimation power of the analyses. 
The drawback to this multivariate analysis technique is that the predictive power 
of the model may appear low due to the number of dependent variable categories. By 
having 9 categories, the likelihood that the each variable is predictive is reduced. There 
are so many factors that affect the efficiency of schools that it is possible that that 
predictive value of one variable is affected by the presence of other variables. Despite 
this concern, the ordered logit is an appropriate and widely accepted technique for 
multivariate analyses.  
As an example, by conducting an ordered logit on the relationship between 
administrative costs and efficiency of a district it may be possible to create an estimate 
of how much effect an decrease in the amount spent on administration will have on the 
efficiency rating of the district. If a district leader knows that an decrease in 
administrative costs by two percent can be estimated to create an increase of one 
category in efficiency rating—i.e., go from a 2-star district to a 3-star district—then it is 
possible for the district leader to focus ways to cut administrative spending in order to 
increase the district’s rating in the FAST. An understanding of this type of relationship 
can help guide the district leader’s decisions when formulating the budget for the 
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district. This type of information can be extremely valuable to the district as tough 
decisions are being made when formulating the budget.  
Construction of Variables 
 As noted previously, data will be collected through information available through 
the Public Education Information Management System (PEIMS) available on the Texas 
Education Agency’s website. One drawback to this data was that some of the financial 
data available was provided as total expenditures, not per student expenditures. In order 
to create per student expenditures for all the data, the total expenditures in the PEIMS 
data will be divided by the average daily attendance (ADA) of the district. This method 
was the same as what is done with PEIMS data in the FAST. Per student expenditures 
allowed for a better comparison of spending due to the huge discrepancies in overall 
enrollment between districts, i.e. 200,000-plus students in Houston ISD compared with 
many districts with less than 500 students.  
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CHAPTER IV 
FINDINGS AND RESULTS 
Introduction 
 Chapter 4 presented the results of the descriptive statistics of the quantitative 
research. The findings and results of each of the 5 major variables to be tested were 
given and an explanation of each finding was provided. Chapter 4 began with an 
analyses of the expenditure patterns of school districts to determine where and in what 
areas highly effective districts spend their money. Next, an analyses of the results 
between relationship between district size and student demographics and efficiency as 
measured by the FAST. Following district size, results were given regarding the 
relationship between property wealth and FAST rated efficiency. Next, the findings and 
results of the relationship between instructional spending and efficiency were given 
followed by the findings on the relationship between administrative costs and efficiency 
as measured by the FAST. After administrative costs were presented, the findings and 
results of the relationship between class size and efficiency as measured by the FAST 
were provided. Finally, the findings and results of the relationship between athletic 
spending and efficiency were presented. 
Expenditures by Function as a Predictor of Efficiency 
 In the many debates about school efficiency, one of the key points of contention 
was how and where schools spend money (Ferguson, 1991). It was therefore necessary 
to begin the analysis of school efficiency as measured by the FAST with an overview of 
where school districts and charter schools spend money. Spending data gathered from 
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the FAST were analyzed by studying total expenditures and on the function level—
instruction, administration costs, debt service, etc.—on a per pupil spending level. Both 
univariate and multivariate analyses from fiscal years 2009, 2010, and 2011 were 
included. 
2008-2009 Data Analyses 
 In the 2008-2009 school year, FAST data reported that there were 1,131 school 
districts and charter schools which were measured by the FAST. The average total 
expenditures for all districts and charter schools were $9,607 per pupil, with a minimum 
expenditure of $4,876 per pupil and a maximum of $29,678. As part of the analyses a 
box and whisker diagram was created to help determine if any outliers existed in the 
data. Statistically, outliers are observations which deviate significantly from the other 
members of the population and could adversely skew the results. Based on the data, it 
was determined that districts and charter schools spending over $26,000 per pupil could 
be considered outliers and were therefore removed for the data. A total of one outlier 
was removed from the data. See Figure 3.  
 Once the outlier was removed the data were sorted into the 9 categories of the 
FAST and the measures of central tendency were calculated. A review of the data and 
show that the mean spending per pupil decreases as the FAST rating for the district 
increases. On average, 1-star districts spent more per pupil than 1.5-star districts. 1.5-star 
districts spent more than 2-star districts and so on. 5-star districts spent $5,259 per pupil, 
which was almost $3,400 less per pupil than 1-star districts. See Table 3. 
 In order to determine if there was a statistically significant difference in the 
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Figure 3: 
Total Expenditures per Pupil, 2008-2009 
 
 
 
 
levels of spending across the 9 categories of the FAST, a regression analysis was 
performed. The regression analysis showed that there was, in fact, a strong statistically 
significant difference (p < .01) across each of the categories of the FAST. These 
 
Table 4: 
Total Expenditures per Pupil by FAST Rating, 2008-2009 
FAST 
Rating 
# Obs Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. Max 
All 1,131 $9,607 2563.584 $4,876 $29,678 
1-star 24 $12,263 3040.873 $7,750 $19,979 
1.5-star 83 $10,713 3128.953 $7,407 $25,238 
2-star 145 $10,431 2479.34 $6,674 $20,987 
2.5-star 201 $9,968 2526.05 $6,806 $23,512 
3-star 224 $9,798 2810.818 $5,198 $25,098 
3.5-star 186 $9,075 1746.932 $4876 $16,286 
4-star 138 $8,869 1777.229 $5,207 $17,304 
4.5-star 86 $8,298 1317.335 $6,060 $13,498 
5-star 43 $7,355 1012.553 $5,311 $9,893 
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findings, though not surprising, clearly indicated that more efficient districts and charter 
schools do spend less per pupil, on average, than do their less efficient peers. However, 
the fact that there were inefficient districts which spent less per pupil than efficient 
districts indicated that where districts spend money was also a factor in efficiency. See 
Table 4. 
 Once the regression analyses were completed, an ordered logit regression was 
completed to determine if there was a relationship between the total operating 
expenditures per pupil and the overall FAST rating. As expected, the ordered logit 
showed that there is a negative, statistically significant relationship between total 
operating expenditures and FAST efficiency meaning that more efficient districts spent 
less on their total operating expenditures than did less efficient districts. The ordered 
logit also indicated that a negative relationship was present between the percent of 
students who were economically disadvantaged and the FAST rating, while a positive,  
Table 4: 
Distribution of Total Expenditures per Pupil by FAST Rating, 2008-2009 
FAST Rating Coefficient Standard Error 
1-star  12262.75*** 477.2002 
1.5-star -1549.931*** 541.8181 
2-star -1831.536*** 515.1812 
2.5-star -2294.8*** 504.8866 
3-star -2464.263*** 502.1142 
3.5-star -3187.395*** 507.0535 
4-star -3394.004*** 517.0334 
4.5-star -3965.076*** 539.6942 
5-star -4907.308*** 595.6674 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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statistically significant relationship was present between district size and efficiency, 
signifying that larger school districts were more efficient when rated by the FAST than 
were smaller districts. See Table 5.  
In order to take a more in-depth look at the spending patterns of the districts and 
charter schools and to determine what effect, if any, the size of a district and the socio-
economic make-up of the district might have, an ordered logit was completed to 
determine which spending function had the greatest effect on the efficiency of the 
district. A total of 18 variables were inputted—the 15 functions of spending as reported 
by Texas school districts and charter schools, plus the total enrollment of the district or 
charter school, and the percent of students who were considered economically 
disadvantaged—with the hope of finding where districts and charters should spend or 
save money.  
There were 6 spending functions that were found to have a statistically 
significant impact on the FAST rating. Data showed that districts which spent less per 
pupil on instruction and instructional leadership were likely to achieve a higher FAST 
rating. In addition, districts which spent less on student support services (i.e. nurses, 
guidance counselors, social work services), security, data processing services, and 
Table 5: 
Ordered Logit Model of Total Expenditures per Pupil, 2008-2009 
 Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Robust 
Standard Error 
Total Expenditures per Pupil -2.735697*** .2802609 .3052768 
Total Enrollment Count .0936392** .0382701 .0413437 
Economically Dis. (Percent) -.0214989*** .0027742 .0030796 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table 6: 
Ordered Logit Model of Expenditures by Function, 2008-2009 
 Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Robust 
Standard Error 
Instructional Expenditures -1.313329*** .3764404 .4091274 
Instr. Related Expenditures .0186212 .0762632 .0795295 
Instr. Leadership Expenditures -.0998491*** .0292942 .029731 
School Leadership Expenditures .056245 .1066213 .0903107 
Support Services Expenditures -.2364724*** .0623433 .0702972 
Transportation Expenditures .0152686 .0497195 .0548292 
Food Services Expenditures .0396065 .075253 .0744735 
Cocurricular Expenditures -.10887 .0629917 .0767683 
Central Administrative Expenditures -.0774943 .1762095 .1895212 
Plant Maintenance Expenditures -.2967514 .1774508 .2334317 
Security Expenditures -.0747272* .043106 .044301 
Data Processing Expenditures -.0538697* .0320173 .0323408 
Community Services Expenditures -.0688913* .03814 .0398185 
Debt Service Expenditures -.0111339 .0260863 .0264398 
Capital Outlay Expenditures -.0146247 .0299724 .0303378 
Total Enrollment Count .371057*** .0804157 .0860743 
Economically Dis. (Percent) -.0207014*** .0031965 .0033928 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
 
 
community services also performed better on the FAST. All other functions of spending 
were found not to have statistically significant impact on overall FAST rating. It was 
also found a positive correlation for districts with higher student enrollment and the 
FAST and a negative correlation between low socio-economic student percentage and 
the FAST. See Table 6. 
A Chi-squared easily rejects the hypothesis that the coefficients on all the 
expenditure categories are jointly zero. In other words, the analysis again demonstrates 
that differences in expenditure predict differences in FAST ratings. The test shows that 
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the probability of having greater Chi-squared test statistic is 0.00, therefore one can 
reject the hypothesis that Expenditures by Function are irrelevant.  
2009-2010 Data Analyses 
 Using the same methods as were used with 2008-2009 FAST data, data from the 
2009-2010 school year were analyzed. In that year, the FAST rated 1,138 school districts 
and charter schools which spent an average of $9,749 in total expenditures per student. 
A box and whisker plot was again created to help determine if any outliers in the data 
existed, and it was found that there were 4 districts or charters schools which reported $0 
total expenditures per pupil. It was assumed that there was an error in the data reporting 
 
Figure 4: 
Total Expenditures per Pupil, 2009-2010 
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to the state for those 4 districts or charters, and those observations were removed from 
the data set. See Figure 4. 
 Districts and charter schools were once again sorted over the 9 categories of the 
FAST and the measures of central tendency were once again calculated. Unlike the 
2008-2009 data, there was not a consistent drop in average level of spending across the 
categories. 2009-2010 saw the average spending of 1.5-star district higher than 1-star 
districts by almost $411, while 2-star districts also spent more on average per pupil than 
1-star districts. However, the data showed that expenditures per pupil did decrease from 
2.5- to 5-star districts, and 5-star districts spent an average of $2,870 less per student 
than 1-star districts. See Table 7.  
 Once again a regression analyses was completed to determine the statistical 
significance of the differences across the categories. As with 2008-09, a strong, 
statistically significant relationship (p < .01) existed between 3.5- to 5-star districts and 
1-star districts. A slightly less (p < .05) statistically significant difference was found  
Table 7: 
Total Expenditures per Pupil by FAST Rating, 2009-2010 
FAST 
Rating 
# Obs Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. Max 
All 1,138 $9,749 2535.439 $0 $23,836 
1-star 37 $10,603 2212.748 $7,730 $16,836 
1.5-star 89 $11,014 3003.998 $7,284 $22,221 
2-star 142 $10,637 2932.951 $7,205 $23,836 
2.5-star 197 $10,399 2743.919 $6,401 $21,836 
3-star 216 $9,819 2437.23 $5,098 $21,565 
3.5-star 163 $9,450 1715.955 $6,106 $15,917 
4-star 140 $9,008 1839.357 $6,161 $17,688 
4.5-star 104 $8,508 1375.971 $5,411 $12,885 
5-star 46 $7,733 1015.87 $4,879 $10,033 
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between 3-star districts and 1-star districts, and there was no statistically significant 
difference found between 1-star districts and 1.5-, 2-, and 2.5-star districts. See Table 8.  
Once the regression analysis was completed, an ordered logit was run to see if 
the same relationship existed between total operating expenditures per pupil and FAST 
rating was present in 2009-10 as was present in 2008-09. As with the previous year, the 
data show that there was a negative, statistically significant relationship between total 
operating expenditures per pupil and FAST rating at the p < .01 level. Again, this finding 
indicated that schools which spend more on total operating expenditures per pupil are 
less efficient than those which spend less. Also similar to the findings in 2008-09, the  
 
Table 9: 
Ordered Logit Model of Total Expenditures per Pupil, 2009-2010 
 Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Robust 
Standard Error 
Total Expenditures per Pupil -2.753417*** .2844209 .2790494 
Total Enrollment Count -.0159316 .0399333 .0413089 
Economically Dis. (Percent) -.0226379*** .002842 .0030425 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
Table 8: 
Distribution of Total Expenditures per Pupil by FAST Rating, 2009-2010 
FAST Rating Coefficient Standard Error 
1-star 10602.51*** 383.5925 
1.5-star 410.9921 456.4155 
2-star 34.78226 430.6778 
2.5-star -203.2648 418.0661 
3-star -783.6246* 415.1485 
3.5-star -1152.213*** 424.9045 
4-star -1594.756*** 431.3132 
4.5-star -2094.321*** 446.6455 
5-star -2869.187*** 515.2645 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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percent of students who were economically disadvantaged has a negative impact on the 
overall efficiency of a district. However, data from 2009-10 did not see a significant 
relationship between district size and efficiency. See Table 9.  
 Once again an ordered logit was conducted to determine how the spending 
patterns of districts might impact on the FAST rating. Unlike 2008-09, which saw 6 of 
the 15 functions of spending have an impact on FAST rating, 2009-10 data indicated that 
5 of 15 functions of spending had a statistically significant relationship on the FAST 
rating. Once again, there existed a negative correlation between instructional 
expenditures, instructional leadership, student support services, and community services 
expenditures and efficiency. However, 2009-10 data showed no statistically significant 
Table 10: 
Ordered Logit Model of Expenditures by Function, 2009-2010 
 Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Robust 
Standard Error 
Instructional Expenditures -1.053749*** .3790796 .3991663 
Instr. Related Expenditures -.0466154 .0721885 .0744991 
Instr. Leadership Expenditures -.0865214*** .0294778 .0298802 
School Leadership Expenditures -.0838489 .1016141 .0738445 
Support Services Expenditures -.2231713*** .0600096 .0622122 
Transportation Expenditures .0594154 .0493692 .0583002 
Food Services Expenditures .0967814 .0805369 .0892133 
Cocurricular Expenditures -.1021459 .0595839 .0705023 
Central Administrative Expenditures .2180447 .01654578 .1812781 
Plant Maintenance Expenditures -.6207935** .1810016 .2815515 
Security Expenditures .0232077 .0426366 .0445849 
Data Processing Expenditures -.0444106 .0330473 .0357576 
Community Services Expenditures -.095488** .0370028 .0390254 
Debt Service Expenditures -.0068729 .0249826 .022358 
Capital Outlay Expenditures -.0313243 .0259984 .0248795 
Total Enrollment Count .3394349*** .078143 .0879813 
Economically Dis. (Percent) -.0274324*** .0032835 .0035039 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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difference in the areas of security expenditures and data processing expenditures. New to 
the findings was that a negative, statistically significant difference was present between 
plant maintenance and operations costs (p < .05). The size of a district or charter school 
was once again positively related to FAST rating, while the negative, statistically 
significant correlation between economically disadvantaged students and FAST rating 
was once again seen in the data. Once again, the Chi-squared test revealed that the 
probability of having a greater Chi-squared statistic is 0.00 and the hypothesis is 
rejected. See Table 10.  
2010-2011 Data Analyses 
 In the final year of FAST data, there were 1,130 districts and charter schools 
rated by the FAST. Those districts and charter schools spent an average of $10,066 in 
total expenditures per pupil. A box and whisker plot was once again created to view the 
distribution of expenditures per pupil across the 9 categories of the FAST and to 
determine if any outliers were present. As in 2009-10, it was determined that school 
districts and charter schools which did not report any total expenditures per pupil would 
be considered outliers and were removed from the data set. A total of 3 outliers were 
removed. See Figure 5. 
 Overall, the average total expenditures per pupil decreased as FAST rating 
increased across the categories. There were two exceptions. 2010-11 data showed that 2-
star districts expended more per student—$131 more—than did 1.5-star districts and 4-
star districts spent $22 more per student than did 3.5-star districts. 5-star districts, which 
spent less on average than all other categories, spent over $4,000 less per student than 
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Figure 5: 
Total Expenditures per Pupil, 2010-2011 
 
 
 
 
did 1-star districts and charter schools, which had the highest average expenditures per 
pupil. See Table 11.  
 Once the measures of central tendency were calculated, a linear regression was  
 
Table 11: 
Total Expenditures per Pupil by FAST Rating, 2010-2011 
FAST 
Rating 
# Obs Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. Max 
All 1,136 $10,066 2494.695 $0 $23,831 
1-star 35 $12,101 3342.16 $7,820 $23,831 
1.5-star 95 $10,887 2670.855 $8,120 $21,676 
2-star 135 $11,018 2689.718 $7,040 $22,229 
2.5-star 188 $10,597 2576.45 $6,434 $23,752 
3-star 229 $10,063 2432.239 $4,433 $20,236 
3.5-star 166 $9,337 2067.318 $5,591 $18,345 
4-star 143 $9,359 1668.461 $6,220 $14,871 
4.5-star 97 $8,718 1310.74 $5,658 $13,102 
5-star 45 $7,998 1138.416 $5,437 $12,024 
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conducted to determine the statistical significance of the differences. Again as in 2008-
09, there was a statistically significant difference found between each of the 9 categories 
of the FAST, with 8 of the 9 categories showing a significant different at the p < .01 
level. Though it should be noted that the expenditures per pupil increased overall 
between 2008-09 and 2010-11. 5-star districts in 2010-11 spent an average of $634 more 
per pupil than in 2008-09 and $265 more per pupil than in 2009-10. See Table 12.  
 Once the regression analyses were finished, an ordered logit regression was done 
to determine whether a relationship existed between the total operating expenditures 
per pupil and FAST rating. As with the prior two years of data, the ordered logit 
revealed a negative, statistically significant (p < .01) relationship between total operating 
expenditures and FAST rating. As with the two prior years, there existed a negative 
relationship between the percent of students who were economically disadvantaged and 
FAST rating. Unlike either of the two previous years, district size was found to also have 
a negative, statistically significant relationship (p < .10), but this difference might have 
Table 12: 
Distribution of Total Expenditures per Pupil by FAST Rating, 2010-2011 
FAST Rating Coefficient Standard Error 
1-star 12101.23*** 388.3245 
1.5-star -1214.229*** 454.2602 
2-star *1083.695** 735.765 
2.5-star -1504.425*** 422.9298 
3-star -2038.713*** 416.9452 
3.5-star -2164.367*** 427.3058 
4-star -2742.69*** 433.2482 
4.5-star -3383.548*** 452.9976 
5-star -4103.495*** 517.766 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table 13: 
Ordered Logit Model of Total Expenditures per Pupil, 2010-2011 
 Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Robust 
Standard Error 
Total Expenditures per Pupil -3.008492*** .3002277 .3098659 
Total Enrollment Count -.0675212 .045155 .0422137 
Economically Dis. (Percent) -.0238879*** .00286 .003123 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
 
been a result of changes in the calculations of the FAST fiscal peers in the third year of 
the study.  See Table 13.   
The final step in the process was to complete an ordered logit analyses to verify 
whether spending by function had any predictive value in 2010-11. The findings for the 
 
Table 14: 
Ordered Logit Model of Expenditures by Function, 2010-2011 
 Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Robust 
Standard Error 
Instructional Expenditures -1.015481** .3969665 .4183498 
Instr. Related Expenditures -.1376984 .0799812 .0937104 
Instr. Leadership Expenditures -.071555** .0295365 .0300013 
School Leadership Expenditures -.0953158 .1031472 .0980695 
Support Services Expenditures -.1178256** .0578106 .0565998 
Transportation Expenditures .0061295 .0494357 .058967 
Food Services Expenditures .1351098 .0868703 .1001056 
Cocurricular Expenditures -.1039321 .0605883 .0664807 
Central Administrative Expenditures .0488069 .1692684 .1803632 
Plant Maintenance Expenditures -.6167241** .1605272 .2409025 
Security Expenditures -.0143553 .0426288 .0437132 
Data Processing Expenditures -.0144773 .0341119 .0367557 
Community Services Expenditures -.0808751** .0369581 .0385024 
Debt Service Expenditures .0092948 .0255276 .0244423 
Capital Outlay Expenditures -.0774578** .0295222 .0300742 
Total Enrollment Count .2338342*** .077043 .080781 
Economically Dis. (Percent) -.0281436*** .0032912 .0035738 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
 
101 
 
ordered logit regression were similar to both the findings in 2008-09 and 2009-10. As in 
both years, there was a negative, statistically significant relationship between 
instructional expenditures, instructional related services, student support services, and 
community services expenditures per pupil. Also as with both prior years, there was a 
positive relationship between district size and FAST rating, while a negative relationship 
existed between the percent of students who were economically disadvantaged and 
efficiency. As with the findings in 2009-10, there was once again a negative, statistically 
significant relationship between plant maintenance and operation expenditures and 
FAST rating. New to the findings in 2010-11 was that expenditures in capital outlay—
generally used for the purchase of new property or major improvements to school sites—
were found to have a negative effect on FAST rating. As in 2008-09 and 2009-10, the 
Chi-squared test showed a probability of having a greater Chi-squared statistics as 0.00. 
See Table 14.  
Multiyear FAST Data Analyses 
 Up to this point, the FAST data analyses had consisted of 3 one-year snapshots of 
FAST data. It became important to verify whether the findings in the snapshots would 
hold over the 3-year span of the FAST. As a result, the data were pooled and an ordered 
logit was once again run for the total operating expenditures per pupil and the 15 
functions of spending used by schools in Texas. By pooling the data, it is possible to 
restrict the coefficient to be the same for each year, thereby allowing the average effect 
of each independent variable to be measured.  
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 In order to increase the validity of the findings, a school year dummy variable 
was created to transform all the data to deviations from the state average on FAST rating 
for each year. Year dummy variables allowed for a level shift each year. It was assumed 
that certain costs were expected to increase each year due to inflation and other factors. 
By inserting a dummy variable into the ordered logistic regression, the relationship 
between increased spending due to inflation was controlled. Data from 2008-09 were 
omitted in the dummy variable calculations to account for collinearity.  
 In the ordered logit analysis for total operating expenditures per pupil, it was 
found that there was a negative, statistically significant relationship (p < .01) between 
total expenditures and FAST rating. Districts which spend more than the state average 
were found to have lower FAST ratings than districts which spend less. The results for 
each of the three years of data were mixed with regards to the relationship between 
district size and FAST rating. 2008-09 showed a positive relationship. 2009-10 showed 
no statistical significance in the relationship, while 2010-11 had a negative relationship. 
Therefore, it was not surprising to find that the three year analysis presented no 
statistically significant relationship between size and FAST rating. Also not surprising 
 
Table 15: 
Ordered Logit Model of Total Expenditures per Pupil, 2008-2011 
 Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Robust 
Standard Error 
Total Expenditures per Pupil -2.857544*** .1683311 .1729298 
Total Enrollment Count -.0209049 .0234284 .0246717 
Economically Dis. (Percent) -.0218635*** .0016342 .0017863 
School Year 2 .133227* .0742627 .0749245 
School Year 3 .2299214*** .0746284 .0747662 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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was to find that the percent of students who were economically disadvantaged continued 
to have a negative, statistically significant relationship. See Table 15.  
 After the analyses for total operating expenditures were completed, an ordered 
logit was completed for the 15 functions of spending. As was expected, the 4 functions 
of spending which were consistently found as being negative—instructional 
expenditures, instructional leadership, student support services, and community 
services—across each of the single years of FAST ratings were once again seen to be a 
negative predictor of efficiency. Other expenditures such as capital outlay and data 
processing, which were seen as significant in only one of the years, were found to be  
Table 16: 
Ordered Logit Model of Expenditures by Function, 2008-2011 
 Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Robust 
Standard Error 
Instructional Expenditures -.7046722*** .2284464 .237678 
Instr. Related Expenditures -.1161007** .0505946 .0556699 
Instr. Leadership Expenditures -.0870272*** .0173178 .0174896 
School Leadership Expenditures -.0349326 .0903387 .0824162 
Support Services Expenditures -.1863871*** .0402334 .0419378 
Transportation Expenditures .0157547 .0308597 .0363745 
Food Services Expenditures .0564497 .1014452 .1168365 
Cocurricular Expenditures -.1453168*** .0378477 .0437011 
Central Administrative Expenditures .0790168 .1013699 .1077034 
Plant Maintenance Expenditures -.7188001*** .1176188 .1365209 
Security Expenditures -.0073722 .0251014 .0255407 
Data Processing Expenditures -.0375511* .0194161 .0227407 
Community Services Expenditures -.0675583*** .0217903 .0227407 
Debt Service Expenditures .0025925 .0149724 .0143021 
Capital Outlay Expenditures -.037421** .016843 .0170515 
Total Enrollment Count .2921458*** .0462208 .0494813 
Economically Dis. (Percent) -.0270173*** .0019924 .002814 
School Year 2 .1044976 .0760989 .076953 
School Year 3 .170989** .0769716 .077429 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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negatively significant over the three year span of data. District size was found to have a 
positive impact on FAST rating, while the percent of economically disadvantage 
students was again found to be negatively correlated with FAST rating. There were, 
however, two functions which were not shown to have a statistically significant impact 
in any individual year that were shown to have a statistically significant impact over the 
three years of FAST data. Instructional related expenditures, which include costs for 
librarians and professional development, was shown to have a negative impact on FAST 
rating (p < .05). Cocurricular activities—which includes athletics—were also found to 
have a negative, statistically significant (p < .01) effect on efficiency. As with the 
individual year analyses, the Chi-squared test yielded a probability of having a greater 
Chi-squared statistics as 0.00. See Table 16.   
 Though it was hoped to be able to find functions which positively impact FAST 
rating, these findings were significant in that they could guide practicing administrators 
and superintendents to find specific functions in the budget that might be reduced and 
have a minimal impact on efficiency. These findings are also consistent with the findings 
of Andrews, Duncombe, and Yinger (2002) who found that there are potential cost 
savings in instructional costs for relatively larger districts. These findings also support 
the work of Ray (1991) who found that districts with high numbers of low-
socioeconomic students are less efficient.  
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Linear Specification of Spending by Function 
 After completing the ordered logistic regression using logarithmic terms, it was 
decided the same ordered logistic regression would be completed using actual dollars per 
pupil in each of the spending functions used by school districts.3 By using actual dollars 
rather than the logarithms of each dollar, it became easier to analyze the effect of 
moving money from one function to another function.  
 By using a linear specification, one could clearly see that removing money from 
districts as a whole created greater efficiency. However, this model also indicated that 
certain functions had a greater negative impact on efficiency than did others because 
these functions had a greater negative coefficient. For example, the coefficient for 
Community Service was -.0014427 while the coefficient of Instruction was -.0000835. 
This finding indicated that, while both were negatively correlated to efficiency, cutting 
expenditures in Community Service would result in a greater increase in efficiency than 
would cutting the same amount in Instruction. The same could be said for Instructional 
Related Services, School Leadership, Student Support Services, Cocurricular Services, 
Plant Maintenance and Operations, Data Processing, and Capital Outlay. In fact, the only 
areas where a positive correlation occurred between actual dollars per pupil and 
efficiency was in the functions of Administration and Debt Services. This finding was 
likely the resulted from larger districts, which tend to be more efficient than do smaller 
districts, have greater administrative costs than do smaller districts. See Table 17. 
                                                 
3 It is worth mentioning that the “goodness of fit” results indicated that the logarithmic model yielded a 
higher result (-6435) than did the linear model (-6652). However, the linear model was included because it 
may yield more applicable information for practicing administrators than would a logarithmic model 
alone.  
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 For practicing administrators, there are two ways to interpret the linear regression 
shown in Table 17. One way to interpret the results is to consider where one might cut 
money in the budget in order to increase efficiency. Suppose dollars had to be cut from 
the budget from a specific function. By analyzing the coefficients from Table 17, district 
leaders can see which functions are most inefficient, thereby allowing district leaders to 
pull money from those functions first.  
 Another interpretation of the results of the linear regression would allow district 
leaders to know where best to spend money. If one were to imagine a scenario where 
districts leaders would be able to pull resources from one function and place the same 
Table 17: 
Ordered Logit Model of Linear Expenditures by Function, 2008-2011 
 Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Robust 
Standard Error 
Instructional Expenditures -.0000835** .0000373 .0000408 
Instr. Related Expenditures -.0013685*** .0002452 .0002597 
Instr. Leadership Expenditures -.0020247*** .003168 .0004774 
School Leadership Expenditures -.0003158* .0001791 .0001894 
Support Services Expenditures -.000785*** .0001773 .0002514 
Transportation Expenditures .0002606 .0001865 .0002219 
Food Services Expenditures -.0002355 .0002478 .000257 
Cocurricular Expenditures -.0006532*** .0001698 .0001804 
Central Administrative Expenditures .0002415** .0000867 .0001056 
Plant Maintenance Expenditures -.0002348*** .0000603 .0000883 
Security Expenditures .0011919 .0010048 .0010258 
Data Processing Expenditures -.000458* .0002346 .000238 
Community Services Expenditures -.0014427* .0006793 .0008293 
Debt Service Expenditures .0000792** .0000317 .0000311 
Capital Outlay Expenditures -.0000185** .000001 .0000001 
Total Enrollment Count .1979113*** .0329346 .0352035 
Economically Dis. (Percent) -.0234529*** .0019675 .0021181 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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resources into another function, then knowing the coefficients of those two functions 
would aid in the decision making. For example, pulling money from Instruction and 
putting the money into Administration would increase efficiency because the coefficient 
for Administration is less negative than the coefficient for Instruction. A Chi-squared 
test completed for such a scenario was completed and the probability of having a greater 
Chi-squared is 0.0076. Therefore, one can reject the hypothesis that there is no 
difference in spending on Instruction versus spending in Administration.  
 This information could be invaluable to district leaders who are forced to make 
cuts but are unsure as to where the cuts should be made. If given the option of cutting 
costs in Cocurricular spending versus Capital Outlay, it would be better to cut in 
Cocurricular than it would be in Capital Outlay because the negative coefficient in 
Cocurricular is greater than the negative coefficient in Capital Outlay. This information 
could also help district leaders in making personnel decisions. If given the option of 
hiring an additional assistant principal or an additional curriculum specialist, district 
leaders should choose to hire an assistant principal because spending in the area of 
Administration is more efficient than spending on Instructional Leadership.  
Program Expenditures as a Predictor for Efficiency 
 As noted in Chapter 2, there is a great deal of both academic and political 
controversy regarding to what extent school districts should be spending their money on 
instruction (Center for Public Policy Priorities, 2005). It was therefore necessary to take 
an in-depth look at instructional programs such as Regular Education, Special Education, 
Career and Technology Education, and others to determine if spending in these specific 
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programs can be used as a predictor of FAST efficiency. Unlike the review of total 
expenditures per pupil, which looked at spending at the function level, the analyses on 
Total Operating Expenditures by Program focused on specific programs which may 
affect efficiency. As defined by the Texas Education Agency, Total Operational 
Expenditures by Program are actual operating expenditures for groups of program 
categories. This analyses was important due to the fact that many of the instructional 
programs receive direct funding from the state and are an aspect of the weighted daily 
average attendance used to fund school districts and charter schools. 
2008-2009 Data Analyses 
 Using 2008-2009 data, analyses of the relationship between instructional 
program spending per pupil and a district’s efficiency as measured by the FAST were 
completed. In 2008-2009, 1,131 districts and charter schools rated by FAST showed 
expenditures in instructional spending. Those districts were analyzed using both 
univariate and multivariate methods.  
As with spending by function, the districts and charter schools were divided into 
each of the 9 categories of the FAST for analyses. Prior to the analyses, a box and 
whisker plot was completed to determine if any outliers existed. Statistically, 
observations above or below 5 standard deviations could be considered outliers. The data 
showed that any observations above $14,961 per student could be considered outliers 
and were removed from the data. There was one observations above $14,961 which was 
removed, as well as 3 observations at $0 which were removed, leaving a total of 1,127 
districts and charter schools for analysis. See Figure 6. 
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Figure 6: 
Instructional Program Expenditures per Pupil, 2008-2009 
 
The data showed only one group—1-star rated districts and charter schools—to 
have a mean spending on instruction above $8,000 per pupil. The data also revealed that 
the mean spending per pupil went down as the FAST rating went up. Though there was 
 
Table 18: 
Instructional Program Expenditures per Pupil, 2008-2009 
FAST Rating # Obs Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. Max 
All 1,131 $6,824 1628.018 $0 $15,348 
1-star 24 $8,627 2151.085 $5,201 $13,223 
1.5-star 82 $7,427 1634.594 $4,543 $12,039 
2-star 145 $7,639 1692.051 $4,178 $14,858 
2.5-star 200 $7,101 1549.572 $4,188 $13,124 
3-star 223 $6,936 1695.009 $3,497 $14,114 
3.5-star 186 $6,530 1132.358 $2,569 $10,751 
4-star 138 $6,402 1261.577 $3,604 $13,002 
4.5-star 86 $6,092 960.8883 $4,167 $9,921 
5-star 43 $5,259 940.1481 $3,019 $6,863 
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no consistent pattern observed in the minimum and maximum amount in spending per 
pupil. See Table 18. 
Once the measures of central tendency were computed, a regression analysis was 
done to test for the differences in the means using robust standard error. Statistically 
significant differences between the relationships of the coefficient values of the different 
FAST categories was found in each of the categories, with 7 of the 9 categories being 
statistically significant at the .01 level. This finding indicates that as instructional 
spending decreases, FAST rating increases, so districts and charter schools which spend 
less on instruction per pupil actually rate better through FAST. This finding is 
contradictory to research (Cullen, Jones, & Slate, 2011) and informal assertions that 
schools which increase instructional expenditures perform better. See Table 19.  
Upon completing the regression analyses, an ordered logit regression was 
performed in order to control for the size and the economic make-up of the districts and 
charter schools. Unlike the simple test of the difference in means presented in the  
Table 19: 
Distribution of Instructional Program Expenditures per Pupil, 2008-2009 
FAST Rating Coefficient Robust Standard Error 
1-star 8627.208*** 300.4196 
1.5-star -1200.696*** 341.5658 
2-star -1258.091*** 324.3304 
2.5-star -1526.548*** 317.9343 
3-star -1691.63*** 316.1727 
3.5-star -2097.112*** 319.2137 
4-star -2225.216*** 325.4965 
4.5-star -2535.255*** 339.7625 
5-star -3368.092*** 375.0002 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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regression analysis, the ordered logit no longer indicated a negative, statistically 
significant relationship between total instructional spending by program and the FAST 
rating. As with operational expenditures by function, there existed a statistically 
significant positive relationship between district size and FAST rating and a negative, 
statistically significant relationship between the percent of students who were 
economically disadvantaged and FAST rating. See Table 20. 
After reviewing the total expenditures by program, an in-depth look into each of 
the 8 program categories was completed. The ordered logistic regression showed that 
 
Table 21: 
Ordered Logit Model of Instructional Expenditures by Program, 2008-2009 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
Robust 
Standard Error 
Regular Education  -.4229918** .1738872 .1953203 
Special Education   -.510392*** .1015912 .1245545 
Accelerated Instruction -.4316952*** .0945308 .1254884 
Gifted and Talented -.123184** .0484706 .049051 
Career and Technology -.0006665 .0425201 .0443305 
Bilingual/ESL .1997752*** ..0362302 .0373653 
Athletics -.0338478 .0453969 .0451172 
Other -.1050823*** .0309889 .0310497 
Total Enrollment Count .2101605*** .0523184 .0576156 
Economically Dis. (Percent) -.0215128*** .003768 .0042263 
* p < .10, ** p <.05, *** p < .01 
Table 20: 
Ordered Logit Model of Total Instructional Expenditures by Program, 2008-2009 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
Robust 
Standard Error 
Total Instructional Expenditures -2.765692*** .2825277 .3090558 
Total Enrollment Count .0933332*** .0382716 .0413502 
Economically Dis. (Percent) -.0214165*** .0027749 .0030802 
* p < .10, ** p <.05, *** p < .01 
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there were 5 programs which were negatively associated with efficiency—regular 
education, special education, accelerated instruction, gifted and talented, and other—
which means that as spending in those programs increased, the efficiency of a district or 
charter school decreased. There was one program which showed a positive relationship 
to efficiency, spending in Bilingual/ESL. As with total program expenditures, there 
existed a positive relationship between district size and FAST rating and a negative 
relationship between the percent of students who were economically disadvantaged and 
FAST rating. This finding is consistent with the research of others (Duncombe, Miner, & 
Ruggiero, 1997) that showed schools with high rates of poverty, students at-risk, and 
students in special education are less efficient than other schools. The Chi-squared test 
showed that the probability of having a greater Chi-squared test statistic is 0.00. As a 
result, one can reject that hypothesis that Expenditures by Program are irrelevant. See 
Table 21. 
2009-2010 Data Analysis 
 After analyzing the 2008-2009 data, data from the 2009-2010 FAST report were 
analyzed to determine if results were consistent with the prior analysis of the relationship 
between instructional spending by program and FAST rating. In 2009-2010, the data 
showed that 1,138 districts and charter schools were analyzed for the FAST report with 
an average total spending by program per pupil was $7,604. As with each of the prior 
analyses, a box-and-whisker plot was prepared to determine outliers. After the 
completion of the box-and-whisker plot, it was determined that districts with 
instructional spending of greater than $15,635 were more than 5 standard deviations  
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above the mean and were removed as outliers. A total of 3 districts and charter schools 
were removed, leaving a total of 1,135 observations for analyses. See Figure 7.  
The data were sorted into each of the 9 categories of the FAST to determine the 
measures of central tendency in each category. As with the 2008-2009 data, the 
measures of central tendency showed that as districts increased in their FAST rating, 
total spending by program decreased. 5-star districts had a mean value of instructional 
program spending per pupil that was over $2,000 less per pupil than did 1-star districts 
and over $500 less per student than 4-star districts. The only exception was the 1.5-star 
districts spent more on instructional programs than did 1-star districts. See Table 22.  
 
Figure 7: 
Instructional Program Expenditures per Pupil, 2009-2010 
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Table 22: 
Instructional Program Expenditures per Pupil, 2009-2010 
FAST Rating # Obs Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. Max 
All 1,138 $7,065 1714.235 $2,804 $20,614 
1-star 37 $7,679 1462.304 $5,952 $11,928 
1.5-star 89 $7,802 1813.589 $4,736 $14,442 
2-star 142 $7,561 1795.573 $3,997 $14,365 
2.5-star 197 $7,387 1722.077 $3,733 $13,901 
3-star 217 $7,095 1583.367 $3,637 $13,931 
3.5-star 163 $6,871 1265.883 $3,543 $12,528 
4-star 140 $6,525 1332.268 $3,543 $12,528 
4.5-star 104 $6,192 1022.215 $3,022 $9,087 
5-star 46 $5,644 966.7292 $2,804 $7,852 
 
 
 
     
 
Once the measures of central tendency were calculated, a regression analysis was 
performed to test for differences within the means of the categories using robust standard 
errors as measures. During the regression analysis, a statistically significant relationship 
was found for 3-star districts (p<.05) and for 4-, 4.5-, and 5-star (p<.01) districts and 
charter schools. However, unlike 2008-09 data which showed statistically significant  
 
Table 23: 
Distribution of Instructional Program Expenditures per Pupil, 2009-2010 
FAST Rating Coefficient Robust Standard Error 
1-star 7679*** 249.8035 
1.5-star 122.6067 297.2274 
2-star -117.7535 280.4665 
2.5-star -291.7462 272.2535 
3-star -584.2627** 270.2624 
3.5-star -808.4724*** 276.7068 
4-star -1153.529*** 280.8803 
4.5-star -1487.308*** 290.865 
5-star -2035.304*** 335.5511 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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differences between each of the 9 categories, 2009-10 data did not show a statistically 
significant difference between 1.5-, 2-, and 2.5 star districts and charter schools.  See 
Table 23.  
In order to control for both the size of school and the percent of students which 
were economically disadvantaged, an ordered logit was conducted. When controlling for 
both size and wealth, the data indicate there is negative, statistically significant 
relationship between total instructional expenditures by program and FAST rating. There 
continued to be a negative relationship between the percent of students who were 
economically disadvantaged and efficiency. However, unlike the previous year, there 
was no significance between size and rating. See Table 24.  
As with 2008-09, instructional programs were analyzed using an ordered logistic 
regression. There were several differences seen in the results. To begin, spending in 
Regular Education was no longer seen to be a significant predictor of FAST rating. 
However, spending in Special Education, Accelerated Instruction, Gifted and Talented, 
and Other all remained negatively correlated with efficiency. Like 2008-09 data, 
spending in the program area of Bilingual/ESL continued to be positively related to 
FAST rating. Unlike the previous year, spending in Career and Technology Education 
Table 24: 
Ordered Logit Model of Total Instructional Expenditures by Program, 2009-2010 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
Robust 
Standard Error 
Total Instructional Spending -2.729025*** .2761721 .2871821 
Total Enrollment Count .0386079 .0374927 .0392873 
Economically Dis. (Percent) -.024632*** .0028045 .0029582 
* p < .10, ** p <.05, *** p < .01 
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Table 25: 
Ordered Logit Model of Instructional Program Expenditures, 2009-2010 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
Robust 
Standard Error 
Regular Education  -.6463406 .230267 .4519041 
Special Education   -.3457939*** .1071857 .1267138 
Accelerated Instruction -.3721555** .1133804 .1567894 
Gifted and Talented -.1220221** .048851 .04937 
Career and Technology -.076304* .0428356 .0451824 
Bilingual/ESL .059568*** .0197213 .0201834 
Athletics .0090882 .0459757 .0458445 
Other -.1536984*** .0320227 .033728 
Total Enrollment Count .1866707*** .0610177 .0700974 
Economically Dis. Percent -.0242766*** .0042293 .0048814 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
 
 
was found to be statistically significant (p < .10). As had been seen for all analyses to 
this point, total enrollment count of a district or charter schools was positively correlated 
to FAST rating while the percent of students who were economically disadvantaged 
continued to display a negative, statistically significant relationship with FAST 
efficiency. The Chi-squared test once again revealed that the probability of having a 
greater Chi-squared statistic is 0.00. See Table 25.  
2010-2011 Data Analyses 
 After the completion of the analyses for both 2008-2009 and 2009-2010, 
analyses of the 2010-2011 FAST data was completed to verify the findings of the two 
previous years. A similar method was used, starting with the determination of outliers 
and then moving forward with both univariate and multivariate analyses. 2010-2011 data 
showed 1,136 districts and charter schools reported expending money on instruction. A 
box and whisker plot was created to help determine if any outliers existed within the  
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data. It was decided that school districts and charter schools which spent over $15,911 
per pupil on instructional program expenditures were above 5 standard deviation limit 
used to determine outliers and were removed from the data. A total of 2 outliers were 
removed. See Figure 8. 
 Once the outliers were established and removed from the data, the data were 
divided into the 9 categories of the FAST for analyses. The measures of central tendency 
were calculated and it was found that 1-star districts spend the greatest amount per pupil 
at $8,664 while 5-star districts spend almost $1,400 less per pupil at an average of 
$5,919. 1.5-star districts spent slightly less per student ($7,809) than did 2-star districts, 
while mean spending went down from 2.5- to 5-star districts. Overall, as instructional 
Figure 8: 
Instructional Program Expenditures per Pupil, 2010-2011 
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program spending per pupil went down, the FAST rating of districts and charter school 
increased. See Table 26. 
 Once the measures of central tendency were calculated, a regression analysis was 
conducted to determine if there was any statistical significance in the results. The 
regression showed that a negative, statistically significant relationship existed between 
each of the categories of the FAST and 1-star districts. In fact, there was a strong, 
negative correlation (p < .01) in each of the categories except for 2-star districts, which 
had a significant relationship at the p < .10 level. See Table 27. 
 Once the regression confirmed a statistically significant relationship did occur 
between instructional spending and FAST rating, an ordered logit was completed to see 
which factors it total instructional program expenditures had a significant relationship 
with FAST rating. Data showed that both total instructional program expenditures and 
the percent of students who were economically disadvantaged had a negative, statistical 
significant relationship with FAST rating. However, in 2010-11 there was no statistical 
Table 26: 
Instructional Spending per Pupil, 2010-2011 
FAST Rating # Obs Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. Max 
All 1,136 $7,308 1720.638 $3,023 $19,985 
1-star 35 $8,664 2229.818 $6,066 $14,963 
1.5-star 95 $7,809 1466.532 $5,459 $13,416 
2-star 135 $7,909 1893.918 $3,875 $14,878 
2.5-star 189 $7,619 1709.094 $4,042 $15,453 
3-star 229 $7,240 1691.009 $3,023 $15,674 
3.5-star 166 $7,175 1346.215 $3,116 $13,327 
4-star 143 $6,816 1203.097 $4,016 $11,553 
4.5-star 97 $6,389 944.0799 $3,826 $9,343 
5-star 45 $5,919 992.2427 $3,554 $8,773 
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significance with the size of district when analyzing instructional program expenditures. 
These findings were the same as in 2009-10. See Table 28.   
 As in 2008.09 and 2009-2010, there was a strong (p < .01) negative, statistically 
significant relationship between spending with spending on special education, 
accelerated instruction, and other programs, as well as a strong negative, statistically 
significant correlation between the percent of low-SES students and FAST rating. 
Though spending on regular education services was still found to be statistically 
significant, the negative correlation was only found at the p < .05 level. Spending on 
gifted and talented programs was also negatively correlated to FAST rating at the p < .10 
Table 27: 
Distribution of Instructional Program Expenditures by FAST Rating, 2010-2011 
FAST Rating Coefficient Standard Error 
1-star 8664.029*** 261.2027 
1.5-star -855.3023*** 305.5537 
2-star -754.9841** 293.1131 
2.5-star -1044.981*** 284.3615 
3-star -1423.614*** 280.4542 
3.5-star -1488.914*** 287.4231 
4-star -1848.49*** 291.4202 
4.5-star -2274.606*** 304.7045 
5-star -2745.229*** 348.2703 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 28: 
Ordered Logit Model of Total Instructional Expenditures by Program, 2010-20011 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
Robust 
Standard Error 
Total Instructional Spending -2.805502*** .2851739 .3016623 
Total Enrollment Count .0022839 .0377269 .0395895 
Economically Dis. (Percent) -.0263205*** .0028283 .0030702 
* p < .10, ** p <.05, *** p < .01 
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level. Also similar to the previous data, spending on Bilingual/ESL programs continued 
to show a positive relationship. These findings were similar to the research of Chaikind, 
Danielson, and Brauen (1993) which found special education students cost and average 
of 2.3 times more to educate than regular education students. Also, the number of 
students enrolled in a school district or charter school no longer showed a statistically 
significant relationship. The Chi-squared test presented the probability of having a great 
Chi-squared test statistic as 0.00. See Table 29.  
Multiyear FAST Data Analyses 
 The final step in the process was to pool all three years’ worth of FAST data and 
analyze the effect of spending instructional program expenditures and FAST rating. As 
expected, the ordered logistic regression showed that total expenditures per pupil by 
program was negatively correlated with FAST rating (p < .01) while the percent of  
Table 29: 
Ordered Logit Model of Instructional Expenditures by Program, 2010-2011 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
Robust 
Standard Error 
Regular Education  -.9904084** .2493422 .4682882 
Special Education   -.4300491*** .1079745 .133839 
Accelerated Instruction -.577037*** .132874 .216873 
Gifted and Talented -.0817984* .0476476 .046563 
Career and Technology -.0174108 .046303 .0530554 
Bilingual/ESL .1329784*** .035604 .0367115 
Athletics -.0550674 .0511114 .0561344 
Other -.1422*** .0315751 .031909 
Total Enrollment Count .1078259 .0535205 .0668469 
Economically Dis. Percent -.0227997*** .0046059 .0061086 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table 30: 
Ordered Logit Model of Total Instructional Expenditures by Program, 2008-20011 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
Robust 
Standard Error 
Total Instructional Spending -2.679648*** .1598938 .1707636 
Total Enrollment Count .0437559* .0218449 .023189 
Economically Dis. (Percent) -.0241479*** .0016159 .0017488 
School Year 2 .1582909** .0743209 .0749202 
School Year 3 .2521273*** .074784 .0746792 
* p < .10, ** p <.05, *** p < .01 
 
 
students who were economically disadvantaged continued to display a negative 
correlation with FAST efficiency. Though two of three years did not show that district 
size had a statistically significant impact on FAST rating when analyzing program 
expenditures, the three-year analysis did conclude that district size was positively 
associated with FAST rating. See Table 30.  
 When analyzing specific programs, the results showed that a majority of 
programs—5 of 8—were negatively correlated with FAST rating. Spending on Regular 
Education, Special Education, Accelerated Instruction, Gifted and Talented, and Other 
program expenditures were found to have a strong (p < .01) negative relationship with 
FAST rating. These findings suggested that efficient districts spend less on these 
programs than did less efficient districts. However, as was seen in all three individual 
years, Bilingual/ESL Education programs continued to show a positive, statistically 
significant relationship with FAST rating, suggesting that Bilingual and ESL programs 
were an efficient use of district funds. This finding seemed to support the work of De 
Jong (2002) which found that effective bilingual education programs improve academic  
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Table 31: 
Ordered Logit Model of Instructional Expenditures by Program, 2008-2011 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
Robust 
Standard Error 
Regular Education  -.586032** .1305938 .2408856 
Special Education   -.3688154*** .0657739 .0792772 
Accelerated Instruction -.2758776*** .0585533 .0705793 
Gifted and Talented -.1261228*** .0276451 .0274126 
Career and Technology -.0398606 .0251224 .0268652 
Bilingual/ESL .1433721*** .0205287 .0211639 
Athletics -.0317672 .0272584 .0280775 
Other -.1301225*** .0181563 .0183576 
Total Enrollment Count .2264379*** .0296096 .034941 
Economically Dis. Percent -.0301342*** .0020496 .0022279 
School Year 2 .0963328 .0744888 .0756256 
School Year 3 .1644075** .074363 .074442 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
 
 
achievement of second language learners. Spending in the areas of Career and 
Technology Education and Athletics were not found to be statistically significant.  
Finally, the ordered logit analysis found that larger schools were positively related to 
FAST rating and that districts and charter schools with high numbers of economically 
disadvantaged students continued to be negatively correlated with efficiency. As with all 
three individual year analysis, the Chi-squared test indicated that the probability of 
having a great Chi-square test statistic is 0.00. See Table 31.   
District Size as a Predictor of Efficiency 
 Due to the number of studies (Andrews, Duncombe, Yinger, 2002; Deller and 
Rudnicki, 1993; Duncombe, Miner, & Ruggerio, 1997) which have found that the size of 
a school district had an impact on its efficiency, it became important to look at school 
district size as a predictor of FAST efficiency. Student enrollment numbers, along with 
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the number of students within a district broken down by ethnic group were used as 
variables in for analysis. Analyses included both univariate and multivariate methods for 
each of the three years of FAST data and analyses of pooled data from FAST. 
2008-2009 Data Analyses 
 In the 2008-2009 school year, there were approximately 4,728,204 students 
enrolled in public school districts and charter schools in Texas. FAST data showed 
ratings for 1,131 school districts and charter schools. The average size for districts and 
charter schools rated by the fast was 4,148 students with the smallest district in the state 
having an enrollment of 38, while the largest had an enrollment of 199,524. A box and 
whisker plot was created to see visualize the distribution of district enrollment across 
each of the categories of the FAST. The plot showed that the widest distribution of  
 
Figure 9: 
District Size, 2008-2009 
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Table 32: 
District Size by FAST Rating, 2008-2009 
FAST Rating # Obs Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. Max 
All 1,131 4,147 12263.37 38 199,524 
1-star 24 1,113 1514.43 80 5,419 
1.5-star 83 4,184 11102.24 41 79,114 
2-star 144 1,989 3934.033 49 27,230 
2.5-star 201 2,063 4503.17 38 30,647 
3-star 224 3,513 9726.112 47 83,033 
3.5-star 186 3,610 8612.184 37 63,189 
4-star 138 3,946 9960.281 88 88,201 
4.5-star 86 8,500 14578.48 94 68,507 
5-star 43 12,216 21328.84 276 100,505 
 
 
 
     
 
district size came with 5-star rated districts and that the smallest distribution came with 
1-star districts. The box and whisker plot also enabled the researcher to determine any 
outliers were present in the data. It was decided that there were two school districts with 
enrollment numbers that could clearly be considered outliers—Dallas and Houston 
ISD—and were removed from the data set. See Figure 9. 
Once the box and whisker plot was completed and the outliers were removed, the 
measures of central tendency were calculated across each of the 9 categories of the 
FAST. The data showed that 4.5- and 5-star districts had the highest mean of all the 
categories while 1-star districts had the lowest mean. Overall, district enrollment 
increased as FAST rating increased with the exception of 1.5-star districts, which had the 
third highest mean enrollment behind only the 4.5- and 5-star districts. See Table 32. 
 In order to determine if there was a statistically significant difference between 
the categories, a regression analysis was completed. The regression showed no  
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statistically significant relationship existed between any of the categories except for 4.5- 
and 5-star districts. The statistical significance in those two categories was at the p < .01 
level. See Table 33. 
After completing a regression analysis, an ordered logit regression was calculated 
to control for a variety of student characteristics which encompassed total enrollment. In 
addition to the total enrollment, the ethnicities of students were included as variables 
within the OLS regression, as well as the percentage of students who were economically 
disadvantaged. The data showed that a statistically significant, positive relationship 
existed between both total enrollment (p < .01) and the percent of African American 
students (p < .05), the percent of Asian/Pacific Islanders (p < .01), and the percent of 
students who were Hispanic (p < .10) within a district. The only ethnic group that did not 
show a statistically significant relationship was the percentage of White students within 
a district. These findings suggested that overall district size, regardless of the ethnic 
makeup, was the most important demographic predictor of efficiency. This finding is  
Table 33: 
Distribution of Total Enrollment by FAST Rating, 2008-2009 
FAST Rating Coefficient Robust Standard Error 
1-star 1112.958 1948.068 
1.5-star 3071.09 2211.856 
2-star 876.2708 3104.154 
2.5-star 950.3501 2061.092 
3-star 2400.229 2049.774 
3.5-star 2497.02 2069.937 
4-star 2833.136 2110.68 
4.5-star 7386.716*** 2203.186 
5-star 11103.44*** 2431.684 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table 34: 
Ordered Logit Model of Total Enrollment and District FAST Rating, 2008-2009 
 Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Robust 
Standard Error 
Total Enrollment .1716884*** .0387978 .0399551 
African American (Percent) .0667568** .0469896 .0314193 
Asian/Pacific Islander (Percent) .1084298*** .0469365 .039864 
Hispanic (Percent) .0526503* .051411 .0313705 
White (Percent) .0493425 .0473591 .0316463 
Economically Dis. (Percent) -.0282352*** .0042308 .0042584 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
 
 
 consistent with the research of Andrews, Duncombe, and Yinger (2002) and Deller and 
Rudnicki (1993)which found that as enrollment goes up the relative efficiency of a 
district increased. There was also a statistically significant, negative relationship 
between the percentage of students who were economically disadvantaged and a 
district’s FAST rating. Again, this finding is consistent with Ruggiero (1996) that found 
that students whose parents had a higher education level—which are less likely to be 
economically disadvantaged—performed better than districts with a higher percentage of 
economically disadvantaged students. The Chi-squared test confirmed that the 
probability of having a greater Chi-squared test statistic is 0.00. See Table 34.  
2009-2010 Data Analyses 
 After completing the analyses of 2008-09 FAST data, the data from 2009-10 
FAST were inputted for analysis. In 2009-10, there were 4,824,778 students being 
educated in 1,138 school districts and charter schools. The average size for school 
districts and charters was 4,209 students with the smallest district or charter school in 
Texas having an enrollment of 23 and the largest with an enrollment of 200,944. 
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 Before conducting and analysis of the measures of central tendency for the 2009-
2010 FAST data, a box and whisker plot was generated to determine if any outliers 
existed within the data. After completing the box and whisker plot, it was decided that, 
once again, the two largest districts in the state could be considered outliers and were 
therefore removed from the data. See Figure 10. 
After removing the outliers, districts were divided into each of the 9 categories of  
the FAST and the measures of central tendency were calculated. In 2009-10, the 
category with the most observations were 3-star districts, which had 217 districts and 
charter schools. The category with the lowest number of observations were 5-star 
districts with 43. The mean values of 1-star districts through 3.5-star districts ranged  
Figure 10: 
District Size, 2009-2010 
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between 2,583 and 3,142, but as district rating improved to 4-, 4.5-, and 5-star districts, 
the mean values increased to between 4,916 and 11,161 for each of those categories. 
This finding suggested that the highest rated districts also had the largest student 
populations and was consistent with the findings of Andrews, Duncombe, and Yinger 
(2002) and others who have found that the relative efficiency of school districts increase 
with size. Despite this finding, there were some very large districts—enrollment 
numbers greater than 40,000 students—whose rating were only in the 1.5- to 3.5-star 
range. See Table 35. 
After completing a univariate analysis, a multivariate analysis was completed to 
determine the statistical significance of the results. As with the 2009-2010 results, there 
were no statistically significant differences found between 1-star through 4-star districts. 
However, there was a statistically significant difference found between 4.5-star districts 
(p < .05) and the other categories of the FAST and between 5-star districts (p < .01). 
 
Table 35: 
District Size by FAST Rating, 2009-2010 
FAST 
Rating 
# Obs Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. Max 
All 1,138 4,209 12408.03 23 200,944 
1-star 37 2,583 2801.689 101 15,538 
1.5-star 89 2,946 7404.515 42 55,086 
2-star 141 3,031 8330.461 23 80,103 
2.5-star 199 2,630 7774.911 36 84,245 
3-star 217 3,119 7866.574 59 63,385 
3.5-star 163 3,142 8492.302 95 65,217 
4-star 140 4,916 10911.62 86 91,464 
4.5-star 104 7,043 14248.97 124 69,066 
5-star 46 11,161 20697.39 154 103,897 
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Again, these findings suggested that larger districts are more efficient. See Table 36.  
Finally, an ordered logit was performed to control for other variables which might have 
an effect on the student population of a district. As in 2008-2009, the percentage of 
students who were economically disadvantaged were included as a variable, as well as 
the ethnic make-up of the students within a district. Unlike in the 2008-2009 data, when 
controlling for both the socioeconomic status of students and their ethnicities, only the 
total enrollment count of a district, the percentage of students who were Asian/Pacific 
Islanders, and the socioeconomic status of students were found to be statistically 
significant. There was a positive, statistically significant relationship (p < .01) between 
the enrollment size of a district and its FAST rating. Also, a positive, statistically 
significant relationship (p < .05) between the percentage of Asian/Pacific Islander 
students and FAST rating. Conversely, there was statistically significant (p < .01) 
negative relationship between the economic status of students and FAST, again 
suggesting that the few economically disadvantaged students a district had the higher its 
Table 36: 
Distribution of Total Enrollment by FAST Rating, 2009-2010 
FAST Rating Coefficient Robust Standard Error 
1-star 2582.514 1613.67 
1.5-star 363.3292 1920.016 
2-star 448.7985 1813.072 
2.5-star 41.67242 1757.293 
3-star 536.21 1745.829 
3.5-star 559.5233 1787.458 
4-star 233.508 1814.417 
4.5-star 4460.861** 1878.917 
5-star 8578.378*** 2167.578 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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rating on the FAST. This finding was consistent with both the findings of 2008-2009 and 
the research of Ruggiero (1996) which suggested that districts with high numbers of 
economically disadvantaged are less efficient. The Chi-squared test computed for 2009-
2010 resulted in the probability of having a greater Chi-squared test statistic of 0.00, 
allowing one to reject the hypothesis that Total Enrollment is irrelevant. See Table 37.  
2010-2011 Data Analyses 
 For the final year of available FAST data, the same method of analyses was used 
to determine if the findings for 2010-2011 were consistent with the findings from the 
previous two years. In 2010-2011, the student population of Texas was 4,912,385 and 
there were 1,136 school districts and charter schools measured by the FAST. The 
average size of the school districts and charter schools was 4,296 students, with the 
smallest district or charter school having an enrollment count of 37 and the largest with 
an enrollment of 203,294.  
 
Table 37: 
Ordered Logit Model of Total Enrollment and District FAST Rating, 2009-2010 
 Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Robust 
Standard Error 
Total Enrollment .1088746*** .0384764 .0384904 
African American (Percent) .0588551 .0519823 .0474556 
Asian/Pacific Islander (Percent) .1027445** .0557112 .0518246 
Hispanic (Percent) .0437704 .0518603 .0473468 
White (Percent) .0409595 .0523135 .0476495 
Economically Dis. (Percent) -.0316231*** .0042201 .0040679 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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 Prior to the analyses, a box and whisker chart was prepared to search for outliers. 
It was determined that both Dallas ISD and Houston ISD—the two largest districts in the 
state—could be considered outliers and were removed from the data. See Figure 11.  
After the outliers were removed, the data were divided into the 9 categories of 
the FAST and the measures of central tendency were calculated. The data showed that 1-
star districts had the smallest average enrollment size (1,877 students) and that 5-star 
was the largest with an average enrollment of 10,380. 5-star districts also had the 
greatest range of enrollment, with a minimum enrollment of 144 and a maximum 
enrollment of 105,860. The category with the second highest average enrollment was 
4.5-star districts with an average size of 7,173 students. The third highest average 
enrollment belonged to 4-star districts with approximately 5,125 students on average. 
The average size of categories 1.5-star to 3.5-star varied, with 3.5-star districts having 
Figure 11: 
District Size, 2010-2011 
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the next highest average while 3-star districts had the second lowest overall average. See 
Table 38. 
Once the measures of central tendency were calculated, a logistic regression was 
completed to determine the statistical significance of the differences in the categories. 
There was no statistical significance in categories 1- to 3.5-star districts. However, there  
Table 38: 
District Size by FAST Rating, 2010-2011 
FAST 
Rating 
# Obs Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. Max 
All 1,136 4,296 12595.57 37 203,294 
1-star 35 1,877 1729.085 37 5,839 
1.5-star 95 3,971 7562.995 66 41,708 
2-star 135 3,151 9291.41 51 81,511 
2.5-star 190 3,449 10012.38 40 85,273 
3-star 228 2,436 5300.204 57 44,468 
3.5-star 166 3,248 8699.921 75 66,364 
4-star 143 5,125 11767.9 91 94,632 
4.5-star 97 7,173 14333.33 141 60,573 
5-star 45 10,380 20738.2 144 105,860 
 
 
 
     
 
Table 39: 
Distribution of Total Enrollment by FAST Rating, 2010-2011 
FAST Rating Coefficient Robust Standard Error 
1-star 1877 1695.331 
1.5-star 2093.747 1983.19 
2-star 1273.511 1902.444 
2.5-star 1571.626 1844.883 
3-star 586.1128 1820.811 
3.5-star 1370.777 1865.513 
4-star 3247.51* 1891.457 
4.5-star 5295.876*** 1977.678 
5-star 8503.444*** 2260.441 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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was a positive, statistically significant difference in 4-star (p < .10), 4.5-star (p < .01) 
and 5-star (p < .01) districts. Again, the positive correlation in 4.5- and 5-star districts 
suggests that larger districts are more efficient that smaller districts, which was 
consistent with the findings in both the 2008-2009 and 2009-2010 FAST analyses and 
the research of Andrews, Duncombe, and Yinger (2002). See Table 39.  
The final step in the process was to complete an ordered logit to determine if 
other factors within total enrollment were correlated to FAST rankings. As with 2008-09 
and 2009-10, student ethnicity and the percent of economically disadvantaged students 
were included in the regressions. Findings in 2010-11 were consistent with the two 
previous years which showed a positive, statistically significant relationship existed 
between total enrollment count (p< .05), the percent of African American students (p < 
.05), and the percent of Asian/Pacific Islander students (p < .01). However, 2010-11 data 
showed no significant relationship existed between the percent of Hispanic students and 
FAST efficiency, while there was a positive relationship between the percent of White 
students enrolled (p < .10). Once again, a negative, statistically significant relationship 
 
 
Table 40: 
Ordered Logit Model of Total Enrollment and District FAST Rating, 2009-2010 
 Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Robust 
Standard Error 
Total Enrollment .0954052** .039065 .0395822 
African American (Percent) .0760989** .0315471 .035893 
Asian/Pacific Islander (Percent) .1347296*** .0371512 .0439995 
Hispanic (Percent) .053497 .0305209 .0337512 
White (Percent) .0577043* .0313901 .0345787 
Economically Dis. (Percent) -.0287134*** .0039902 .0040716 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
 
134 
 
was seen with the percent of students who were economically disadvantaged and the 
overall efficiency of the district. The Chi-squared test shows that the probability of 
having a greater Chi-squared test statistic is 0.00. See Table 40. 
Multiyear FAST Data Analyses 
 Once the single year analyses were completed, the data were pooled to determine 
the overall impact of enrollment over the three year span of the FAST. As with the 
spending by function and the spending by program, a dummy variable of the school year 
was included to restrict the coefficients to ensure that the same coefficients were being 
compared each year. As with prior analyses, data from 2008-2009 were omitted to 
account for collinearity.  
 The ordered logistic regression confirmed the findings of the individual years 
that the total enrollment of a district or charter school had a positive, statistically 
significant relationship (p < .01) with FAST rating for the pooled data. The percent of 
African American students and the percent of Asian/Pacific Islander students was also 
found to have a positive correlation with FAST rating at the p < .01 level, while the 
Table 41: 
Ordered Logit Model of Total Enrollment, 2008-2011 
 Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Robust 
Standard Error 
Total Enrollment .1240945*** .0223686 .0226976 
African American (Percent) .0566216*** .022323 .020756 
Asian/Pacific Islander (Percent) .1054953*** .0250253 .0245696 
Hispanic (Percent) .0397416* .0220642 .0204689 
White (Percent) .0389617* .0223969 .0207132 
Economically Dis. (Percent) -.029198*** .0223882 .0023831 
School Year 2 .0793374 .0741924 .0742607 
School Year 3 .1884174** .084809 .0838526 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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percent of Hispanic students and the percent of White students was positively related to 
FAST at the p < .10 level. These findings implied that, regardless of race, the overall 
enrollment of a district or charter school was the most important demographic factor in 
the overall FAST rating for that district or charter school. Also, the percent of students 
who were economically disadvantaged continued to display a negative correlation with 
FAST rating. See Table 41.   
It is important to note methodological change in the FAST between to the 2010 
FAST report and the 2011 and 2012 FAST reports which had an effect on the findings of 
this section. According to the FAST Appendix, the original analysis divided districts into 
two groups—metropolitan and nonmetropolitan districts—and then divided the districts 
into spending quintiles (i.e. very low, low, average, high, very high). The two most 
recent versions of the FAST report divided districts into four groups—small 
metropolitan, small non-metropolitan, midsized and large districts—before subdividing 
each group of districts by spending. The change in strategy was intended to reduce the 
disparity with respect to district size.  
The result of this methodological change was that district size had less of an 
effect on overall efficiency in the 2011 and 2012 FAST report than it had in 2010. This 
can be seen by noting the coefficient value in 2010 was .1716884 while the coefficient 
value in 2012 was .0954052, meaning that district size in 2010 had almost double the 
effect on efficiency as it did in 2012.  In order to control for the change in methodology, 
a fourth ordered logistic regression was completed on the data to determine if the 
interaction was different in 2010 compared to the other FAST years. The ordered logit  
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revealed that despite the methodological change, the relationship between district size 
and rating was not substantially different. Therefore, the change in methodology did not 
produce a statistically significant difference on the findings. As with each of the 
previous Chi-squared tests relating to enrollment, the Chi-squared test found that the 
probability of having a greater Chi-squared test statistic is 0.00. Therefore, the 
hypothesis is rejected that enrollment and demographic make-up of districts is irrelevant 
to efficiency. See Table 42.  
Property Wealth per Pupil as a Predictor of Efficiency 
2008-2009 Data Analyses 
Using quantitative analyses, the data from the 2008-09 FAST were analyzed to 
determine what, if any, relationship existed between a school district’s efficiency as 
measured by the FAST and property value per pupil. In 2008-09, the data showed 1,131 
districts and charter schools rated by the FAST. Of those, 111 observations had a 
property value of $0, meaning they were likely charter schools which do not levy a 
Table 42: 
Ordered Logit Model of Total Enrollment, 2008-2011 
 Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Robust 
Standard Error 
Total Enrollment .0959608*** .0263137 .026571 
African American (Percent) .05596*** .0222965 .0206552 
Asian/Pacific Islander (Percent) .1051645*** .0250178 .0245439 
Hispanic (Percent) .0391177* .0220381 .0203691 
White (Percent) .0382336* .0223715 .020616 
Economically Dis. (Percent) -.0295253*** .0023868 .0023824 
School Year 2 .05295823* .3016025 .2972212 
School Year 3 .638266** .3042387 .2988423 
School Year 2008 .0649842 .0422271 .0418081 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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property tax and therefore have no property value per pupil. The remaining 1,020 
observations were analyzed using univariate and multivariate methods.  
 The data were sorted into each of the 9 categories used by the FAST—1-star, 
1.5-star, 2-star, etc.—to calculate the measures of central tendency for each category.  
Prior to calculating the measures of central tendency, a box and whisker plot was 
performed to determine if any outliers existed within the data. The data showed any 
observations above $4,692,847 per pupil were considered outliers because those 
observations were more than 5 standard deviations above the mean; therefore, any 
observations that were above that threshold were removed from the data. There were a 
total of 11 outliers removed. See Figure 12. 
Figure 12: 
Property Value per Pupil, 2008-2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
138 
 
 The data showed that there was no consistent pattern in either the mean value, 
minimum value, or maximum value when comparing FAST districts rated from 1-star to 
4-star. However, the data revealed that 4.5- and 5-star districts did, in fact, have a lower 
mean property value per pupil than did 1-star to 4-star districts. The 4.5- and 5-star 
districts had a maximum value per pupil of$866,277 and $800,041 respectively, while 
each of the other FAST categories had a maximum value of greater than $1.6 million per 
pupil. More interestingly, despite the fact that 5-star districts had the lowest maximum 
property value per pupil, 5-stardistricts also displayed the highest minimum value per 
pupil. The minimum property value per pupil for 5-star districts was $116,821, which 
was more than the highest minimum value per pupil of any other category. See Table 
43.  
 Once the measures of central tendency were calculated, a regression analysis was 
performed to test for the differences in means using robust standard errors. The analyses 
indicated a statistically significant difference existed between, 7 of the FAST categories 
Table 43:  
Property Value per Pupil, 2008-2009 
FAST 
Rating 
# Obs Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. Max 
All 1,020 $530,153 832538.8 $30,920 $10,950,949 
1-star 23 $673,039 754800.2 $39,273 $3,214,192 
1.5-star 79 $389,103 303461.5 $54,901 $1,633,202 
2-star 130 $630,831 722198.8 $58,874 $4,585,111 
2.5-star 184 $428,649 493891.1 $61,221 $3,052,426 
3-star 198 $532,469 659531.6 $30,920 $4,456,982 
3.5-star 172 $405,968 421877.8 $35,016 $2,950,051 
4-star 115 $463,029 564989 $71,102 $4,271,507 
4.5-star 76 $337,773 180027 $80,836 $866,277 
5-star 32 $318,663 134643.5 $116,821 $800,306 
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of the FAST and 1-star districts; however, only the 4.5-star districts and charter schools 
reached the p < .01 threshold. See Table 44. 
The next step in the process involved completing an ordered logit using district 
FAST rating as the dependent variable and the property value per pupil as the 
independent variable. During the analyses, several external factors which related were 
controlled for, including the percent of revenue generated locally and the percent of state 
revenue earned by the district. These controls were based on the idea that districts with 
higher percentages of locally generated revenue might be more inclined to be efficient in 
their spending. Also, the district’s adopted maintenance and operations tax rate and 
interest and sinking tax rate were controlled for with the belief that districts which have a 
higher tax rate would be more desirous to be more efficient with their money. Finally, 
the district or charter schools overall size and the percent of students who were 
economically disadvantaged were also included as part of the regression.  
Table 44: 
Distribution of Property Wealth per Pupil by FAST Rating, 2008-2009 
FAST Rating Coefficient Robust Standard Error 
1-star 673039.1*** 111734.8 
1.5-star -283936.4** 126962.4 
2-star -42207.99 121216.8 
2.5-star -244930.4** 118512.7 
3-star -267070.9 118046.1 
3.5-star -267070.9** 118971.2 
4-star -210010.4* 122399.4 
4.5-star -335262.9*** 127526.2 
5-star -354375.9** 146485.6 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
140 
 
 The ordered logit showed a statistically significant, negative relationship (p < 
.01) between tax value per pupil and FAST rating, meaning that as tax value went up the 
FAST rating of the district went down. When controlling for percent of funds from local 
revenue and percent of funds from federal revenue, both exhibited a statistically 
significant relationship (p < .01 and p < .05), although in opposite directions. The 
percent of local revenue showed a positive relationship with property value per pupil 
while the percent of federal revenue showed a negative relationship. Those findings can 
be interpreted as indicating that districts with a greater portion of federal revenue are 
using those funds to fund programs which are not efficient. When controlling for tax 
rates, neither the maintenance and operations nor the interest and sinking rate for 
districts were statistically significant, while the total enrollment of a district or charter 
school continued to display a positive relationship with the FAST rating and the percent 
of students who were economically disadvantaged continued to display a negative 
relationship with efficiency. The Chi-squares test indicated that the probability of having 
a greater Chi-square statistic is 0.00. See Table 45.  
Table 45:  
Ordered Logit Model of Property Value per Pupil, 2008-2009 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
Robust 
Standard Error 
Property Value Per Pupil -1.099267*** .1812158 .1938392 
Local Revenue Percent .0398169*** .008629 .0090855 
Federal Revenue Percent -.0621884** .0303807 .0296783 
M&O Tax Rate -.7873866 .9706824 .9229177 
I&S Tax Rate .2273707 .5189514 .5101112 
Total Enrollment .0967653* .0498514 .0534448 
Economically Dis. (Percent) -.0302154*** .0036771 .003777 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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2009-2010 Data Analyses  
Using the same methodology, the data from the 2009-10 FAST were analyzed to 
determine what, if any, relationship existed between a school district’s efficiency as 
measured by the FAST and property value per pupil. In 2009-2010, the data showed 
1,138 districts and charter schools rated by the FAST. Of those, 118 observations had a 
property value of $0. The remaining 1,020 observations were analyzed using univariate 
and multivariate methods.  
 The data were sorted into each of the 9 categories used by the FAST—1-star, 
1.5-star, 2-star, etc.—to determine what the measures of central tendency were for each 
of the categories. Prior to calculating the measures of central tendency, a box and 
whisker plot was performed to determine if any outliers existed within the data. The data  
 
Figure 13:  
Property Value per Pupil, 2009-2010 
 
 
 
142 
 
 
showed any observations above $5,000,000 per pupil were considered outliers; therefore, 
any observations that were above that threshold were removed from the data. There were 
a total of 4 outliers removed. See Figure 13. 
The data showed that there was no consistent pattern in either the mean value, 
minimum value, or maximum value when comparing FAST districts rated from 1-star 
to4-star. However, the data revealed that 4.5- and 5-star districts did, in fact, have a 
lower mean property value per pupil than did 1-star to 4-star districts. The 5-star districts 
had a maximum value per pupil of $752,041, while each of the other FAST categories 
had a maximum value of greater than $2,000,000 per pupil. As with the 2008-2009 data, 
5-star districts showed to have lowest maximum property value per pupil while at the 
same time they displayed the highest minimum value per pupil. The minimum property 
value per pupil for 5-star districts was $153,323, which was more than double the 
highest minimum value per pupil of any other category. See Table 46. 
  
Table 46:  
Property Value per Pupil, 2009-2010 
FAST 
Rating 
# Obs Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. Max 
All 1,020 $521,372 826470.1 $30,811 $12,367,087 
1-star 36 $580,787 845698.2 $46,422 $4,136,768 
1.5-star 85 $471,034 444342.5 $74,925 $2,342,043 
2-star 130 $533,762 641143.6 $64,153 $4,154,755 
2.5-star 185 $527,627 663945.2 $62,245 $4,618,667 
3-star 195 $549,441 722483.5 $54,000 $4,725,016 
3.5-star 146 $428,781 369946.9 $30,811 $2,535,408 
4-star 118 $458,938 635541.7 $39,370 $4,557,816 
4.5-star 86 $352,879 269101.2 $73,713 $2,264,785 
5-star 35 $330,931 139241.2 $153,323 $752,041 
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Once the measures of central tendency were calculated, a regression analysis was 
performed to test for the differences in means, using robust standard errors. Again, the 
analyses indicated no statistical significant relationship between the coefficient values of 
the different FAST categories except in relationship between 1-star districts and 4.5- and 
5-star districts (p < .10). The property value per pupil for both 4.5 and 5-star districts 
were statistically significantly less than 1-star districts, although only at the .10 level of 
significance. See Table 47. 
Similar to 2008-2009 data, the next step in the process involved completing an 
ordered logit using district FAST rating as the dependent variable and the property value 
per pupil as the independent variable. During the analyses, several external factors which 
related were controlled for, including the percent of revenue generated locally and the 
percent of state revenue earned by the district. Like the 2008-09 data, the district’s 
adopted maintenance and operations tax rate and interest and sinking tax rate were 
Table 47:  
Distribution of Property Wealth per Pupil by FAST Rating, 2009-2010 
FAST Rating Coefficient Robust Standard Error 
1-star 580787.3*** 98389.58 
1.5-star -109753.5 117390.3 
2-star -47025.52 111181.2 
2.5-star -531160.57 107537.4 
3-star -31346.62 107087.3 
3.5-star -152006.2 109852.1 
4-star -121849.2 112400.6 
4.5-star -227908.5* 117187.1 
5-star -249856.6* 140134.2 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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included as  variables with the belief that districts that have a higher tax rate would be 
more desirous to be more efficient with their money. Finally, the district’s enrollment 
and percent of students who were economically disadvantaged were included in the 
regression.  
The findings for property value per pupil continued to indicate a statistically 
significant, negative relationship with FAST rating (p < .01). The relationship between 
percent of revenue generated locally continued to be positive, though its statistical 
significance went from the .01 level to the .05 level. Federal revenue as a percent of 
overall revenue continued to exhibit a statistically significant, negative relationship (p < 
.01). As with 2008-09, the relationship between the maintenance and operations tax rate 
and the interest and sinking tax rate and FAST rating were not statistically significant. 
This result indicated that the overall level of taxation for a district had no effect on a 
district’s FAST rating. Finally, while the total enrollment of a district did indicate a  
Table 48:  
Ordered Logit Model of Property Value per Pupil and District FAST Rating, 2009-2010 
 Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Robust 
Standard 
Error 
Property Value Per Pupil -.8270128*** .1537557 .1391949 
Local Revenue Percent .0118193** .0062814 .0054425 
Federal Revenue Percent -.1183148*** .0164251 .0159389 
M&O Tax Rate -.7397287 .9130895 .8921238 
I&S Tax Rate .70013 .505978 .5041454 
Total Enrollment .1180055** .0467005 .0468238 
Economically Dis. (Percent) -.0271948*** .0041807 .0040311 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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positive, statistically significant rating (p < .05), the percentage of students who were 
economically disadvantaged did not have a statistically significant impact on FAST 
rating (p < .01). Like the 2008-09 data, the Chi-squared test showed that the probability 
of having a greater Chi-squared test statistic was 0.00. See Table 48. 
2010-2011 Data Analyses 
 Data from the 2010-2011 FAST report were analyzed to establish whether or not 
the findings in 2008-09 and 2009-10 were consistent with the 2010-11 data. In 2010-11, 
there were 1,136 districts and charter schools which were measured by the FAST. Of 
those, 120 observations had a property value per pupil of $0 and were removed from the 
data set. Of the remaining 1,016 districts, the average property value per pupil was 
$488,132 per student with a minimum value per student of $31,010 and a maximum 
value of $4,963,364.  
Prior to calculating the measures of central tendency, a box and whisker chart 
was created to help determine outliers. It was determined that districts with a property 
value of greater than $3,506,655 per student were more than 5 standard deviations from 
the mean and would be considered outliers which were removed from the data. A total of 
13 outliers were removed. The remaining 1,003 districts were used in the data set. See 
Figure 14. 
 The data indicate that overall the property value per pupil was down in 2010-
2011 compared to both 2008-09 and 2009-10. Similar to the two prior years of FAST 
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data, 4.5- and 5-star districts had the lowest average property value per pupil with values 
of $341,303 and $310,410 respectively, while the average property values per pupil were 
mixed among the other categories. Once again, 5-star districts had the highest minimum 
value per pupil and the smallest maximum value per pupil. See Table 49. 
 
Table 49: 
Property Value per Pupil, 2010-2011 
FAST 
Rating 
# Obs Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. Max 
All 1,016 $488,132 603704.5 $31,010 $4,963,364 
1-star 32 $561,345 664523.2 $77,227 $3,165,677 
1.5-star 92 $490,498 539186.3 $54,459 $3,136,606 
2-star 126 $498,549 512066.7 $45,916 $3,015,653 
2.5-star 175 $457,829 441367.4 $71,623 $2,833,147 
3-star 200 $429,377 424255.9 $31,010 $2,953,849 
3.5-star 147 $443,211 402339.7 $74,247 $2,964,514 
4-star 119 $395,069 300414.5 $74,612 $1,969,355 
4.5-star 80 $341,303 290752.9 $39,051 $2,572,977 
5-star 32 $310,410 132740.1 $120,365 $701,014 
 
Figure 14: 
Property Value per Pupil, 2010-2011 
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 Once the measures of central tendency were calculated, a regression analyses 
was conducted to determine the significance of the relationship between the property 
value per pupil and FAST rating. Unlike the prior two years of data which showed only a 
slightly (p < .10) statistically significant relationship between 4.5- and 5-star districts  
and the FAST rating, 2010-11 data indicated that there was a negative, statistically 
significant (p < .10) correlation between both 4--star districts and FAST rating. None of 
the other categories indicated a statistically significant relationship. See Table 50. 
 After the regression analyses were run, an ordered logistic regression was 
completed. As with each of the two previous years, there was a negative, statistically 
significant (p < .01) correlation between both property value per pupil, percent of 
Federal revenue, and the percentage of low-SES students. Again, as with prior years, 
there was a positive, statistically significant relationship between the percent of local 
revenue and FAST rating. The Chi-squared test confirmed that the probability of having 
a greater Chi-squared test statistic was 0.00. See Table 51. 
Table 50:  
Distribution of Property Wealth per Pupil by FAST Rating, 2010-2011 
FAST Rating Coefficient Standard Error 
1-star 561345.2*** 76087.1 
1.5-star -70397.1 88334.02 
2-star -62795.81 85202.89 
2.5-star -103516.5 82751.75 
3-star -131968.7 81948.32 
3.5-star -118134.3 83961.25 
4-star -166276.3* 85708.93 
4.5-star -220042.7** 90027.48 
5-star -250935.6** 107603.4 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
 
 
 
 
148 
 
 
Multiyear FAST Data Analyses 
 Once the three individual year analyses of FAST data were completed, the data 
were pooled into one large data set to determine if the patterns found existed throughout 
all three years of FAST data. Data from 2008-09 were omitted in the dummy variable 
calculations to account for collinearity. Findings from the multiyear ordered logistic 
regression indicated that property value was a negative, statistically significant predictor 
of FAST rating, which was consistent from all three years of analysis. Also consistent 
with the individual year analyses was the finding that the percent of Federal revenue was 
negatively correlated with FAST efficiency. As had been established with each of the 
prior variables, the percent of students who were economically disadvantaged continued 
to show a statistically significant, negative relationship with FAST efficiency, while the 
size of a district or charter school remained positively correlated with efficiency. The 
one difference in the findings in the multiyear analysis from the individual analyses was 
Table 51: 
Ordered Logit Model of Property Value per Pupil and District FAST Rating, 2010-2011 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
Robust Standard 
Error 
Property Value Per Pupil -1.338012*** .219229 .2490431 
Local Revenue Percent .0273193*** .0078318 .0077253 
Federal Revenue Percent -.0857239*** .0159126 .0201185 
M&O Tax Rate -1.339418 1.210002 1.199149 
I&S Tax Rate -.0094341 .1042247 .1079767 
Total Enrollment .1186005** .0521768 .0525231 
Economically Dis. (Percent) -.0346564*** .0046689 .0053114 
* p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < 01 
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that the Interest and Sinking tax rate—the tax rate which was levied by school districts to 
pay for school construction bonds—was statistically significant. The positive coefficient 
suggested that as districts’ Interest and Sinking tax rate increase, their efficiency 
increased as well. The finding that school construction expenditures was positively 
associated with efficiency supported research of Schneider (2002) who found that  clean 
air, good light, and a quiet, comfortable, and safe learning environment are conducive to 
student achievement. As in the previous years, the Chi-squared tests showed that the 
probability of having a greater Chi-Squared test was 0.00. These results confirmed the 
fact that one can reject the hypothesis that Property Values per Pupil are irrelevant to 
FAST efficiency. See Table 52.  
 
 
 
Table 52: 
Ordered Logit Model of Property Value per Pupil and District FAST Rating, 2008-2011 
 Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Robust Standard 
Error 
Property Value Per Pupil -.2500752*** .0675753 .1542003 
Local Revenue Percent .0316224 .1039744 .1992105 
Federal Revenue Percent -.2012587*** .0424507 .0431991 
M&O Tax Rate .7181087 .5314965 .6032671 
I&S Tax Rate .1213039*** .0344087 .0357982 
Total Enrollment .2620694*** .0285066 .0368442 
Economically Dis. (Percent) -.0369118*** .0022315 .0022823 
School Year 2 -2.262351*** .5042639 .5099107 
School Year 3 -2.237429*** .4977237 .5033551 
* p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 
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Administrative Costs per Pupil as a Predictor for Efficiency 
2008-2009 Data Analyses 
 Following the same statistical procedures used to this point, a quantitative 
analyses of the relationship between administrative costs per pupil—defined as the 
spending in the Administration function by districts—and the FAST rating was 
accomplished. In 2008-2009, there were 1,131 districts and charter schools which were 
rated by the FAST. Those districts and charter schools spent an average of $1,152 per 
pupil on administrative costs, with a minimum of $452 per pupil and a maximum of 
$9,496 per pupil.  
 As with the variables which were chosen to include in this study, the data were 
sorted into each of the 9 categories of the FAST to calculate the measures of central 
 
Figure 15: 
Total Administrative Cost per Pupil, 2008-2009 
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Table 53: 
Administrative Costs per Pupil, 2008-2009 
FAST Rating # Obs Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. Max 
All 1,131 $1,152 638.8009 $452 $9,496 
1-star 24 $1,444 634.3747 $645 $2,752 
1.5-star 81 $1,171 566.2501 $576 $3,798 
2-star 144 $1,251 519.8527 $563 $3,018 
2.5-star 200 $1,189 579.2666 $545 $3,668 
3-star 222 $1,188 602.3246 $516 $3,842 
3.5-star 186 $1,034 428.6452 $463 $2,952 
4-star 138 $1,056 435.3091 $535 $2,926 
4.5-star 86 $917 321.6198 $548 $1,932 
5-star 46 $851 325.9724 $452 $1,923 
 
 
 
     
 
tendency in each of the categories. Prior to determining the central tendencies, a box-
and-whisker plot was completed to assess whether any outliers existed within the data. It 
was estimated that administrative costs exceeding $4,346 per pupil could be considered  
outliers because they were greater than 5 standard deviations above the mean. Therefore, 
those observations were removed from the analyses. In total, there were 7 districts and 
charter schools removed for being outliers. See Figure 15. 
Of the remaining 1,124 districts and charter schools, 1-star districts and charter 
schools did spend more on administrative costs per pupil ($1,444) than did all other 
categories while 4.5- and 5-star district did spend the least  ($917 and $851 
respectively). However, the average administrative cost per pupil varied between the 
other ratings in the FAST, with 3-star districts spending more than 1.5-star districts and 
4-star districts spending more than 3-star districts. See Table 53.  
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 A regression analysis was completed to test for the differences in the central 
tendencies to determine if there was a statistical significance in the differences. The 
regression did show that there was a statistically significant difference between all 9 
categories of the FAST, with 8 of the 9 categories showing a significant at the p < .05 or 
p < .01 level. These findings suggested that more efficient districts do spend less on 
administrative costs than do less efficient districts or charter school. See Table 54.  
 The next step in the process was to conduct an ordered logit regression to control 
for student enrollment count, percent of economically disadvantaged students, the 
average salaries of both campus level and district-level administrators, and the percent of 
campus and district-level administrators of the total staff. The choice to include 
administrative salaries was made to substantiate both the research (Walters, 2005) and 
the commonly held belief that high administrative costs had a negative effect on the 
efficiency of school. The analysis indicated a positive, statistically significant 
relationship did exist between the average salary of campus administrators and the FAST  
Table 54: 
Distribution of Administrative Costs per Pupil by FAST Rating, 2008-2009 
FAST Rating Coefficient Robust Standard Error 
1-star 1444.4580*** 104.7653 
1.5-star -273.0262** 119.2805 
2-star -193* 113.1595 
2.5-star -255.2283** 110.8732 
3-star -256.6385** 110.283 
3.5-star -410.8777*** 111.3193 
4-star -388.1033*** 113.5103 
4.5-star -527.2607*** 118.4853 
5-star -593.7607*** 130.7738 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
153 
 
rating (p < .01), but a negative relationship (p < .01) between the salary of central office 
administrators and efficiency. The ordered logit regression also indicated that a positive,  
statistically relationship existed between the percent of campus administrators (p < 
.10)and the percent of central office administrators (p < .05) in the district. The Chi-
squared test conducted to test the whether the multiple coefficients are the same resulted 
in the probability of having a greater Chi-square test statistics was 0.00; therefore 
allowing one to reject the hypothesis that Administrative Costs per Pupil are irrelevant. 
The positive relationship suggested that as the percentage of administrators increased the 
FAST rating of the district or charter school also increased. However, the total 
administrative costs per pupil exhibited a negative, statistically significant relationship 
with FAST rating, which supports the claim of Walters (2006) that low administrative 
costs can be found in higher performing districts. See Table 55.  
 
Table 55: 
Ordered Logit Model of Administrative Costs per Pupil and District FAST Rating, 2008-
2009 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
Robust 
Standard Error 
Total Admin. Costs per Pupil -.7245652*** .2155092 .2148632 
Avg. Salary of Campus Admin. .0727489*** .0312356 .0257447 
Average Salary of Central Admin. -.0852705*** .0321179 .028173 
Total Campus Admin. (Percent) .0160712* .0148974 .0093883 
Total Central Admin. (Percent) .1206865** .0457172 .0466372 
Total Enrollment Count .1408735** .0564518 .0578696 
Percent Economically Dis. -.0225477*** .0028379 .0031669 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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2009-2010 Data Analyses 
 Following the completion of the 2008-2009 FAST data analyses of 
administrative costs per pupil, the data from the 2009-2010 school year were analyzed. 
In 2009-2010, there were 1,138 school districts and charter schools that were rated by 
the FAST. However, after completing a box and whisker plot of all districts, it was 
determined that districts which spent over $4,648 per pupil could be considered outliers 
because those districts or charter schools spent more than 5 standard deviations above 
the mean. A total of 5 observations were removed as outliers. See Figure 16.  
The data were divided into each of the 9 categories of the FAST for analyses to 
determine the measures of central tendency for each category. Of each of the categories, 
 
Figure 16: 
Total Administrative Cost per Pupil, 2009-2010 
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2.5-star districts had the highest mean spending per pupil ($1,276) and the 5-star districts 
had the lowest mean spending per pupil ($915). 1-star districts had the highest minimum 
value per pupil ($581), while 3-star districts and charter schools had the highest 
maximum value per pupil ($4,608). 4.5-star district had the lowest value per pupil with a  
 value of $2,100 per pupil. See Table 56. 
A regression analyses was conducted to determine if there was a statistically 
significant difference between the categories of the FAST. Unlike data from 2008-2009, 
the regression analysis showed only one statistically significant relationship—5-star at 
the p < .10 level—existed between any of the categories. The lack of a statistically 
significant relationship indicated that, though higher rated districts and charter schools 
may have a lower average administrative cost per pupil, the differences in FAST ratings 
were caused by something other than administrative cost. This finding is contradictory to  
 
Table 56: 
Distribution of Administrative Costs per Pupil by FAST Rating, 2009-2010 
FAST Rating # Obs Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. Max 
All 1,138 $1,168 696.0402 $443 $10,932 
1-star 37 $1,145 543.1118 $581 $2,450 
1.5-star 88 $1,238 561.8275 $530 $3,263 
2-star 141 $1,219 632.078 $574 $4,188 
2.5-star 197 $1,276 575.1058 $534 $3,614 
3-star 217 $1,137 602.8656 $504 $4,608 
3.5-star 163 $1,098 525.6473 $443 $3,537 
4-star 140 $1,044 436.397 $547 $2,810 
4.5-star 104 $1,002 362.0186 $558 $2,100 
5-star 46 $915 415.4912 $467 $2,364 
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widely held belief that schools are inefficient due to high administrative costs. The 
relative efficiency of school districts and charter schools measured by FAST ratings—at 
least in 2009-2010—cannot be attributed to administrative costs. See Table 57. 
 Once the regression analyses was calculated, an ordered logit regression was 
prepared to control for other factors which may have an impact on the administrative  
 spending of a school district or charter school. As with all the ordered logit regressions 
completed for this study, the total enrollment count and the percent of students who were 
economically disadvantaged were variables which were controlled for during the 
analyses. In addition, administrative cost factors including the average salary of campus 
and central office administrators were included, as well as the percent of employees who 
were campus administrators and central office administrators.  
It was found that a statistically significant relationship did exist between 5 of the 
7 independent variables and the FAST rating. Of interest, however, was the relationship 
Table 57: 
Distribution of Administrative Costs per Pupil by FAST Rating, 2009-2010 
FAST 
Rating 
Coefficient Standard Error 
1-star 1144.622*** 89.05757 
1.5-star 93.62838 106.1413 
2-star 73.91029 100.0625 
2.5-star 131.2362 97.0612 
3-star -7.1884422 96.35136 
3.5-star -46.88543 98.64885 
4-star -99.87876 100.1367 
4.5-star -142.1312 103.6964 
5-star -229.2086* 119.6275 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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between the coefficients of the variables and the FAST rating. A negative coefficient 
indicated an inverse relationship between the variable and the FAST rating while a 
positive coefficient indicated a direct relationship between the variable and the FAST 
rating. When studying the ordered logit regression, it was expected to see the negative 
coefficient between total administrative costs per pupil and the percent of economically 
disadvantaged students and the FAST rating. What was surprising to observe was that a 
positive coefficient existed between the percent of central office administrators and the 
FAST. This relationship indicated that as the percent of central office administrators 
increased, the FAST rating increased. The Chi-squared test performed indicated that the 
probability of having a greater Chi-squared test statistic was 0.00. See Table 58.  
2010-2011 Data Analyses 
 After the analyses of the 2009-2010 FAST data were completed, the final year of 
FAST data were analyzed using the same methodology as the previous two years. 2010-
2011 FAST data showed that there were 1,136 school districts and charter schools with  
Table 58: 
Ordered Logit Model of Administrative Costs per Pupil and District FAST Rating, 2009-
2010 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
Robust 
Standard Error 
Total Admin. Costs per Pupil -.4350179** .20178717 .194255 
Avg. Salary of Campus Admin. .0206493 .0299836 .0313382 
Average Salary of Central Admin. -.060154** .0311836 .029614 
Total Campus Admin. (Percent) .0287034 .0215304 .0392659 
Total Central Admin. (Percent) .0936074* .0490896 .0505357 
Total Enrollment Count .141748*** .0537711 .0535547 
Percent Eco. Disadvantaged -.0267264*** .002893 .0030961 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
 
 
 
 
158 
 
administrative expenditures. Prior to analyses, a box and whisker plot was created to 
determine if there were any outliers within the data. It was calculated that administrative 
 expenditures of greater than $4,210 per student were more than 5 standard deviations 
from the mean and would be removed from the data as outliers. A total of 4 outliers were 
removed. See Figure 17.  
As with the prior years, the districts and charter schools were divided into the 9 
categories of the FAST and the measures of central tendency were calculated. The data 
showed that 1-star districts spend more on average ($1,322) than any of the other 
categories of the FAST, while 4.5- and 5-star districts spend the least ($963 and $924, 
respectively. In fact, 1-star districts spend an average of $380 more per pupil than do 5- 
 
Figure 17: 
Total Administrative Cost per Pupil, 2010-2011 
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star districts. Overall, average spending per pupil decreased as the FAST rating 
increased, though 1.5-star districts spent less ($1,214) on average than did both 2- and 
2.5-star districts ($1,249) and 3-star ($1,140) districts spent less than 3.5-star districts 
($1,160). See Table 59.  
 Unlike 2009-2010 which saw only one statistically significant relationship 
between administrative costs and FAST rating, significant relationships existed in 5 of  
 
Table 60: 
Distribution of Administrative Costs per Pupil by FAST Rating, 2010-2011 
FAST 
Rating 
Coefficient Standard Error 
1-star 1321.618*** 91.47697 
1.5-star -107.7861 106.597 
2-star -72.98061 102.351 
2.5-star -72.24728 99.36497 
3-star -181.8413* 98.0607 
3.5-star -161.5393 100.409 
4-star -241.5337** 101.7725 
4.5-star -358.9166*** 106.3069 
5-star -379.951*** 121.2046 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
Table 59: 
Distribution of Administrative Costs per Pupil by FAST Rating, 2010-2011 
FAST Rating # Obs Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. Max 
All 1,136 $1,171 607.8321 $466 $7,210 
1-star 34 $1,322 733.0756 $578 $3,614 
1.5-star 95 $1,214 616.5237 $551 $3,644 
2-star 135 $1,249 557.6454 $552 $3,688 
2.5-star 189 $1,249 593.0258 $503 $3,739 
3-star 228 $1,140 501.7611 $541 $3,969 
3.5-star 166 $1,160 537.3183 $532 $3,630 
4-star 143 $1,080 497.4604 $560 $3,928 
4.5-star 97 $963 361.6076 $517 $2,402 
5-star 45 $942 362.3805 $466 $1,771 
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the nine categories of FAST. The regression analysis of administrative spending per 
pupil showed that like 2008-2009, a statistically significant relationship (p < .01) existed 
between 4.5- and 5-star districts and FAST rating, while 3-star districts showed a 
relationship at the p < .10 level and 4-star districts were at the p < .05 level. See Table 
60.  
The ordered logistic analysis showed that, as was the case in 2008-09 and 2009-
2010, a negative, statistically significant relationship (p < .05) existed between the total 
administration costs per pupil and FAST rating. Also as with both 2008-09 and 2009-10, 
there was a positive, statistically significant relationship between the percent of central  
office administrators and the total enrollment of the district. Again in 2010-11, the 
percent of students who were economically disadvantaged displayed a negative, 
statistically significant effect on FAST rating. These findings are contrary to the work of 
Rassouli-Currier (2011) who found that there was no relationship between 
administrative costs and efficiency. Once again, the Chi-squared test performed on 2010-
Table 61: 
Ordered Logit Model of Administrative Costs per Pupil and District FAST Rating, 2010-
2011 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
Robust 
Standard Error 
Total Admin. Costs per Pupil -1.088089** .4159841 .4680388 
Avg. Salary of Campus Admin. .0358072 .0286114 .034306 
Average Salary of Central Admin. .4187581 .3140919 .3617665 
Total Campus Admin. (Percent) .0372303 .0196071 .0318429 
Total Central Admin. (Percent) .0891961** .0446086 .0450346 
Total Enrollment Count .1046123 .0643568 .0703883 
Percent Eco. Disadvantaged -.0275493*** .0028934 .0031296 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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11 data showed that the probability of having a greater Chi-squared test statistic was 
0.00. See Table 61.  
Multiyear FAST Data Analyses 
 The findings for the pooled FAST data were different than any of the three 
individual years in that all of the independent variables were found to have a statistically 
significant effect on FAST rating. Total administrative costs per pupil had a negative, 
statistically significant relationship with FAST rating which verified that more efficient 
districts and charter schools spend less on administrative costs than do less efficient 
districts. Unlike the individual year analyses, the multiyear analysis showed that both the 
average salary of campus administrators and the percent of campus level administrators 
had a positive correlation with FAST rating, while a negative, statistically significant 
relationship was present for central office administrators. Larger districts continued to be 
positively associated with efficiency and the percent of students who were economically  
 
Table 62: 
Ordered Logit Model of Administrative Costs per Pupil and District FAST Rating, 2008-
2011 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
Robust 
Standard Error 
Total Admin. Costs per Pupil -.6152813*** .1147283 .113967 
Avg. Salary of Campus Admin. .0363481** .0170265 .0165636 
Average Salary of Central Admin. -.0420394** .0182957 .0178305 
Total Campus Admin. (Percent) .0256593* .0104274 .0134985 
Total Central Admin. (Percent) -0811228*** .0252745 .0267617 
Total Enrollment Count .0388692*** .0308836 .0320343 
Percent Eco. Disadvantaged -.0249238*** .0016495 .0017929 
School Year 2 .0768228 .0737684 .0735174 
School Year 3 .0959559 .0737326 .0728984 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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disadvantaged was negatively correlated with FAST ratings. As with each of the 
previous years, the Chi-squared test yielded that the probability of having a greater Chi-
square test statistic was 0.00. See Table 62. 
Student Teacher Ratio as a Predictor of Efficiency 
 In 1984, the state of Texas implemented a policy restricting class size to 22:1 for 
students in kindergarten through the fourth grade under the assumption that limiting the 
size of a class would improve the education of students (Scharrer, 2009). Studies (Cho, 
Glewee, & Whilter, 2012; Hoxby, 2000; Jepsen & Rivkin, 2009) on the effect of class 
size on achievement have been mixed. Cho, Glewwe, and Whitler (2012) found that 
class size had a positive effect on reading and math scores in Minnesota but that the 
effects were minimal. While Jepsen and Rivkin (2009) found that smaller class size does 
have a slightly positive effect on student achievement, those effects were often negated 
by the poor quality of the new teachers hired to fill positions, especially in schools with 
high populations of economically disadvantaged students. Hoxby (2000) found that 
small class size had statistically significant effect on student achievement. Due to the 
continued debate, it was of interest to learn whether student/teacher ratio was a predictor 
in the FAST rankings of school districts and charter schools and was therefore included 
as a variable of this study. 
2008-2009 Data Analyses 
 In the 2008-2009 school year, there were 1,130 school districts and charter 
schools which were rated by the FAST. Those districts and charter schools had an 
average classroom size of 12. 42 students per teacher, with a minimum number of 4.09 
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and a maximum of 32.63. As with prior data, a box and whisker graph was created to 
help determine the existence of outliers within the data. It was determined that districts 
and charter schools with a student/teacher ratio of greater than 25.9 to 1 could be 
considered outliers because they were greater than 5 standard deviations above the mean 
and were therefore removed from the data. A total of 4 outliers were removed from the 
data. See Figure 18. 
Once the outliers were removed, the data was divided into the 9 categories of the 
FAST and their measures of central tendency were calculated. There was a clear trend 
Figure 18: 
Student/Teacher Ratio, 2008-2009 
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that districts rated more efficient by the FAST had larger student/teacher ratios than less 
efficient school districts and charter schools. While 1-star districts had the highest 
student/teacher ratio at 10.87 to 1, 5-star districts had the lowest student/teacher ratio at 
15 to 1. The average student teacher ratio increased almost half a student per teacher 
between 2-star districts and 5-star districts. These findings suggested that as the 
student/teacher ratio increases, the efficiency of a district or charter school increases. See 
Table 63. 
Once the central tendencies were calculated, a regression analysis was conducted 
to determine if any statistically significant relationships existed within the data. It was 
found that statistically significant relationships were present in 7 of the 9 FAST 
categories. See Table 64. 
Once the regression was completed, an ordered logit was prepared to control for 
other factors which might affect the student/teacher ratio. As with all previous variables, 
the total enrollment count of the district or charter school was included, as well as the 
Table 63: 
Student/Teacher Ratio by FAST Rating, 2008-2009 
FAST 
Rating 
# Obs Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. Max 
All 1,130 12.41594 2.709262 4.086779 32.625 
1-star 24 10.87613 2.577209 6.640106 16.85828 
1.5-star 83 11.96726 2.419396 4.285786 16.45011 
2-star 145 11.71921 2.438839 6.231676 16.88772 
2.5-star 200 11.67599 2.355887 5.46827 19.5032 
3-star 225 12.14209 2.62873 4.086779 23.18025 
3.5-star 186 12.6179 2.253545 6.960557 18.95034 
4-star 136 13.01865 2.537088 7.264308 21.85714 
4.5-star 86 13.67132 2.357095 6.714046 21.838 
5-star 42 14.99573 2.703911 11.15807 24.52644 
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Table 64: 
Student/Teacher Ratio by FAST Rating, 2008-2009 
FAST Rating Coefficient Standard Error 
1-star 10.87613*** .5005263 
1.5-star 1.091126** .5683027 
2-star .8430813 .5403638 
2.5-star .7998552 .5297072 
3-star 1.265959** .5265447 
3.5-star 1.741766*** .5318388 
4-star 2.142522*** .542897 
4.5-star 2.795188*** .566075 
5-star .41196*** .6274429 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
 
 
 
percent of students who were economically disadvantaged. The data showed that, even 
when controlling for total enrollment count and the percent of students who were 
economically disadvantaged, the student/teacher ratio continued to have a positive, 
statistically significant effect on FAST rating. See Table 65.  
While the studies from both Cho, Glewwe, and Whitler (2012) and Jepsen and 
Rivkin (2009) indicated that smaller class size does increase student achievement, both 
noted that the gains were minimal. The findings presented in the 2008-2009 data was 
that the efficiency of a district increased as student/teacher ratio increased. The Chi- 
 
Table 65: 
Ordered Logit Model of Student/Teacher Ratio and District FAST Rating, 2008-2009 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
Robust 
Standard Error 
Student/Teacher Ratio .2139609*** .0284965 .03212 
Total Enrollment Count -.009623 .0473592 .0534855 
Percent Eco. Disadvantaged -.0248805*** .002781 .0030132 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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squared test presented that the probability of having a greater Chi-squared test statistic is 
0.00. These findings were consistent with the research of Cho, Glewwe, and Whitler 
(2012) and Jepsen and Rivkin (2009) in that the additional costs of reducing class size 
may not be the most efficient way for districts to spend money.  
2009-2010 Data Analyses 
 Following the same procedures of 2008-2009, the 2009-2010 FAST data were 
analyzed to determine what effect, if any, student/teacher ratio has on efficiency. In 
2009-10, there were 1,137 school districts and charter schools which were rated by the 
FAST. The average student/teacher ratio in 2009-10 was 12.46 students per teacher, with  
a minimum number of students of 3.92 and a maximum of 31.64. Prior to analyses, a 
box and whisker plot was created to search for outliers. It was determined that student 
teacher ratios of greater than 26.08 to 1 were greater than 5 standard deviations above  
 
Figure 19: 
Student/Teacher Ratio, 2009-2010 
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Table 66: 
Student/Teacher Ratio by FAST Rating, 2009-2010 
FAST 
Rating 
# Obs Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. Max 
All 1,137 12.4696 2.721841 4.079837 31.63838 
1-star 37 12.56934 2.596544 6.832688 19.41934 
1.5-star 89 11.6724 2.4939 6.439805 18.60315 
2-star 142 11.66817 2.580788 4.600644 19.0032 
2.5-star 199 11.70972 2.619494 4.079837 21.82546 
3-star 216 12.31842 2.501634 5.773005 23.16928 
3.5-star 163 12.42372 2.319112 7.781535 21.80131 
4-star 139 13.24604 2.370773 6.88055 22.7697 
4.5-star 104 13.441 2.432331 9.091955 25.17647 
5-star 46 15.39097 2.2617335 11.06173 23.18161 
 
 
 
     
 
the mean and were removed from the data set. A total of two observations were removed 
from the data. See Figure 19. 
 Once outliers were removed, the data was sorted into the 9 categories of the 
FAST and the measures of central tendency were calculated. Overall, 5-star districts had 
the highest average student/teacher ratio (15.39) followed by 4.5-star (13.44) and then 4- 
star districts (13.24). The next highest student/teacher ratio was 3.5-star districts at 12.42  
to 1. The fact that 1-star districts did not have the highest student/teacher ratio and was 
the lowest rated by the FAST seemed to confirm the finding Hoxby(2000) who found 
that class size had no statistical significance in relation to student achievement. The 
overall trend was that as student/teacher ratio increased, efficiency as rated by the FAST 
increased as well. See Table 66.  
 Once the measures of central tendency were established, a linear regression was 
completed to determine if the changes in the data regarding student/teacher ratio were 
significant. As with 2008-09, 5-star districts showed a positive, statistically significant (p  
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< .01) between student/teacher ratio and FAST rating. A positive relationship (p < .10) 
was also found in 4.5-star districts. However unlike 2008-09, 1.5-star districts displayed 
a negative correlation between student/teacher ratio and FAST rating, meaning that as 
class size went down FAST rating increased. Also different from 2008-09 data, there 
was no statistical significance relationship between 3-, 3.5-, and 4-star districts and 
FAST ratings, See Table 67.  
 The final step in the process was to execute an ordered logit on the data to 
determine to what extent, if any, student-teacher ratio had when controlling for the size 
of the district. As with 2008-09, student/teacher ratio continued to display a positive, 
statistically significant (p < .01) correlation with FAST rating and the percent of students 
who were economically disadvantaged continued to present a negative correlation (p < 
.01). However, 2009-10 data did report a negative, statistically significant relationship (p 
< .01) between the district size and FAST rating. This finding ran contrary to many of 
the variables already analyzed as part of this study, as well as the findings in 2008-09. 
Table 67: 
Student/Teacher Ratio by FAST Rating, 2009-2010 
FAST Rating Coefficient Standard Error 
1-star 12.56934*** .4098381 
1.5-star -.8969459* .4876436 
2-star -.9311766** .4601449 
2.5-star -.859628* .4463153 
3-star -.2509281 .4435531 
3.5-star -.1456253 .4539766 
4-star .6766956 .4611702 
4.5-star .8716588* .4772052 
5-star 2.821629*** .5505191 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table 68: 
Ordered Logit Model of Student/Teacher Ratio and District FAST Rating, 2009-2010 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
Robust 
Standard Error 
Student/Teacher Ratio .2460255*** .0276862 .0326795 
Total Enrollment Count -.0998216* .046423 .0540988 
Percent Eco. Disadvantaged -.0292424*** .002898 .002868 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
 
 
This difference may be attributed to the fact that larger districts have smaller class sizes 
than smaller districts who often seek waivers to avoid the 22:1 ratio required by the state 
in elementary classes. The Chi-squared test indicated that the probability of having a 
greater Chi-squared test statistic is 0.00. See Table 68. 
2010-2011 Data Analyses 
 In the final year of FAST data, there were 1,135 school districts and charter 
schools which were rated by the FAST with an average student/teacher ratio of 12.52 
students per teacher. The smallest student/teacher ratio was 3.91 students per teacher and 
the maximum ratio was 29.79. A box and whisker plot was created to determine outliers, 
and it was gauged that districts and charter schools with an average of greater than 26.08 
students per teacher were greater than 5 standard deviations above the mean and could 
be considered outliers. There were two school districts or charter schools which were 
removed from the data set. See Figure 20.  
 As with prior years, the data were separated into the 9 categories of the fast and 
the measures of central tendency were calculated. Once again, 5-star districts produced 
the highest student/teacher ratio of all the categories with a ratio of 15.37 students per 
teacher, which as almost 30% more than 1-star districts (11.51). Again, the trend showed 
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Figure 20: 
Student/Teacher Ratio, 2010-2011 
 
 
 
 
a slight uptick on the number of students per teacher from 1-star to 5-star districts, 
though 2- and 2.5-star districts once again had a lower student/teacher ratio than 1.5-star 
districts (though both ratios were greater than 1-star districts). See Table 69. 
 
Table 69: 
Student/Teacher Ratio by FAST Rating, 2010-2011 
FAST 
Rating 
# Obs Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. Max 
All 1,135 12.51831 2.712983 3.916406 27.79511 
1-star 35 11.5145 2.870206 5.70345 16.77461 
1.5-star 95 12.25857 2.519243 5.689724 18.15503 
2-star 136 11.65693 2.612879 4.856865 21.75735 
2.5-star 190 11.76368 2.443021 3.916406 17.01695 
3-star 227 12.37361 2.424158 4.384042 20.28595 
3.5-star 166 12.44708 2.632933 6.240396 21.39905 
4-star 142 13.24126 2.334969 8.576939 21.14266 
4.5-star 97 13.57982 2.207168 9.08905 24.31599 
5-star 45 15.37016 3.081979 9.02351 25.39153 
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Much like 2008-09, 3- to 5-star districts all had a positive, statistically significant 
relationships with student/teacher ratio and increased FAST ratings. Unlike 2009-10, 
there were no negative correlations between the two. Again, these findings are 
supportive to the findings of Cho, Glewwe, and Whitler (2012) and Jepsen and Rivkin 
(2009) that indicated that the minimal gains in student achievement due to a reduction of 
class size may not be worth the overall cost. See Table 70.  
The final step in the analyses was to create an ordered logit regression to include 
district size and economic status of students. Like 2008-09, student/teacher ratio 
exhibited a positive, statistically significant (p < .01) relationship while the percent of 
economically disadvantaged students had a negative relationship. However, 2010-11 
data yielded a negative, statistically significant relationship (p < .01) between the 
district’s size and the FAST ratings. Once can assume that this negative relationship 
between district size and student/teacher ratio indicated that larger districts do not 
necessarily have larger student/teacher ratios. It might have been the case that larger  
Table 70: 
Student/Teacher Ratio by FAST Rating, 2010-2011 
FAST Rating Coefficient Standard Error 
1-star 11.5145*** .4234078 
1.5-star .7440682 .4953004 
2-star .1424219 .4747746 
2.5-star .2491754 .4607584 
3-star .8591094* .4548797 
3.5-star .9325767** .4659108 
4-star 1.726758*** .4727171 
4.5-star 2.06532*** .4939238 
5-star 3.855652*** .5645437 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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districts had a larger pool of teachers from which to hire and were able to keep 
classroom size to a minimum. As has been found consistently, the percent of students 
who were economically disadvantaged showed a negative, statistically significant 
relationship. The Chi-squared test indicated that the probability of having a greater Chi-
squared test statistic is 0.00. See Table 71.  
Multiyear FAST Data Analyses 
 As has been done with prior variables, the three years of FAST data were pooled 
and analyzed as a way to verify if the findings from individual year analyses could be 
seen across all three years of FAST ratings. The ordered logistic regression of the pooled 
data indicated that class size has a positive, statistically significant (p < .01) relationship 
with overall efficiency, meaning that larger class sizes lead to more efficiency in school 
districts and charter schools. This finding confirmed the results from each individual 
year. In addition, the overall enrollment of a district or charter school was negatively 
correlated (p < .01) to efficiency when controlling for class size. Again, this was the first 
time that enrollment size was seen to be negative factor for efficiency. This finding  
Table 71: 
Ordered Logit Model of Student/Teacher Ratio and District FAST Rating, 2010-2011 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
Robust 
Standard Error 
Student/Teacher Ratio 2.603378*** .0291943 .0310676 
Total Enrollment Count -.1601308*** .0484933 .0520911 
Percent Eco. Disadvantaged -.032282*** .0028437 .0029378 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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 implied that larger districts have smaller class sizes which were negatively associated 
efficiency. Consistent with the findings of the previous variables analyzed, the percent of 
students who were economically disadvantaged continued to show a negative correlation 
with efficiency, meaning that as the percent of students who were economically 
disadvantaged increased the efficiency of those districts or charter schools decreased. 
Finally, the Chi-squared test showed that the probability of having a greater Chi-squared 
test statistic was 0.00; therefore, one can reject the hypothesis that the student/teacher 
ratio is irrelevant to efficiency. See Table 72.  
Teacher Experience as an Predictor of FAST 
 Much like the debate over administrative spending and the effect of class size on 
student achievement, there is continued debate over whether students who are taught by 
more experienced teachers perform better than their peers. Similar to many issues in 
education, the research has produced mix results. For example, the research of Kukla-
Acevedo (2009) indicated that teacher experience had a positive impact on student 
achievement in for a variety of students, including African American students, White 
students, and low-SES students. Ronfeldt, Loeb, and Wyckoff (2011) observed that there 
Table 72: 
Ordered Logit Model of Student/Teacher Ratio and District FAST Rating, 2008-2011 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
Robust 
Standard Error 
Student/Teacher Ratio .4262481*** .0162114 .0183444 
Total Enrollment Count -.0972672*** .0271867 .0307399 
Percent Eco. Disadvantaged -.0283959*** .001613 .0016858 
School Year 2 .0749126 .0740585 .0744803 
School Year 3 .072203 .0739236 .0735394 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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was a disruptive effect from teacher turnover in that the ELA and math scores were 
lower in grade-levels with higher turnover rates. Conversely, the research of Hanushek 
and Rivkin (2010) found evidence that high turnover rates for teachers was not as 
damaging as many suggest because the turnover rate resulted mainly from ineffective 
teachers leaving the school system. As a result of the continued debate, teacher 
characteristics including total overall experience, years of experience, average years with 
a district, and teacher turnover rate were included in this study. 
2008-2009 Data Analyses 
 Following the same methods as with the previous factors of efficiency analyzed 
in this study, the effect of teacher experience on the FAST ratings of districts and charter 
school was analyzed. In 2008-09, there were 327,663 teachers in the state of Texas. 
Those teachers had an average of 11.77 years of experience. Prior to the calculations, a  
 
Figure 21: 
Average Teacher Experience, 2008-2009 
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box and whisker plot was created to help determine the existence of outliers. It was 
determined that districts and charter schools which had an average teacher experience of 
greater than 28.1 years would be considered outliers and were removed from the data. 
There were no observations removed for the 2008-09 school year. See Figure 21. 
Districts and charter schools were divided into the 9 categories of the FAST and 
were analyzed for their measures of central tendency. It was found that 1-star districts 
had the highest average teacher experience with a mean of 12.43 years of experience. 
Conversely, the most efficient districts as rated by the FAST had the lowest average 
years of experience at 9.73 years. All other categories had an average range of between 
11.24 years (4-star districts) and 12.18 years (2.5-star districts). See Table 73.  
Once the measures of central tendency were calculated, a regression analysis was 
performed to see if there were any statistically significant differences which occurred 
between the ratings. It was determined that only 5-star districts had a statistically  
 
Table 73: 
Average Teacher Experience by FAST Rating, 2008-2009 
FAST 
Rating 
# Obs Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. Max 
All 1,130 11.76792 3.256759 .0992989 22.37462 
1-star 24 12.43106 3.233529 4.910007 18.52632 
1.5-star 83 12.04105 3.225523 .6973753 18.62198 
2-star 145 11.87896 3.313507 1.335018 21 
2.5-star 201 12.18552 3.051057 1.643538 22.37462 
3-star 225 12.15384 3.334171 .0992989 18.86667 
3.5-star 186 11.63884 3.076356 1.367482 17.87097 
4-star 137 11.24659 3.437955 2.230769 18.38554 
4.5-star 86 11.27467 2.888178 1.90341 16 
5-star 43 9.730722 3.631793 2.058824 16.86207 
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significant difference within the rating at the p < .01 level. Also, 4-star districts, which 
had the second lowest overall mean value, were statistically significant at the p < .10 
level. No statistically significant differences were found in the other categories of the 
FAST. See Table 74.  
 The final step in the process was to complete an ordered logit regression analysis 
to control for a variety of factors which may have an effect on the overall average years 
of experience of teachers within a district or charter school. Factors included in the 
ordered logit included the teacher turnover rate, and the percent of new teachers, 
teachers with 1-5 years experience, 6-10 years experience, and 11-20 years of 
experience, as well as the size of the district or charter school and the percentage of 
student who were economically disadvantaged. When including those independent 
variables, overall teacher experience did have a negative, statistically significant 
relationship with the FAST rating. However, there was no statistically significance found 
between the teacher turnover rate or the percentage of teachers at each level of  
Table 74: 
Average Teacher Experience by FAST Rating, 2008-2009 
FAST Rating Coefficient Standard Error 
1-star 12.43106*** .6515851 
1.5-star -.3900108 .7470807 
2-star -.5521005 .7103527 
2.5-star .2455449 .6961582 
3-star -.2772175 .6921865 
3.5-star -.7922253 .699146 
4-star -1.184467* .713292 
4.5-star -1.156391 .7441523 
5-star -2.700339*** .8213303 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table 75: 
Ordered Logit Model of Average Teacher Experience and District FAST Rating, 2008-
2009 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
Robust 
Standard Error 
Average Years of Experience -.194566** .0880723 .0866318 
Teacher Turnover Rate -.0086534 .0066358 .0072032 
% Beginning Teachers -.0284701 .0256671 .0259039 
% Teacher 1-5 yrs. Experience -.0071448 .023013 .023172 
% Teacher 6-10 yrs. Experience .0115642 .0197642 .0204136 
% Teachers 11-20 yrs. Experience .0034442 .0140234 .014829 
Total Enrollment Count .1756016*** .0381559 .038997 
Percent Eco. Disadvantaged -.0240709*** .0029348 .0030634 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
 
 
experience. The Chi-squared test found that the probability of a greater Chi-squared 
statistic was 0.00. These findings support the conclusions of Hanushek and Rivkin 
(2010) who found that teacher turnover did not have a negative effect on student 
achievement. As with all of the previous variables examined in this study, the percent of 
students who were economically disadvantaged continued to have a statistically 
significant (p < .01), negative effect on FAST efficiency. Also, it was observed that there 
was a positive, statistically significant (p < .01) relationship between the size of a district 
and its rating, indicating that larger districts were more efficient than smaller districts. 
See Table 75. 
2009-2010 Data Analyses 
 The same methods that were used for the 2008-09 analyses were used when 
studying the 2009-2010 FAST data. In 2009-10, there were 333,007 teachers in the state 
of Texas with an average experience of 11.84 years. As with 2008-09, the box and 
whisker plot indicated that districts and charter schools whose teachers had an average of  
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greater than 28.7 years of experience could be considered outliers. No district charter 
school met that threshold. However, 2009-10 data indicated that there were 6 school 
districts or charter schools with an average teacher experience of zero years. It was also 
decided to remove these observations from the data as being outliers. See Figure 22. 
Once the observations were removed from the data, the data were sorted into the 
9 categories of the FAST and the measures of central tendency were calculated. As in 
2008-09, 5-star districts were found to have the lowest average experience with a mean 
value of 9.63 years. 1-star districts, which had the highest average experience in 2008-
09, had the third lowest average experience at 11.82 years, while 2.5-star districts had 
the highest average experience at 12.42 years. This change in data indicated that, as was  
Figure 22: 
Average Teacher Experience, 2009-2010 
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found when running the logistic regression in 2008-09, the average experience of 
teachers had little overall effect on the efficiency of a school district. See Table 76. 
Once the measures of central tendency were gauged, a logistic regression was 
completed to determine the statistical significance of the data sets. The logistic 
regression yielded similar results in 2009-2010 in that 5-star districts did have a positive, 
statistically significant relationship (p < .01) with the overall FAST rating. Unlike the 
previous year’s data, there was not a statistically significant relationship with any of the 
other categories of the FAST. See Table 77.  
Again, the final step in the process was to complete an ordered logit regression to 
determine whether factors other than average years of experience yielded statistically 
significant results. The same variables—experience, turnover rate, percentage of 
teachers at different levels of experiences—were used as controlling factors. Unlike 
2008-09, the overall experience of teachers had no statistical significance. However, the 
teacher turnover rate did have a negative, statistically significant (p < .01) effect on 
Table 76: 
Average Teacher Experience by FAST Rating, 2009-2010 
FAST 
Rating 
# Obs Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. Max 
All 1,137 11.7835 3.00423 0 22.55556 
1-star 37 11.81908 2.60109 3.699809 17.8296 
1.5-star 89 12.13279 3.085371 1.539393 20.77778 
2-star 141 12.15139 3.289825 1.7588 22.55556 
2.5-star 198 12.41986 3.130556 1.452111 18.34211 
3-star 218 12.01545 3.366756 1.4 19.2 
3.5-star 162 12.18392 3.087769 1.375 19.37931 
4-star 137 11.19652 3.531458 1.672465 18.67974 
4.5-star 103 11.04954 3.277437 2.653846 16.27586 
5-star 46 9.631648 3.416097 1.560606 15.74255 
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overall FAST rating, which appeared to support the findings of Ronfeldt, Loeb, and 
Wyckoff (2011) of the negative effects of teacher turnover on achievement. Again 
different from 2008-09 was the fact that the percent of teachers with 6-10 years 
experience and the percent of teachers with 11-20 years experience was positively  
 
Table 77: 
Average Teacher Experience by FAST Rating, 2009-2010 
FAST Rating Coefficient Standard Error 
1-star 11.81908*** .5340179 
1.5-star .3136566 .6353984 
2-star .3323172 .600007 
2.5-star .6007794 .5817778 
3-star .1963736 .5775608 
3.5-star .3648443 .591868 
4-star -.6225619 .6018249 
4.5-star -.7695378 .6225887 
5-star -2.187429*** .717325 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 78: 
Ordered Logit Model of Average Teacher Experience and District FAST Rating, 2009-
2010 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
Robust 
Standard Error 
Average Years of Experience -.0828048 .0886347 .0912313 
Teacher Turnover Rate -.0261323*** .0073028 .0078769 
% Beginning Teachers .0243551 .0264518 .0267479 
% Teacher 1-5 yrs. Experience .0297685 .0233306 .0235346 
% Teacher 6-10 yrs. Experience .0457699** .019895 .0189345 
% Teachers 11-20 yrs. Experience .0267976** .0138511 .0134739 
Total Enrollment Count .0787752* .0389697 .0410458 
Percent Eco. Disadvantaged -.0292249*** .0030782 .0032514 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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related to FAST rating, suggesting that more experienced teachers produce higher results 
in their students. It was once again noted that the overall district size had a positive 
effect on efficiency at the p < .10 level while the percent of economically disadvantaged 
students had the same negative effect (p < .01). Finally, the Chi-squared test presented a 
probability of having a greater Chi-square test statistic of 0.00. As a result, one can reject 
the hypothesis that that Teacher Experience is irrelevant to the efficiency of a school 
district. See Table 78.  
2010-2011 Data Analyses 
 The final year of FAST data showed that the number of teachers in the state rose 
slightly to 334,843. These teachers had an average experience of 11.84 years, with the 
maximum average at 29.5 years of experience. The box and whisker plot showed that, as 
with the previous two years, districts and charter schools with an average of greater than 
28.7 years of experience could be considered outliers because they were more than 5 
standard deviations above the mean. There were 4 districts with an average of zero years 
experience. The one district or charter school with greater than 28.7 years experience 
was removed, as were the 4 districts with zero years experience. See Figure 23.  
Once divided into the categories of the FAST, the findings in 2010-11 were 
much more similar to the findings of 2008-09 in that 2010-11 once again showed that 5- 
star districts average the fewest years of experience of all the categories, while 1-star 
districts and charter schools had the highest average at 12.49 years. 4.5-star districts had 
the second lowest average years experience for their teachers, again suggesting that 
districts and charter schools which have less experienced teachers are more efficient. 
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Based on the findings of these two years, it could be inferred that the increased salary 
costs that were a direct result of increased teacher experience did not lead to greater 
efficiency. See Table 79.   
 
Table 79: 
Average Teacher Experience by FAST Rating, 2010-2011 
FAST 
Rating 
# Obs Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. Max 
All 1,131 11.84464 3.315054 0 29.5 
1-star 35 12.49498 3.047886 1.996214 20.41663 
1.5-star 95 11.90628 2.499357 2.833333 17.59259 
2-star 136 12.28697 3.284545 1.485923 19.29539 
2.5-star 189 12.34855 3.080549 1.295974 19.53377 
3-star 229 11.80257 3.351205 1.316667 19.35328 
3.5-star 166 12.30228 3.269594 1.333333 19.68966 
4-star 142 11.44515 3.521784 .0900901 19.13908 
4.5-star 97 10.70435 3.55868 2.121657 16.65625 
5-star 42 9.868022 3.655371 1.429761 15.7561 
      
 
Figure 23: 
Average Teacher Experience, 2010-2011 
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 After computing the measures of central tendency, a regression analysis was 
completed to determine the statistical significance of the findings. Once again, there was 
a statistically significant (p < .01) relationship between 5-star districts and FAST rating. 
Unlike the prior two years’ data, 4.5-star districts showed statistical significance at the 
p< .01 level and 4-star districts showed significance at the p < .10 level. Again these 
findings show that there was a statistical significance in data which showed that teachers 
with less experience and FAST rating. See Table 80.  
 The final step in the process was to complete the ordered logit regression on the 
2010-11 data. Findings were similar to the findings of the 2008-09 analyses which 
showed a negative, statistically significant relationship (p < .01) between overall teacher 
experience and FAST rating. Unlike 2009-10, the teacher turnover rate was no longer a 
statistically significant predictor of FAST rating, nor were the experience levels of the 
teachers. The size of the district continued to show a positive relationship with the FAST 
rating, while the percent of students who were economically disadvantaged was once 
Table 80: 
Average Teacher Experience by FAST Rating, 2010-2011 
FAST Rating Coefficient Standard Error 
1-star 12.49498*** .5523386 
1.5-star -.5887062 .6461231 
2-star -.2080145 .6193469 
2.5-star -.1464306 .6013101 
3-star -.6924105 .5930477 
3.5-star -.1926979 .6077841 
4-star -1.04983* .616629 
4.5-star -.1796031*** .6443272 
5-star -.262696*** .74787 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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again a negative predictor of efficiency. The Chi-squared test found that the likelihood 
of having a greater Chi-squared test statistic was 0.00. As with 2008-09, these findings 
were supportive of the work of Hanushek and Rivkin (2010) which found that teacher 
turnover had little to no effect on the overall scores of students and contradicted the 
findings of Ronfeldt, Loeb, and Wyckoff (2011) which claimed turnover rate has a 
negative effect on student achievement. See Table 81.  
Multiyear FAST Data Analyses 
 After the individual year analyses were completed, the data were pooled into one 
larger data set to determine if the snapshots from individual years were found across all 
three years of FAST data. Findings from the pooled data revealed that average teacher 
experience had a negative, statistically significant (p < .01) correlation with overall 
FAST efficiency. Of note, teacher turnover rate, which was not statistically significant in 
two of the three individual years, was found to be statistically significant when the data 
Table 81: 
Ordered Logit Model of Average Teacher Experience and District FAST Rating, 2010-
2011 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
Robust 
Standard Error 
Average Years of Experience -.2188567** .0888994 .0865821 
Teacher Turnover Rate -.0140137 .0075278 .0075425 
% Beginning Teachers -.019258 .0260595 .0248303 
% Teacher 1-5 yrs. Experience -.0164881 .0232455 .0218541 
% Teacher 6-10 yrs. Experience -.0011077 .0195352 .01845 
% Teachers 11-20 yrs. Experience .0070161 .0140943 .0130703 
Total Enrollment Count .1030522*** .0380305 .0391184 
Percent Eco. Disadvantaged -.0313207*** .0030575 .0032321 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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were pooled. The negative coefficient indicated that as turnover rate decreased, FAST 
rating improved. This finding was supportive of the work of Ronfeldt, Loeb, and 
Wyckoff (2011) whose research indicated that high teacher turnover had a negative 
effect on student achievement. As has been the case with each of the variables studied so 
far, the total enrollment of the district or charter school continued to display a positive, 
statistically significant relationship with FAST rating while the percent of students who 
were economically disadvantaged continued to be a negative predictor of FAST rating. 
Finally, the Chi-squared test once again showed that the probability of having a greater 
Chi-square test statistic was 0.00 allowing for the rejection of the hypothesis that 
Teacher Experience was irrelevant to efficiency. See Table 82.  
 
 
Table 82: 
Ordered Logit Model of Average Teacher Experience and District FAST Rating, 2008-
2011 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
Robust 
Standard Error 
Average Years of Experience -.1704628*** .0511197 .0510745 
Teacher Turnover Rate -.0146948*** .0040865 .0043447 
% Beginning Teachers -.0096812 .0150336 .0149812 
% Teacher 1-5 yrs. Experience .0001266 .0133871 .0132003 
% Teacher 6-10 yrs. Experience .0170114 .0113873 .0111553 
% Teachers 11-20 yrs. Experience .0115655 .008067 .0079805 
Total Enrollment Count .1202846*** .0220882 .0227878 
Percent Eco. Disadvantaged -.0279501*** .0017402 .0018227 
School Year 2 .0393956 .075296 .0753011 
School Year 3 .0357693 .0755639 .0754447 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Cocurricular Spending per Pupil as a Predictor of Efficiency 
 Numerous reports throughout the last 20 years have found that there is a positive 
link between participation in extracurricular activities—specifically athletics—and self-
concept and student achievement. Fejgin (1994) showed that athletic participation had 
positive effects on grades, self-concept, and educational aspirations. Broh (2002) had 
similar findings in his study which focused on African American participation in 
athletics. Lipscomb (2007) found that participation in athletics and/or clubs correlated 
with a 1% - 2% increase in math and science scores. Lumpkin and Favor (2012) found 
that high school athletes scored higher on state assessments than did non-athletes. While 
each of these studies showed a positive correlation between athletic participation and 
student achievement, very few studies have been conducted to determine if spending 
money in for athletics increased efficiency. As a result, athletic spending was included in 
this study. 
2008-2009 Data Analyses 
 Data from the 2008-2009 FAST were analyzed using the same methods as done 
with prior variables. In that year, a total of 1,131 school districts and charter schools 
were rated by the FAST. Those rated spent an average of $262 per pupil on athletics, 
though 104 districts and charter schools had expenditures of $0 on athletics. A box and 
whisker plot was created to help determine the existence of outliers. It was found that 
districts spending over $1,124 per student on athletics could be considered outliers 
because they spent more than 5 standard deviations above the mean. However, there 
were no data observations which met the 5 standard deviation threshold, so no 
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Figure 24: 
Extracurricular Costs per Pupil, 2008-2009 
 
 
 
 
observations were removed as outliers. See Figure 24.  
After the outliers were removed from the data, the data were divided into the 9 
categories of the FAST and the measures of central tendency were calculated. The data  
 
Table 83: 
Extracurricular Costs per Pupil by FAST Rating, 2008-2009 
FAST Rating # Obs Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. Max 
All 1,131 $262 172.4437 $0 $988 
1-star 24 $401 218.9851 $0 $855 
1.5-star 83 $291 179.4956 $0 $791 
2-star 145 $298 188.8299 $0 $899 
2.5-star 201 $281 177.9278 $0 $933 
3-star 225 $262 164.3397 $0 $794 
3.5-star 186 $249 157.5789 $0 $988 
4-star 138 $243 161.4302 $0 $866 
4.5-star 86 $207 145.2746 $0 $927 
5-star 43 $142 122.0127 $0 $444 
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showed a clear trend that as FAST rating increased, the athletic spending per pupil 
decreased. The only exception was that 2-star districts spent $7 more per pupil than did 
1.5-star districts. 1-star districts spent the most at $401 per student while 5-star districts 
spent the least amount at $142 per pupil. See Table 83. 
Once the measures of central tendency were calculated, a regression was done to 
determine the statistical significance of the differences within the categories. It was 
found that a statistically significant relationship existed between each of the categories  
of the FAST. All categories showed a statistical significance at the p < .01 level. See 
Table 84.  
The final step in the process was to conduct an ordered logit regression to 
determine the effect, if any, that athletic spending per pupil had on the FAST rating. In 
addition to including athletic expenditures per pupil as an independent variable, the total 
enrollment count of the district was inputted as an independent variable, as well as the  
 
Table 84: 
Regression of Extracurricular Costs per Pupil by FAST Rating, 2008-2009 
FAST Rating Coefficient Standard Error 
1-star 401.125*** 34.38832 
1.5-star -109.7033*** 39.04486 
2-star -103.3181*** 37.12533 
2.5-star -120.9337*** 36.38348 
3-star -139.3828*** 36.17591 
3.5-star -152.1626*** 36.53963 
4-star -158.596*** 37.25881 
4.5-star -194.4622*** 38.89181 
5-star -259.0785*** 42.92538 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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percent of students who were economically disadvantaged. The ordered logit regression 
showed that athletic spending per pupil had a negative, statistically significant 
relationship with FAST rating at the p < .01 level. As was seen in other variables, there 
was a positive relationship (p < .01) between total enrollment and a negative relationship 
(p < .01) with the percentage of low-SES students. Finally, the Chi-squared test 
indicated that the probability of having a greater Chi-squared statistic was 0.00. 
Therefore, the hypothesis is rejected that Extracurricular Costs were irrelevant to a 
district’s efficiency. See Table 85. 
2009-2010 Data Analyses 
 In 2009-2010, there were 1,138 school districts and charter schools that were 
rated by the FAST. The average spending per pupil for those districts and charter school 
was $277 with 109 districts and charter schools spending $0 on athletics. A box and 
whisker plot showed that districts and charter schools expending more than $1,278 per 
student could be considered outliers as they spent more than 5 standard deviations above 
the mean. A total of one outlier was removed from the data set. See Figure 25.  
Once the data set was developed, the data were divided into the 9 categories of 
the FAST and the measures of central tendency were calculated. Unlike 2008-09 in 
Table 85: 
Ordered Logit Model of Extracurricular Costs per Pupil and District FAST Rating, 
2008-2009 
 Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Robust Standard 
Error 
Athletic Spending per Pupil -.1861129*** .0322196 .0363658 
Total Enrollment Count .2602081*** .0361587 .0376287 
Percent Eco. Disadvantaged -.0246729*** .0027643 .0029937 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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which more efficient districts showed a definite decrease in spending on athletics per 
pupil, the spending levels per pupil varied somewhat between the FAST categories. 1.5- 
star districts had the highest level of spending at $329 per pupil followed by 1-star  
 
Figure 25: 
Extracurricular Costs per Pupil, 2009-2010 
 
 
 
 
Table 86: 
Extracurricular Costs per Pupil by FAST Rating, 2009-2010 
FAST Rating # Obs Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. Max 
All 1,138 $277 186.2311 $0 $1,278 
1-star 37 $316 174.3259 $0 $783 
1.5-star 89 $329 189.7981 $0 $814 
2-star 142 $298 187.5982 $0 $846 
2.5-star 198 $314 200.1306 $0 $1,101 
3-star 218 $277 186.272 $0 $1,095 
3.5-star 163 $269 167.9321 $0 $909 
4-star 140 $244 170.9565 $0 $988 
4.5-star 104 $218 157.2373 $0 $680 
5-star 46 $152 127.7206 $0 $487 
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Table 87: 
Regression of Extracurricular Costs per Pupil by FAST Rating, 2009-2010 
FAST Rating Coefficient Standard Error 
1-star 316.4054*** 29.59599 
1.5-star 12.89797 35.21463 
2-star -18.71526 33.22885 
2.5-star -2.218537 32.24291 
3-star -38.90082 .320092 
3.5-star -41.11706 32.78341 
4-star -71.68398** 33.27787 
4.5-star -98.69387*** 34.4084 
5-star -164.275*** 39.75512 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
 
 
districts which had average spending at $316. 2.5-star districts spent more per student 
than did 2-star districts but only slightly. Once again, 5-star districts exhibited the lowest 
level of spending on athletics at $152 per pupil. See Table 86. 
After the measures of central tendency were calculated, a regression analysis was 
conducted to help determine whether or there was any statistically significant differences 
within the findings. The results did show that as districts spent less there was a greater 
level of statistical significance in the relationship. 4-star districts spent an average of $71 
less per pupil than did 1-star districts and had a significance at the p < .05 level. 4.5-star 
districts spent an average of $98 less per pupil had and a statistical significance at the p <  
.10 level. Finally, and 5-star districts spent $164 less than did 1-star districts and also 
had a statistical significance at the p < .01 level. These findings were similar to the 
findings in 2008-09 which showed that more efficient districts spend less per pupil on 
athletics than did less efficient districts. See Table 87.  
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The final step in the process was to complete an ordered logistic regression on 
the data. Like 2008-09, athletic spending per pupil had a negative coefficient, meaning 
that as athletic spending went down, FAST rating increased. The size of a district 
continued to display a positive, statistically significant impact on FAST rating (p < .01) 
while the percent of students who were economically disadvantaged continued to show a 
negative effect on efficiency. In addition, the Chi-squared test showed that the 
probability of having a greater Chi-square test statistic was 0.00. See Table 88.  
2010-2011 Data Analyses 
 The final year of data presented 1,136 school districts and charter schools that 
were rated by the FAST. In that year, districts and charter schools spent an average of 
$283 per pupil on athletics, with 107 school districts and charter schools expending $0 
on athletics. A box and whisker plot was completed to ascertain the existence of outliers, 
and it was calculated that school districts and charter schools expending more than 
$1,219 per pupil would be considered outliers as it was more than 5 standard deviations 
above the mean. A total of one outliers was removed. See Figure 26.  
 
Table 88: 
Ordered Logit Model of Extracurricular Costs per Pupil and District FAST Rating, 
2009-2010 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
Robust 
Standard Error 
Athletic Spending per Pupil -.1919596*** .0311261 .0348335 
Total Enrollment Count .1963542*** .03529 .0356566 
Percent Eco. Disadvantaged -.0289358*** .0028248 .0029675 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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 Once the data set was created, the data were sorted into the 9 categories of the 
FAST and the measures of central tendency were measured. The findings from 2010-11 
were similar to the findings of 2009-10. 1-star districts continued to be the highest  
Figure 26: 
Extracurricular Costs per Pupil, 2010-2011 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 89: 
Extracurricular Costs per Pupil by FAST Rating, 2010-2011 
FAST Rating # Obs Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. Max 
All 1,136 $283 187.0984 $0 $1,558 
1-star 35 $365 200.5151 $0 $893 
1.5-star 95 $301 160.1627 $0 $740 
2-star 135 $314 180.2672 $0 $1,013 
2.5-star 190 $325 196.9711 $0 $1,058 
3-star 229 $284 186.5909 $0 $1,168 
3.5-star 166 $281 184.0307 $0 $870 
4-star 143 $246 168.7717 $0 $887 
4.5-star 97 $215 146.9274 $0 $672 
5-star 45 $157 143.2572 $0 $516 
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spending of all the FAST ratings at $365 per pupil. However, the data showed spending 
levels varied between the 1.5- and 2.5-star districts with the lower-rated 1.5-star districts 
spending less per pupil than both the 2- and 2.5-star districts. As has been seen in the 
prior two years, once FAST rating reached 3-star and higher spending per pupil 
decreased with each of the categories. For the third straight year, 5-star districts spent the 
least on athletics per pupil. Once again, 5-star districts spent less than half per pupil than 
1-star districts. See Table 89.  
Once the univariate statistics were completed, a regression analysis was done to 
determine the statistical significance of the spending levels. Much more similar to the 
findings of 2008-09, there was a statistically significant difference found in 7 of the 9 
categories. Statistically significant differences were found in 1.5- districts at the p < .10 
level, while 4- to 5-star districts all had statistically significant differences in at the p < 
.01 level. These findings suggested, like the findings in 2008-09 and 2009-10, that 
districts which spend less on athletics are more efficient than districts which spend more. 
See Table 90.  
Table 90: 
Regression of Extracurricular Costs per Pupil by FAST Rating, 2010-2011 
FAST Rating Coefficient Standard Error 
1-star 365.1714*** 30.22871 
1.5-star -63.5188* 35.36141 
2-star -51.48995 33.92167 
2.5-star -40.33985 32.89532 
3-star -80.57754** 32.45667 
3.5-star -84.27986** 33.26317 
4-star -119.5141*** 33.72575 
4.5-star -149.8725*** 35.26312 
5-star -208.6603*** 40.30495 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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The final step in the process was to conduct an ordered logit of the data to 
determine if the spending patterns had a significant effect on the FAST rating. Results 
from 2010-11 were similar to those of the two prior years. Statistical significant 
relationships were present in each of the three independent variables tested. Athletic 
spending per pupil had a statistically significant (p < .01) negative coefficient, signifying 
that as spending per pupil decreased the FAST rating increased. As with prior years, the 
ordered logit revealed the total enrollment count was positive while the percent of 
students who were economically disadvantaged decreased. Finally, the Chi-squared test 
indicated that the probability of having a greater Chi-square test statistic was 0.00. See 
Table 91.  
Multiyear FAST Data Analyses 
 Once the analyses of the three individual years were completed, the data were 
pooled into one large data set to determine if the findings from the singular year 
snapshots held true over the three years of the data. The ordered logistic regression of 
the pooled data showed, as was seen in each individual year, there existed a negative, 
statistically significant relationship between athletic spending per pupil and FAST  
Table 91: 
Ordered Logit Model of Extracurricular Costs per Pupil and District FAST Rating, 
2010-2011 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
Robust 
Standard Error 
Athletic Spending per Pupil -.2088355*** .031403 .0352664 
Total Enrollment Count .1537135*** .0353386 .0363703 
Percent Eco. Disadvantaged -.0304775*** .0028233 .0029646 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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efficiency.  As was also seen in each of the three year snapshots, the total enrollment of a 
district had a positive correlation with efficiency, while the percent of students who were 
economically disadvantaged was negatively related to efficiency. Finally, as was the 
case in each of the three individual years of analysis, the Chi-squared test showed that 
the probability of having a greater Chi-squared test was 0.00. This finding allows one to 
reject the hypothesis that Extracurricular Costs are irrelevant to a school district or 
charter school’s efficiency. See Table 92.  
 The findings for all three years of data showed a consistent pattern that a 
decrease in athletic spending would increase efficiency as measured by the FAST. As 
noted earlier in this section, research has shown a positive relationship between athletic 
participation and student achievement. However, it was important to remember that 
research by Lipscomb (2007) noted that only a 1% - 2% gain resulted from participation 
in athletics. It was quite possible that the minimal gains achieved by students who 
participated in athletics were not worth the costs—at least in terms of the efficiency of a 
school district or charter school—of the athletic expenditures.  
Table 92: 
Ordered Logit Model of Extracurricular Costs per Pupil and District FAST Rating, 
2008-2011 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
Robust 
Standard Error 
Athletic Spending per Pupil -.1950315*** .0182138 .020451 
Total Enrollment Count .2035098*** .0205392 .0211142 
Percent Eco. Disadvantaged -.0279709*** .001617 .0017123 
School Year 2 .086524 .0739604 .0741465 
School Year 3 .1051097 .0738734 .0733598 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Summary of Findings 
 The findings of this research present both a challenge and an opportunity for 
administrators and policymakers wishing to increase efficiency in Texas public schools. 
Overall, districts and charter schools which spend less money were found to be more 
efficient than their peers. Districts should consider cost saving measures, such as 
increasing class size and hiring less experienced teachers with lower salaries, as ways to 
increase efficiency. Spending less on athletics while increasing expenditures in 
Bilingual/ESL programs were also found as ways to increase efficiency. Property 
wealthy districts were found to be less efficient; therefore policymakers must find ways 
to ensure that property wealthy districts do not spend money inefficiently. Finally, the 
most consistent findings of this study were that larger districts do operate in a more 
efficient manner than do smaller districts and that the number of students who were 
economically disadvantaged was the strongest predictor of efficiency throughout each of 
the variables analyzed. Steps must be taken to ensure that smaller districts and districts 
with high numbers of economically disadvantaged students are using the most effective 
techniques to increase the achievement of students. See Table 93. 
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Table 93: 
Summary of the Findings 
 
Variable Findings 
Expenditures by Function  Efficient districts expend less per pupil overall 
 9 of 15 functions were found to be negatively 
correlated with efficiency 
 
Expenditures by Program  Efficient districts expend less per pupil overall 
 5 of 8 programs were found to be negatively 
correlated with efficiency 
 Bilingual/ESL was the only program found to be 
positively correlated with efficiency 
 
District Size  Total enrollment was positively correlated with 
efficiency 
 Ethnic make-up of students was not a factor in 
efficiency 
 
Property Wealth  Wealthier districts were found to be less efficient 
 The percent of revenue from Federal funds was 
found to be negatively correlated with efficiency 
 The Interest and Sinking tax rate of a district was 
found to be positively correlated with efficiency 
 
Administrative Costs   Efficient districts expend less per pupil overall 
 The average salary of campus administrators was 
positively correlated with efficiency 
 The average salary of central office administrators 
was negatively correlated with efficiency 
 The percent of campus administrators was 
positively correlated with efficiency 
 The percent of central office administrators was 
negatively correlated with efficiency 
 
Student/Teacher Ratio  Efficient districts have a higher student/teacher ratio 
 
Teacher Experience  Efficient districts have teachers with lower average 
years of experience 
 Teacher turnover was found to be negatively 
correlated with efficiency 
 
Athletic/Cocurricular Costs  Efficient districts spend less per pupil on athletics 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Introduction 
 The findings of this study are summarized in this chapter. To begin, a summary 
of the findings from each of the 8 variables are given discussing the significance of each 
of the findings and how it relates to prior research. Following the summary, a discussion 
of the conclusions which can be drawn is provided. At the end of Chapter 5, there is an 
overview of implications to practice and recommendations on how to use the 
information in this record of study to improve overall efficiency in schools, as well as 
final conclusions. 
Summary of Research 
 This study began as an attempt to identify spending patterns within districts 
which might serve as predictors for efficiency. Using the Financial Allocation Study of 
Texas (FAST) as the lens through which efficiency is measured, FAST data from 2008-
2009, 2009-2010, and 2010-2011 were analyzed to help identify the spending patterns 
which either help or hinder a district’s efficiency. The summary of those findings are 
presented below. 
Expenditures by Function as a Predictor of Efficiency 
 The first area of analysis for this study was to explore operating expenditures by 
function, specifically which functions may be positively or negatively correlated with 
efficiency, to ascertain where efficient school districts and charter schools spend their 
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money. The results of the analysis showed more efficient districts and charter schools 
do, in fact, spend less on total operating expenditures per pupil than do less efficient 
districts. The results also indicated a negative, statistically significant relationship 
between 8 of the 15 functions and efficiency. More efficient districts spend less in the 
areas of Instructional Expenditures, Instructional Related Expenditures, Instructional 
Leadership, Support Services, Cocurricular Expenditures, Plant Maintenance and 
Operations, Data Processing, Community Service Expenditures, and Capital Outlay 
Expenditures. The finding that expenditures in instruction are negative statistically 
significant factors in FAST rating supports the work of Hanushek (1996) and others 
which has argued that more resources in schools do not systematically improve student 
performance. This finding is evidence against the 65% mandated directed to Texas 
school districts by Governor Perry in 2005 and confirms its subsequent repeal. 
 However, there were areas which did not have a predictive value on overall 
efficiency. Spending in the areas of School Leadership, Transportation, Food Services, 
Central Administrative Costs, Security, and Debt Services were not found to be 
statistically significant to FAST rating. The finding that school leadership, i.e. the costs 
associated with campus level administrators and central administrative costs, were not 
statistically significant runs contrary to the widely held belief that school districts and 
charter schools are overly bureaucratic and that administrators utilize too great a share of 
educational costs. It is also supportive of the work of Brewer (1996) which showed 
inconsistent support for the contention that administrative resources are detrimental to 
educational productivity. While some may be surprised to see no correlation between 
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debt service spending and FAST rating, this finding might support the findings of 
Schneider (2002) who posited that good lighting, cleaner air, and a well-designed school 
have a positive correlation with student achievement; therefore, the additional costs 
associated with the construction of school buildings may be more efficient in the long 
run.  
 Finally, as was seen throughout the study, there was a negative correlation 
between the number of students who were economically disadvantaged and the FAST 
rating and a positive correlation between district size and efficiency. This finding is 
supportive of the work of Ray (1991) and Condron and Roscigno (2003) who found that 
the socio-economic status of students is negatively correlated with efficiency. The 
finding may also be supportive of the work of Duncombe and Yinger (2001) which 
found that consolidation of schools with less than 300 pupil may result in a 20% 
reduction of costs and a 7%-9% reduction in costs for districts with up to 900 students.  
Program Expenditures as a Predictor of Efficiency 
 A specific analysis into instructional expenditures by program was conducted to 
determine if certain educational programs lead to greater educational efficiency in school 
districts and charter schools. The total operational expenditures by program were 
analyzed, as was each instructional program reported by districts to the state: Regular 
Education program expenditures, Special Education expenditures, Accelerated 
Instruction expenditures, Gifted and Talented expenditures, Career and Technology 
expenditures, Bilingual/ESL program expenditures, Athletic expenditures, and Other 
program expenditures. The analyses showed that there was negative, statistically 
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significant relationship between total operating expenditures by program and FAST 
rating, again, signifying that more efficient districts and charter schools spend less 
money per student on programmatic expenditures than do less efficient districts and 
charter schools. This finding also held true when looking at spending in Regular 
Education, Special Education, Accelerated Instruction, Gifted and Talented, and Other 
program expenditures. These findings do support the belief that students in special 
programs, i.e. special education, are more expensive to educate than peers (Chaikind, 
Danielson, & Brauen, 1993). 
However, unlike expenditures by function which was unable to discover a single 
function which was positively correlated to efficiency, when looking at spending by 
program the analyses revealed that spending in the area of Bilingual/ESL was positively 
associated with efficiency.  This finding may surprise many who believe that bilingual 
education is a waste of tax payer dollars and that English immersion is the best route to 
student success, but does support of the work of Greene (1998) who found that bilingual 
education are effective at increasing student achievement on standardized tests.   
Finally, overall district size proved once again to be positively related to school 
district rating, while the percent of students who are economically disadvantaged is once 
again a negative predictor of efficiency.    
District Size as a Predictor of Efficiency 
 After exploring the total operating costs and the spending by program of school 
districts and charter schools, the analysis of the size of a district and efficiency shows 
that district size does have an effect on overall FAST rating. All three years of data show 
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that larger districts are more efficient than smaller districts. In fact, each year is found to 
have a significance at the p < .01 level. When considering the ethnic make-up of 
students, the findings suggests that no matter the ethnic group, an increase in the number 
of students enrolled is positively correlated to efficiency. As such, an influx of Hispanic 
or African American students to a districts will have a positive impact on efficiency in a 
similar manner that an influx of White or Asian/Pacific Islander students would have on 
a district or charter school. As was seen in all areas of the study, the number of students 
who were economically disadvantaged continued to show a strong (p < .01) negative 
statistically significant relationship with FAST rating.  
 These findings are contrary to the findings of Driscoll, Halcoussis, and Svorny 
(2003) who found that reducing both school and class size improves overall education 
achievement. The findings also contradict the work of Howley (1996) which revealed 
that smaller schools and districts facilitate the achievement of impoverished students, 
though Howley does show that larger schools and districts facilitate the achievement of 
more affluent students. A study by Walberg and Fowler (1987) indicated that students in 
smaller districts generally achieved more than those in larger districts. Although it is 
important to note that effective does not necessarily mean the same as efficient, FAST 
data demonstrated that larger districts, as a whole, are more efficient than smaller 
districts.  
Property Wealth per Pupil as a Predictor of Efficiency 
 When analyzing the property wealth per pupil as a predictor for financial 
efficiency, the results show a consistent pattern for all three years of FAST data. To 
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begin, property value per pupil is negatively correlated with efficiency in all three years 
of the study. A second finding in this area is that districts with a higher percentage of 
Federal revenue are negatively correlated with rating. The finding that Federal funds 
have a negative correlation with efficiency is not surprising because Federal funds are 
generally based on the number of students on free and reduced lunch. Since students on 
free and reduced lunch have a tendency to score lower on achievement tests (Ray, 1991; 
Condron and Roscigno, 2003), one could argue that it is logical to see that districts 
which have a higher portion of their budget from Federal funds achieve less and are 
therefore less efficient. However, it since FAST ratings are based on a value-added 
model where achievement is based on a student’s growth, inefficiencies seen schools 
with higher numbers of economically disadvantaged students cannot be solely related to 
the achievement tests alone. It is possible that districts with high numbers of 
economically disadvantaged students are unable to attract and retain highly effective 
teachers and principals, thereby resulting in less efficient districts.  
It was also seen that districts which have a higher Interest and Sinking (I&S) tax 
rate—the tax rate which is used to pay for school construction—score higher in FAST 
rating than do districts which do not have a higher I&S rate. Though this finding does 
not necessarily confirm the finding that Debt Service expenditures are not statistically 
significant predictors of FAST rating (See Expenditures by Function as a Predictor of 
Efficiency), this does seem to support that expenditures on school construction are not 
detrimental to efficiency. The final finding of this area is that the size of a district is 
positively correlated with FAST rating, meaning that larger districts are more efficient 
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than smaller districts, and that the percent of students who were economically 
disadvantaged is negatively correlated with efficiency.  
 These findings support the work of Rolle, Torres, and Eason (2012) that found 
that the local property value per students is the strongest predictor of expenditures per 
student; therefore, it is logical to assume that districts with greater assessed property 
value spend more money on their students than property poor districts. However, 
spending more money does not necessarily translate to efficiency as measured by the 
FAST. The fact that property wealthy districts are less efficient than poorer districts 
contradicts the work of Houck, Rolle, and He (2010) which found that efficient districts 
in Georgia have higher wealth than their peers.  
Administrative Costs per Pupil as a Predictor of Efficiency 
 Despite the fact that administrative spending proved to have no statistical 
significance when compared to other functions of spending overall, it is such a widely 
held belief that districts waste money by hiring unnecessary administrators that it was 
decided to analyze this specific area of spending by school districts and charter schools 
separately. Perhaps not surprisingly to critics, districts which spend less per pupil on 
administrative costs prove to be more efficient than those which spend more when 
analyzing administrative costs alone. This finding is seen in all three years of analysis. 
However, the analysis did show that the percent of administrators in both central 
administration and at the campus level has a positive correlation with efficiency, as well 
as having a positive correlation between administrator salary and efficiency in each of 
the three years. While these findings seem to contradict themselves, the results might be 
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explained by the positive relationship between district size and efficiency. Larger 
districts tend to have more administrators, and those administrators tend to be paid more 
than administrators in similar positions in smaller districts; therefore, it can be inferred 
that the relationship between increased salary and increased percent of administrators is 
a nonlinear relationship between size and rating. Once again, the percent of students who 
are economically disadvantaged serves a negative predictor of efficiency.  
 As mentioned, the finding that administrative costs are negatively associated with 
efficiency is supportive of the widely held belief by politicians and others that schools 
waste money when they spend on administration. Research by the likes of Walters 
(2005) and others have found that lower administrative costs increase efficiency. These 
findings support that argument. 
Student/Teacher Ratio as a Predictor of Efficiency 
 While multiple studies (Cho, Glewee, & Whilter, 2012; Hoxby, 2000; Jepsen & 
Rivkin, 2009) have found a positive effect between student/teacher ratio and student 
achievement, others (Hanushek, 1996) have less confidence in this belief due to a lack of 
consistent statistical support. Either way, few studies have been conducted to see 
whether the supposed gains from a small student/teacher ratio leads to greater efficiency. 
When using the FAST as a measure for efficiency, it was found that larger 
student/teacher ratios produce greater efficiency in all three years of analysis. This 
finding can lead one to assume that, though there may be gains in achievement, those 
gains are not worth the additional costs of hiring more teachers to reduce class size. As 
with each of the factors analyzed thus far, the analysis of student/teacher ratio did 
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conclude that there is a negative correlation between students who are economically 
disadvantaged and FAST rating. However, this variable was the only factor which 
produced a negative correlation between district size and efficiency of all the variables 
produced. This finding can possibly be the result of the fact that smaller schools, which 
may have a smaller number of students, might more often receive waivers from the 
Texas Education Agency (TEA) to allow their classes to extend beyond the 22 to 1 
mandated ratio in K thru 4th grade while larger districts are more able to meet the 
mandate.  
 As noted, this finding does not necessarily refute the findings of those who have 
found that reduced student/teacher ratio produces higher results (Cho, Glewee, & 
Whilter, 2012; Hoxby, 2000; Jepsen & Rivkin, 2009). However, it does seem to confirm 
the findings of Hanushek (1996) that smaller class size does not consistently lead to 
better achievement by students. Though smaller student/teacher ratios may produce 
higher achievement, this research shows that smaller class sizes are less efficient.  
Teacher Experience as a Predictor of Efficiency 
 The results of the analyses of teacher experience as a predictor of efficiency 
showed that teacher experience is negatively associated with efficiency, meaning that 
districts with more experienced teachers are not as efficient as those with less 
experienced teachers. Again, this finding does not suggest that experienced teachers do 
not produce better results. Research by Harris and Sass (2011) and Kukla-Acevedo 
(2009) argues that teachers with more experience produce greater achievement in 
students than less experienced teachers; however, the gains made in achievement may 
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not be worth the additional costs of having a more experienced staff.  Teacher turnover 
rate was found to be negatively associated with efficiency and supports the work of 
Ronfeldt, Loeb and Wyckoff (2011) which noted the disruptive effect of teacher 
turnover on achievement. The findings that district size is positively associated with 
efficiency and that the percent of students who are economically disadvantaged is 
negatively associated with efficiency are the same as has been found in previous 
variables studied.  
Cocurricular Expenditures per Pupil as a Predictor of Efficiency 
 The results of the FAST data analyses show that athletic expenditures per pupil 
have a negative correlation to efficiency in schools. This finding supports the previous 
assertions in both Expenditures by Function and the Program Expenditures section 
of this study. The research by Fejgin (1994), Broh (2002), and Lumpkin and Favor 
(2012) has shown that athletic participation has a positive effect on student grades and 
achievement. These findings support the assertion that, while athletic expenditures may 
increase student achievement, it may not be the most efficient use of funds. This area of 
analysis again found that district size is positively associated with efficiency while the 
economic status of students is negatively associated.  
Discussion 
 The study of school efficiency is daunting. There is fierce debate amongst 
scholars, educators, policy-makers, politicians, and the public in general as to what it 
means to have an efficient school system. The methodology used varies by researcher. 
The inputs and outputs vary by study. The existing research on efficiency concentrates 
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mainly on what it means to be efficient based on a framework created by the researcher, 
which may or may not be accepted by his or her peers and is often not even read by 
practicing administrators.  
 The Financial Allocation Study of Texas (FAST) is unique in that it is the first—
at least to this researcher’s knowledge—framework which is sanctioned by a state to 
calculate the efficiency of every school district, campus, and charter school within a 
state. It is a framework that is used by practicing educators. It is reported on by local 
newspapers and news stations. It is looked to as the definition of efficiency in the state of 
Texas. Therefore, a study of the FAST and how efficiency is measured through its lens 
provides meaningful insight to those wishing to gain a better understanding of efficiency 
in Texas.  
 The first and most glaring revelation when studying the FAST is simply that 
efficient districts spend less overall. While this may not completely answer the question 
as to whether or not money matters in schools, it does provide evidence and context that 
seems to support the arguments of Hanushek and others who contend that additional 
spending by schools does not necessarily lead to greater achievement. The FAST, which 
has attempted to control for many of the variables which continue to be major points of 
contention for researchers,—including district size, geography, student demographics, 
and different economic contexts of districts—seems to confirm the widely held belief 
that schools spend money in ways that do not lead to greater achievement.  
However, it is important to note that while schools which spend more per pupil 
are not as efficient as schools which spend less, it does not necessarily mean that school 
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districts and charter schools are “wasting” money. Schools may choose to spend money 
on curricular programs such as Advanced Placement or having additional foreign 
language courses which may not have a direct effect on state assessment scores. The 
money and the spending might be of great value to the school and the students, but that 
value might not be able to be quantified by student achievement. This might lead one to 
assume that a district or charter school is being wasteful when, in fact, the district or 
charter schools is simply placing a priority on things which do not increase measured 
achievement.    
Another significant finding of this study is that the most predictive variable for 
efficiency in Texas is the socio-economic status of students. The percent of students who 
were economically disadvantaged was found to be negatively correlated to efficiency in 
all 8 variables analyzed in this research. Districts and charter schools with high levels of 
students in poverty are less efficient than are districts with fewer economically 
disadvantaged students. For example, 69% of students in 1-star districts are 
economically disadvantaged compared to only 48% of students in 5-star districts. This 
trend is seen across all FAST ratings and throughout this study.  
Districts with high numbers of students in poverty face a number of challenges 
that are not present in districts with more affluent districts. The social, familial, and 
environmental barriers faced by students in poverty (Morgan Consoli et. al., 2013; 
Williams & Sánchez, 2013) often inhibit the achievement of students in poverty making 
it more expensive for districts and charter schools to generate the necessary 
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achievement. While the FAST attempts to control for poverty, the results of the study 
show that the economic status is the greatest predictor of efficiency.  
The other most consistent finding of the study is that larger districts are more 
efficient than smaller districts. Due to the geographic size of Texas and the distribution 
of the populace, as well as the strongly held belief in local control, it is easy to see why 
the more than 1,000 school districts were created. Despite the consolidation of schools 
which has been occurring throughout Texas—and the nation—over the last 100 years, 
over 30% (320 total) of school districts in Texas continue to have an enrollment of less 
than 500 students, with an additional 20% (205 total) with an enrollment of less than 
1,000 students. These small school districts, though important to many of the town and 
communities throughout the state, are not found to be efficient as larger districts. Though 
researchers (Duncmbe et. al., 1995, 1996; Reschovsky & Imazeki, 1997; Andrews, 
Duncombe, & Yinger, 2002) have found that a U-shaped curve exists in efficiency and 
that as districts grow beyond 2,000 students they lose some their efficiency, there 
appears to be a great number of districts whose efficiency could increase if consolidated 
with other districts. What remains to be seen is whether politicians have the political will 
make such a move. 
Spending patterns, which was the original impetus for this record of study, allow 
for limited conclusions in that the results showed that more efficient districts spend less 
per pupil than do less efficient districts in almost all areas. Spending on instruction and 
instructional related services is less in more efficient districts and charter schools. 
Spending in instructional leadership, cocurricular/athletics, administrative costs, plant 
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maintenance, and other functions and programs are also less in efficient districts and 
charter schools when compared to their less efficient peers. In order to become more 
efficient, school districts and charter schools must learn how to spend less and become 
more effective in these areas if they wish to increase efficiency. In fact, the only program 
which was found to be positively correlated with FAST rating was spending in the area 
of Bilingual/ESL education. Bilingual/ESL programs in Texas appear to be an effective 
use of funds, and the findings in this study would argue for an increased investment in 
bilingual education and possibly expanding such programs to include more students who 
might have limited language skills.  
Another area of interest in this record of study was to discover whether the 
property wealth of a district had an effect on efficiency. Property wealthy districts were 
found to be less efficient than less wealthy districts. Despite efforts to increase equity, 
i.e. Robin Hood, the fact that property value is the number one driver of the school 
funding mechanism in the state of Texas means that wealthier districts receive greater 
funding than do less wealthy districts. It does appear that wealthy districts use these 
additional funds inefficiently and it can be concluded that further efforts to increase the 
equity amongst school district should continue.  
The final aspects of the study involved researching the effects of teacher 
experience and classroom size as predictors of efficiency. The results show that having a 
higher student/teacher ratio leads to greater efficiency, while districts with more 
experienced teachers are not as efficient as those with less overall efficiency. These 
findings are not surprising due to the fact that payroll and salary costs are the greatest 
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portion of a school’s budget. The need to hire more teachers to reduce the 
student/teacher ratio increases the payroll cost of a district and leads to lower efficiency. 
For example, having to hire 4 teachers to teach 78 students in a grade (19.5:1 
student/teacher ration) is obviously more expensive than only having 3 teachers (26:1 
ratio). The additional payroll costs of hiring an additional teacher was found to be 
inefficient. The same could be said with teacher experience due to the fact that teacher 
salary in Texas is directly related to the number of years experience of a teacher. 
Employing a teacher with 5-years experience versus a teacher with 15-years experience 
could mean a salary difference of $8,000-$10,000 for that position. Factoring that across 
an entire campus or district staff could create a significant difference in the overall 
payroll for the district. Therefore, it is not surprising to see that districts which save on 
payroll, either through a having a greater student/teacher ratio or a less experienced staff, 
would lead to less payroll costs and an increased level of efficiency.  
Implications for Policy 
 Policymakers have the difficult responsibility of determining and prioritizing 
where limited tax payer funds are spent. This decision is especially difficult when 
determining the allocation of educational funds due to the fact that educational outcomes 
may not be fully realized until years later. According to Brimley, Verstegen, and 
Garfield (2012): 
It is normal for people, and especially overburdened taxpayers, to compare 
costs and apparent productivity of various institutions or industries – 
particularly those in direct competition with each other for scarce tax 
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dollars. Such comparisons may reflect unfavorably on education for 
reasons beyond the control of those involved. (p. 13) 
It is therefore important for policy-makers to have an understanding of the FAST and 
how Texas measures efficiency in order to have as much information as possible when 
making those decisions.  
 To begin, efforts should be made to further explore how and why the 
socioeconomic status of students is the most consistent predictor of FAST efficiency. 
The first and most glaring conclusion that can be drawn from this study is that school 
districts and charter schools with high numbers of economically disadvantaged students 
are less efficient. Such a finding could lead policymakers to begin to question the 
efficiency rating process. Are their flaws in the design of the FAST which fail to 
adequately account for socioeconomic status in students? Are their flaws in the 
accountability measures which unfairly inhibit adequate achievement on the 
standardized tests which represent the outcome in the FAST? Is it correct to expect 
efficiency from all school districts and charter schools or is there a level of inefficiency 
which policymakers are able to accept and defend due to the variety of factors which are 
beyond the control of educators? Without further discussions and consensus about these 
and other FAST related questions, it may be impossible for policymakers to make 
informed decisions regarding the findings of this study and FAST in general.  
 Another implication for policymakers is that the size of a district is related to 
efficiency and that larger districts tend to be more efficient than do smaller districts. The 
possible consolidation of districts has been tried before in response to school finance 
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lawsuits and failed miserably at the ballot box (Walsh, Kimerer, & Maniotis, 2005), so 
there may be little incentive for policymakers to take steps to consolidate districts. 
However, the fact remains that FAST data show that larger districts do perform more 
efficiently than do smaller districts and, if greater efficiency is the goal of policymakers, 
then efforts to consolidate small districts—especially inefficient small districts—should 
be made.  
 Policymakers must also consider the implications of maintaining a class-size 
restriction on K-4 classes. Findings in this report indicate that larger class sizes are more 
efficient than smaller classes. Therefore, policymakers who desire efficiency in public 
education should also consider increasing the student/teacher ratio above the 22:1 
mandate which is current law in Texas. Small class size is a selling point for many 
school districts and, like consolidation, will likely receive a great deal of resistance from 
parents and educators, but as policymakers trying to stretch a limited budget, increasing 
the student/teacher ratio may be the quickest way to increase the efficiency of schools 
because it requires a smaller initial investment than other possible options.  
 The finding that the interest and sinking rate of districts was positively correlated 
with efficiency should encourage policymakers to find ways to encourage the 
construction of buildings rather than increasing capital outlay expenses. Funding for 
Existing Debt Allotment (EDA) and Instructional Facilities Allotment, which are both 
designed to help property poor districts pay for school construction and have been cut in 
recent budget cycles, should be reintroduced as a way to help school districts fund new 
construction. New buildings provide a sense of pride in the community, in educators, 
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and in students; the results suggest that expenditures in these areas are worth the 
additional costs that come with the repayment of bonds.  
Implications for Practicing Administrators 
 As a practicing administrator, the knowledge that the percent of students who are 
economically disadvantaged provides the greatest predictor of financial efficiency is 
important. Practicing administrators should use this knowledge to find inexpensive ways 
to better reach these students in order to increase achievement. Make it a goal of the 
district or campus to focus on these students by providing training to teachers through 
in-service which is designed and focused on helping this population of students. There 
are efficient districts which have high levels of economically disadvantaged students, so 
administrators should make efforts to seek out these districts and learn how successful 
districts are able to increase achievement for these students. Practicing administrators 
should attempt to establish relationships with the parents of these students in an effort to 
increase parent support for these students. By creating policy and practices which are 
aimed specifically at increasing achievement in students who are economically 
disadvantaged, district leaders will go a long way in improving the overall efficiency of 
a district.  
 The finding that both teacher experience and teacher turnover have a negative 
impact on efficiency has implications for practicing administrators and should impact 
both the hiring and retention efforts of districts. Districts which have a desire to be more 
efficient should find ways—preferably inexpensive ways—to retain teachers. Research 
by Jensen (1987) finds that by providing meaningful work, developing professional 
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working conditions, and giving opportunities for growth are all effective in retaining 
good teachers. Therefore, practicing district leaders should make efforts to create these 
conditions within their districts as a way to retain their teachers.  
 However, there is always going to be a need to hire new teachers. The results of 
this study indicate that less experienced teachers are more efficient, so district leaders 
should not be afraid to hire less experienced teachers who are able to fill positions at a 
lower cost. Once hired, the practicing administrators should help these teachers as they 
learn how to best teach their students. Creating strong teacher induction programs and 
meeting the needs of new teachers are ways to increase the competency of less 
experienced teachers as they begin their careers. Developing strong mentoring programs, 
which help less experienced teachers learn and grow as teachers, is likely to be more 
cost-effective in the long run than hiring more experienced teachers that have a higher 
salary. By viewing new teachers as assets which are able to bring new ideas and 
practices into existing school climates, practicing administrators will be able to 
encourage the growth of these less experienced teachers and increase the efficiency of a 
school district. 
 The finding that bilingual/ESL programs are an efficient use of district funds 
should encourage practicing administrators to increase the effective use of these 
programs. If there is a question as to whether a student should be included in a 
bilingual/ESL program, district leaders should err on the side of placing these students in 
the bilingual/ESL program rather than in the regular education setting until leaders are 
certain that these students will be successful in the mainstream. The goal of a 
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bilingual/ESL program is to increase proficiency in both languages as a means to 
increase achievement (Christian, 1994), and practicing administrators should embrace 
this goal as a way to increase efficiency. 
 Bottom line for administrators is that they must find ways to cut costs in 
education if districts are to become more efficient. By limiting the expenses in areas 
such as athletics, plant maintenance and operations, and student support services—just to 
name a few—a district leader can increase the efficiency of the district. Therefore, 
efforts should be made to limit the costs associated with these aspects of school.  
Recommendations for Further Studies 
 Overall, the goals and objectives of this study were limited compared to all the 
information and studies that could be gathered from the Financial Allocation Study of 
Texas (FAST). Volumes of research could be done using FAST data, and as with most 
studies, this research generated as many questions as it did answers. There are several 
aspects of efficiency in Texas which would benefit from further research. 
To begin, further research should include an in-depth analysis of the 5-star 
districts in Texas to better understand their unique characteristics (student demographics, 
teacher demographics, spending patterns, etc.) and why they are rated as the most 
efficient school districts in Texas. A better knowledge of 5-star districts would increase 
the understanding of how and why these districts are efficient and would enable other 
districts to possibly replicate the spending patterns of these districts. If the goal of 
educators is to be more efficient, then a greater understanding of efficient districts would 
help those districts striving to increase their efficiency.  
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Similarly, an in-depth analysis of the spending patterns and characteristics of 1-
star districts and why they are rated as the least efficient school districts in Texas. As 
with 5-star districts, it is important to look specifically at the least efficient districts as an 
example of how not to spend money or to make recommendations to those districts as 
how to better spend their money. For practicing school leaders and policymakers, a 
knowledge of how 1-star districts spend their money can be an important tool to help 
make better decisions by helping them avoid spending which is seen to be inefficient.  
A third recommendation for future study would be a qualitative analyses—either 
through case study or some other qualitative means—of school districts and charter 
schools which are efficient despite high numbers of economically disadvantaged 
students. The results of this study clearly show that the level of economically 
disadvantaged students is negatively correlated with efficiency. It is a predictor that is 
seen across the study and is consistent throughout all years of the FAST. However, there 
are many districts with high numbers of economically disadvantaged students who have 
a 5-star rating. Knowledge about the practices of these districts which facilitate success 
in students who are economically disadvantaged could be invaluable to other districts 
with high numbers of economically disadvantaged that are striving to become more 
efficient.  
Another recommendation for further study using FAST data is to have an 
analysis of spending patterns and efficiency at the campus level rather than at the district 
level. The traditional model of economic analysis of school finance has been focused at 
the district level and school district capacity (Duncombe, Ruggiero, & Yinger, 1996). 
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However, as suggested by Berne and Steifel (1994), “the most critical activities [to 
improve education] are closest to the child—at the school or program level…Analyses at 
the school level are more likely to yield meaningful variations in these variables and to 
uncover stronger relationships with inputs” (p. 405). Despite this logic, research which 
provides economic analysis at the campus level is rare. Inadequate research at the 
campus level severely limits the ability of researchers to create predictive models of 
school funding mechanisms. Researchers are left to make broad generalizations about 
theoretical concepts—such as adequacy, equity, and efficiency—and are unable to 
determine the causal relationship between budget and assessment results. Therefore, a 
study at the campus level would aid researchers in their ability to develop specific policy 
recommendations to policymakers. 
The findings in this research were limited to the composite academic output used 
by the FAST as the measure of academic success. An analysis of specific outputs, i.e. 
graduation rates or 3rd grade math scores, to determine if spending in specific areas of 
the budget might lead to greater achievement in selected areas. This might be beneficial 
to a district which is efficient yet can have improvement in specific areas. For example, 
it might be valuable for a district which wants to see improvement in SAT scores to 
know how efficient districts with high achievement in SAT scores spend money. A 
knowledge of how to efficiently spend money to achieve increases in specific areas can 
be important for district leaders wishing to make improvements in those areas.  
Finally, further research should include an analysis of teacher characteristics 
alone as a predictor of efficiency. While this study did research teacher experience and 
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teacher student ratio, teacher demographics such as degree earned, race and ethnicity, 
and professional development were omitted. Teachers are the ones who are in daily 
contact with students. The teacher, more than anyone else in the school district, has the 
most direct contact with students and can effect student achievement more than any 
other educator. Therefore, it would be interesting to know about teacher characteristics 
and their relationship to efficiency.  
Conclusions 
 Efficiency, though easy to call for or push as a political agenda, is difficult to 
both define and achieve in public education. The number of internal and external factors 
which effect a school district’s efficiency are innumerable and are in constant flux. As 
with most doctoral works, this study began with the grand idea of finding the answer to 
what it is that makes a school district efficient, and as a result, be able to tell other 
superintendents, principals, and lawmakers exactly where and how to spend money in 
order to become more efficient. And, as with most doctoral dissertations, the results are 
far from earth shattering.  
Efficient districts spend less; they spend less in almost all areas and programs.  
Efficient districts have fewer students who are economically disadvantaged. Efficient 
districts tend to be larger. Efficient districts spend less on payroll costs by having larger 
student/teacher ratios and less experienced teachers. Efficient districts spend less on 
athletics. Property wealthy districts do tend to waste money as they are less efficient than 
poorer districts. These findings are far from surprising for those with even a passing 
interest in public education. 
 
 
222 
 
However, there were a few areas which might surprise the average person. When 
looking at the budget as a whole, administrative costs are not significantly different 
between efficient districts and less efficient districts, which suggests that most districts 
are not overly bloated with administrators. Bilingual/ESL programs are an efficient use 
of funds in public schools.  
As with most hotly debated topics, people can look at the FAST and take from it 
what they want. If they want to believe that public education is wasteful, there is 
definitely data which supports that claim. If they are supporters of public education, then 
the data is there to support that position as well. For practicing educators, it is their 
responsibility to look at the good, the bad, and the ugly of public education and look at 
all the facts in order to make the best decisions for students. Money may make the world 
go ‘round, but the ‘business’ of education is the kids, and in a fiscal environment where 
resources are limited, it is important to be able to make cost-effective decisions which 
benefit the most kids.  
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